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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores the relationships between three groups of variables in the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), from 1989 to 2003. The first group consists of output level and output growth as 
measured by gross domestic product index (GDPI) and gross domestic product growth (GDPG). 
The second group consists of two categories of institutional development (INST), and the third 
group of variables is structural policy reforms (SPR), often known as liberalization policies.  
This dissertation’s theoretical and empirical framework explicitly account for the 
endogeneity between output performance variables, the measures of institutional development 
and SPR. Several empirical specification models of the theoretical simultaneous system of three 
equations are estimated. In the first group of specification models the dependent endogenous 
variables are GDPG, SPR and INST, while in the second group the dependant endogenous 
variables are GDPI, SPR and INST. Moreover, two datasets are used. The first dataset has data 
from 1989 to 2003, thus covering the whole transition period, while the second dataset is a subset 
of the first one, containing data for the recovery stage of transition only.  
The empirical methods used in this dissertation include panel data analysis, principal 
component analysis, two stages least squares approach and three stage least squares approach in 
the presence of a SUR modeling procedure. 
With respect to the output performance equation, the findings of this research indicate 
that institutional reform (INSTREF), and property rights and contract enforcement institutions 
(PCINST and ROLINST) are very important determinants of output levels when the whole 
transition period dataset is used, and very important determinants of both the output levels and 
output growth rates when the recovery stage dataset is used. While the effect of current SPR is 
ambiguous, the effect of lagged SPR on output and output growth is positive. Moreover, SPR 
continue to affect output performance via their indirect effect on institutional development.  
With respect to the institutional reforms, and property rights and contract enforcement 
institutions, two sets of determinants were found to be important. On the side of the demand 
factors, SPR, and especially lagged SPR is found to be an important determinant of both 
institutional reforms and property rights and contract enforcement institutions. On the side of 
supply factors, macroeconomic stabilization, a measure of the state’s capacity to implement 
 institutional reform, resulted very important in explaining the variation in institutional reform 
and property rights and contract enforcement institutions. Political reform, in terms of a shift 
from the autarkic political regime to a democratic political regime, is found to positively affect 
institutional development in the recovery stage. 
With respect to the structural policy reforms’ equations, this dissertation’s main finding is 
that political reform positively affects SPR in both datasets. Moreover, lagged SPR is found to 
positively affect SPR, which is an indication of transition governments’ maintained commitment 
to a package of SPR-s.  
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Introduction, Motivation and Goals 
 
Analyzing the process of transition from planned to market economies is a complex and 
multidimensional process encompassing not only economic changes but also profound changes 
in political and social relations. The term “transition” in this dissertation refers to the systematic 
transformation of centrally planned economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) into market economies. It has been more than a decade since 
transition started. CEE countries started the transition process in 1989 and 1990 while the 
countries in the area of the former Soviet Union that form the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) started in 1991 and 1992.  While some economies resemble more and more market 
economies, others are lagging behind in this transformation process. On average, there seems to 
be a clear divide between the more advanced countries that constitute the most serious candidates 
for European Union (EU) enlargement and the rest of the region, notably South-eastern European 
(SEE) countries and the CIS. Most authors contend that for the SEE and CIS countries, transition 
cannot be said to be over, while for the rest of the CEE countries transition is almost complete.1 
Output performance and especially GDP growth rates have been of a particular interest to 
researchers working on the transition phenomena. One reason for this interest lies in the 
objective of improving economic well-being of the transition countries citizens via positive 
economic growth rates (Havrylyshyn et al. 1998). Another reason is the spectacular and 
universal decline in output at the beginning of transition. However, the experience of the CEE 
and CIS countries has varied a lot in terms of the collapse in measured output at the beginning of 
transition. While the output paths of most countries are qualitatively similar, an asymmetric “U” 
or “V” shape, with a sharp initial decline giving way to a gradual recovery, transition countries 
have differed greatly both in terms of the magnitude of the initial decline and the timing and 
strength of the recovery (Berg et al. 1999). On average, FSU countries have experienced sharper 
declines and slower recoveries than transition countries in CEE, although there are large 
differences within these groups as well (See Table 1 and Figures 1.1-1.4). 
The early years of transition have been characterized by a sharp contraction in output 
following the disruption of traditional trade and financial links and the abandonment of the 
                                                          
1 See for example Gros and Suhrcke, 2000. 
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centrally planned lines of production (Havrylyshyn et al. 1998). This was generally followed by 
attempts to maintain production and employment at previous levels by running large fiscal 
deficits, resulting in high rates of inflation, particularly after countries had introduced their own 
currencies, and further collapses in output. After this common experience, most transition 
countries engaged in comprehensive stabilization and reform programs, often supported by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although countries that implemented such programs 
generally succeeded in bringing down inflation to low levels, the success in achieving sustained 
growth has varied a lot across transition economies. Pinning down the factors determining the 
variation of output growth rates during the first decade of transition has been a challenge for both 
IMF and World Bank scholars as well as independent researchers.  
The current literature on output and output growth determinants in transition economies 
has only recently tried to empirically measure the effect of the market-oriented institutional 
framework on output and output growth. Data deficiencies, together with a lack of a clear 
conceptual framework on how institutions affect output performance in transition, are serious 
challenges to any attempt to untangle this relationship. 
There exist several papers that provide empirical evidence that institutions (usually taken 
for granted or unable to measure) are the missing ingredient of cross-country differences in 
economic growth.2 The recent historical experience of CEE and CIS economies may constitute 
another candidate to the list of historical examples elaborated in Acemoglu et al. (2004) as 
“quasi-natural experiments” in support of the view that institutions are the fundamentals of long 
run economic growth. Acemoglu et al.’s (2004) “quasi-natural experiments” in history consist of 
the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the 
colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth century. 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation summarize existing theoretical and stylized empirical 
regression papers showing that institutions matter for output performance in transition. But, how 
much do they matter and what is the relationship between structural reform policies (SPR), also 
known as liberalization policies, and institutions in transition economies remain open questions. 
While the main focus of this dissertation is to identify the underlying factors associated with 
output growth recovery or lack of it in transition economies, so as to draw some conclusions for 
appropriate policy implications to promote sustained growth, another open question is whether 
                                                          
2 See for example Acemoglu et al. (2003a) and (2004), Olson et al. (2000), Knack and Keefer (1995). 
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political and social movements toward democratization have any direct or indirect effects on 
output and output growth differences across transition countries. 
From a personal standpoint, in the beginning of this research I was trying to identify the 
causes of the 1997 Albanian Pyramid Scheme crisis and its impacts on the Albanian economy. 
The deeper I went searching, I realized that the extreme financial, social and political crisis that 
the Albanian transitional economy was faced with, was a result of the lack of institutions 
securing property rights and enforcing contracts. It was as if economic structural reforms in 
general and financial liberalization in particular were taking place without the property rights and 
contract enforcement institutions to support and monitor them.  
This dissertation addresses more explicitly and more in depth than other studies the 
impact of institutional reform and property rights and contract enforcement institutions on output 
and output growth performance for transition economies up to date.  It seeks to empirically 
measure the effect that the institutional reform and measures of property rights and contract 
enforcement institutions have on output performance during the transition period as a whole and 
during the recovery stage of the transition period. Moreover, this dissertation explores the 
relationship between each of the above categories of institutions with measures of structural 
policy reform to draw some conclusions on the expectations that were raised in the beginning of 
transition from World Bank scholars and independent researchers. According to these 
expectations, structural policy reforms, namely price and trade liberalization and privatization, 
would facilitate the creation of markets, which would then in turn result in some endogenous 
adaptation of institutions and make institutional reform easier further down the transition road. 
In order to be able to measure the impact of institutions on output performance in 
transition countries, we have to rely on a conceptual framework adapted so far from researchers 
working on output and output growth performance in transition economies, over which some 
consensus has emerged. After the most important factors impacting output performance in 
transition are identified from the relevant literature, the econometric analysis focuses on 
determining the suitable econometric techniques for measuring the impact of two categories of 
institutions on output and output growth performance in transition economies using a panel data 
framework.   
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 first engages in a discussion of the 
conceptual theoretical framework of growth in transition. Then it seeks to provide a detailed 
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literature review of the growth determinants in general and transitional growth determinants in 
particular, as it relates to the first transition decade in CEE and CIS. Last, it highlights some of 
the main unresolved questions. The purpose of chapter 2 is twofold. First it focuses on the role of 
institutions as the fundamentals of long-run economic growth, exploring both the theoretical 
background and the empirical findings of studies using a variety of institutional measures. 
Second, it establishes a framework of institutional reform analysis for transition economies and 
discusses recent empirical work on the impact of various institutional measures on economic 
performance in transition economies. Chapter 3 presents the methodology employed in transition 
related growth related papers, while chapter 4 presents the theoretical model and empirical model 
specifications. Chapter 5 discusses some issues with transition data and provides a general 
overview of data trends for GDP and GDP growth performance, initial conditions, inflation, 
structural policy reform, institutional reform, property rights and contract enforcement 
institutions, and political reform. Chapter 6 outlines the econometric estimation results. Chapter 
7 concludes and outlines some policy recommendations. 
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I. Determinants of Output Performance in Transition Economies  
 
1.1  Building a Theoretical Conceptual Framework for Output and  
Output Growth in Transition Economies  
 
Fifteen years ago there was no theory to guide the various economic phenomena 
associated with the political and economic process of transition, but only separate theories of 
capitalism and socialism (Havrylyshyn et al. 1999). In their 1999 paper Havrylyshyn et al. 
pointed out to the absence of such a general theory of transition even after almost a decade of 
transition experience. However, we may point to several elements that such a theory would 
contain. One would be that the "transformational recession" that accompanies transition requires 
a reorientation from a seller's to a buyer's market and the imposition of a hard budget constraint 
(via privatization and elimination of various government support mechanisms) on producers in 
order to succeed (Kornai 1994). At the same time, transition requires the reallocation of 
resources from the old to the new activities through the closure of inefficient state enterprises 
and the establishment of new firms in the private sector, as well as the restructuring of those 
firms that survive (Blanchard 1997). Blanchard’s (1997) reallocation and restructuring can be 
thought of as the dynamic movements resulting from the establishment of the new incentives and 
are reminiscent of the Schumpeterian concept of “creative destruction” by entrepreneurial 
activity, but with much larger impacts than what the Schumpeter’s model predicted 
(Havrylyshyn et al. 1999).  
Havrylyshyn et al. (1999) summarizes the policy actions needed to put in place both 
Kornai’s new incentives and Blanchard’s Schumpeterian changes in economic activity as 
encompassing the following measures of reform: (a) macroeconomic stabilization; (b) price and 
market liberalization; (c) liberalization of the exchange and trade system; (d) privatization; (e) 
establishing a competitive environment with few obstacles to market entry and exit; and (f) 
redefining the role of the state as the provider of macro stability, a stable legal framework, 
enforceable property rights, and occasionally as a corrector of market imperfections. Such a core 
concept of transformation yields implications for output performance that differentiate transition 
economies from market economies. First, output will decline initially under a new buyer’s 
market and hard budget constraints. The accumulation of un-salable goods signals the need for 
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cutbacks in production. A second implication is that growth of the new production will not occur 
until the new incentives are in place and made credible. This means that the sooner structural 
policy reforms achieve a hard budget constraint and liberal price environment, the sooner the 
reallocation and the restructuring of the old production and the creation of new production can 
begin. Liberalization includes the freeing of prices and resource allocation, so that enterprise 
managers respond to changing price signals by allocating resources accordingly, corresponding 
this way to underlying shifts in demand and supply. Since the liberalization of prices can occur 
virtually overnight, but resource reallocation takes time, some initial decline in output is likely to 
happen, but the extent of this decline will depend on several factors, including the degree of price 
distortions carried over from the centrally planned economy, and the extent to which aggregate 
demand falls in the initial period. Third, the proximate mechanisms in the early recovery period 
are not likely to depend so much on the conventional factor inputs that explain medium-term 
growth, such as investments, including foreign direct investments and new technology, but 
rather, the initial output expansion will come primarily from a variety of efficiency 
improvements.  
Havrylyshyn et al. (1998, 1999) list five types of mechanisms conducive to increased 
output, which may be simultaneous or overlapping: (i) recovery of underutilized capacity, (ii) 
elimination of egregious waste of labor, capital and materials (known as X-efficiency in 
theoretical terms), (iii) efficiency gains from a more appropriate combination of capital and labor 
known as factor efficiency, (iv) efficiency gains from resource reallocation toward goods in 
which a country has comparative advantage, or in which there is unsatisfied consumer demand, 
and (v) output expansion via new net investment and employment increases. It is important to 
note that it is a simplification to say that all of the efficiency improvements (except the fifth item 
listed above) need no new net investments. What Havrylyshyn et al. (1998, 1999) means, is that 
often the investment required is small. Also, such efficiency improvements can take place at the 
sector or firm level even if aggregate net investment in the economy is zero, since new gross 
investment is directed not to replace depreciated stocks in “old” industries, but to expand in the 
“new” ones. Summarizing, the proximate sources of output growth in transition, as given by 
Havrylyshyn et al. (1998, 1999) could be grouped in three categories: reallocation, efficiency 
improvements and investment. While the first two sources are expected to generate output 
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growth in the short run and the medium run, investment is thought of as a long-run source of 
output growth for transition economies. 
 
1.2  Main Factors Associated with GDP Growth in Transition and                   
Non-Transition Economies: A Literature Review 
 
This section includes three sub-sections. The first one provides a summarized literature 
survey of the way economists’ views on the determinants of economic growth have evolved 
throughout the last five decades, and what part the institutional approach plays in it today. In the 
second section, the special circumstances of transition economies are discussed so as to see the 
relevance of growth theory to the transition countries case. This part summarizes some 
theoretical aspects of the literature on growth in transition economies, aiming at providing a 
conceptual framework of why negative growth rates were present among all transition economies 
at the beginning of the past decade and how economic policy reforms, and institution building 
could be crucial in achieving positive growth rates. The third section summarizes recent 
empirical work on output growth performance in transition economies.  
 
1.2.1  Evolution of Economic Growth Theory 
 
What follows is a brief summary of how economic growth theory has changed over the 
last five decades, focusing on the latest contributions. Its purpose stands in identifying potential 
factors and variables that could impact output growth determinants in transition economies as 
well as find evidence on the impact of institutions in the framework of endogenous growth 
theory. 
A crucial question in the field of economic growth and development raised by many 
economists, including Olson (1996) and Acemoglu et al. (2004), is, Why are some countries 
much poorer than others? Parente and Prescott (2002, p.1) raise a similar question, “Why isn’t 
the whole world as rich as the United States and Switzerland?” To address such questions from 
different angles, a condensed review of the growth theory is provided below. 
 Traditional neoclassical growth models following Solow (1956), Cass (1965) and 
Koopmans (1965), explain differences in income per capita in terms of different paths of factor 
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accumulation (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 2004). In these models, cross-country differences in 
factor accumulation are due either to differences in saving rates (Solow), preferences (Cass-
Koopman) or other exogenous parameters, such as total factor productivity growth. These 
neoclassical growth models set the first stage of the synthesis of growth theory. The second 
element of this synthesis is the set of models developed in the mid-1980s, elaborated in Romer 
(1986) and (1990), and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004). These models add to the role of factor 
inputs an explanation of technical progress based on increasing returns, research and 
development and imperfect competition, as well as human capital and government policies. 
Motivated by the work of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1998), the growth theories that developed 
afterwards, endogenized the steady-state growth and technical progress, but their explanation for 
income differences is similar to that of older theories (Acemoglu et al. 2004). For instance, in the 
model of Romer (1990), a country that allocates more resources to innovation may be more 
prosperous than another, but it is basically the type of preferences and the properties of the 
technology employed in the creation of ideas that determine the allocation of such resources 
(Acemoglu et al. 2004). In another recent contribution, Parente and Prescott (2002, pp.1-2) assert 
that “differences in international incomes are the consequences of differences in the knowledge 
individual societies apply to the production of goods and services. These differences do not arise 
because of some fundamental difference in the stock of usable knowledge from which each 
society can draw. Rather, these differences are the primary result of country-specific policies that 
result in constraints on work practices and on the application of better production methods at the 
firm level.” Many of these barriers, namely monopoly rights, exist to protect the vested interests 
of lobbies involved in production processes. Moreover, Parente and Prescott (2002) contend that 
poor countries need not create new ideas to increase their standard of living, but rather apply the 
existing ideas to the production of goods and services. It is exactly due to the presence of barriers 
to the adoption and efficient use of more productive technologies that poor countries remain 
poor, by not using this existing stock of useable knowledge. 
Although recent contributions to growth theory, such as Parente and Prescott (2002), 
emphasize the importance of economic policies, including taxes or barriers to technology 
adoption they do not present an explanation for why these differences exist (Acemoglu et al. 
2004). The growth theory tradition summarized above has explained economic growth via 
several insightful mechanisms that, however, cannot provide a fundamental explanation for 
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economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2004). The search for these fundamental explanations started 
with North and Thomas (1973), who pointed out that economic growth explanatory variables 
such as innovation, economies of scale, education and capital accumulation are not causes of 
growth, but rather growth itself (Acemoglu et al. 2004). Moreover, Acemoglu et al. (2004, p. 1) 
contends that “Factor accumulation and innovation are only proximate causes of growth. In 
North and Thomas’s view the fundamental explanation of comparative growth lies in differences 
in institutions.”  
“Even though many scholars, including John Locke, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, 
Douglas North, and Robert Thomas, have emphasized the importance of economic institutions, 
there has been a vacuum in the institutional economics literature in providing a useful framework 
for thinking about how economic institutions are determined and why they vary across 
countries” (Acemoglu et al. 2004, p. 2). While the economists belonging to New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) school of thought have good reasons to believe that economic institutions 
matter for economic growth, “there has been a lack of crucial comparative static results that 
explain why equilibrium economic institutions differ. This is part of the reason why much of the 
economics literature has focused on proximate causes of economic growth, largely neglecting the 
fundamental institutional causes (Acemoglu et al. 2004, p. 2).3  
Prior to the work of Acemoglu et al. (2004) there have been some other major 
contributions in the field of economic growth, pertaining to what is known as the political 
economy models of growth. Olson (1996) in particular summarizes the conceptual basis for the 
role of institutions such as property rights, the rule of law and corruption. Clague et al. 1997 also 
investigate how societal differences in property rights and contract enforcement mechanisms are 
an important part of the explanation of why some countries prosper while others do not. Olson 
(1996) put forth the explanation that many countries are poor because they waste a lot of 
resources and that there exists a negative relationship between this waste and the institutional 
bases of property rights and rule of law. The weaker the institutional bases, the higher the waste, 
and the higher the degree of resulting corruption.  
The standard growth models identify two sources of output growth. The first source 
comes from the accumulation of labor and capital, or more generally from the accumulation of 
                                                          
3 Acemoglu et al. (2004) have tried to fill this vacuum by providing a theoretical framework explaining the channels 
through which economic institutions, as the fundamental causes of economic growth, affect economic performance. 
This approach is discussed in detail in section 2.2 of this dissertation. 
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production factors. The second source of output growth is attributed to total factor productivity, 
TFP. “Economists have historically taken TFP as due to technological change or increases in the 
stock of knowledge that is not explicitly attributable to any particular factor of production… 
From this perspective (of a broader view of TFP), causes of growth in TFP would include 
institutional changes that strengthen property rights, increase the flexibility of goods and factor 
markets, improve the quality and productivity of government goods and services delivery, and 
raise the quality of government policy” (Zinnes et al. 2001, p. 318). Olson et al. (2000) sets forth 
the hypothesis that differences in institutional governance and economic policies explain cross-
country differences in TFP. Like Parente and Prescott (2002), Olson et al. (2000, p. 344) argue 
that “the per capita incomes of the poor countries are only a small fraction of what they could be. 
Because of the same shortcomings in governance that largely account for their low incomes, 
most of these countries do not take advantage of their opportunities for exceptional growth and 
thus fail to converge.” Moreover, Olson et al. (2000) contends that it is the fundamental changes 
in their policy regimes and institutions, and their better governance that enables some developing 
countries to exploit the opportunities for catch-up growth that poor countries have. Olson (1996) 
elaborates on a number of historical facts indicating how the fastest-growing countries have 
never been the ones with the highest per capita incomes but always a subset of the lower-income 
countries. Olson (1996, p. 20) documents that “During the 1970s South Korea grew seven times 
as fast as the United States. During the 1970s, the four countries (apart from the oil exporting 
countries) that had the fastest rates of growth of per capita income grew on average 6.9 
percentage points faster per year than the United States. In the 1980s, the four fastest growers 
grew 5.3 percentage points faster per year than United States. They outgrew the highest income 
countries as a class by similarly large multiples. All of the four of the fastest-growing countries 
in each decade were low-income countries.” 
Olson et al. (2000) empirically test their hypothesis, using a methodology that allows 
them to separately measure the effect of the structure of incentives given by the institutions and 
economic policy regimes on the growth rate of output, after controlling for factor accumulation, 
as it is randomly done in empirical growth regressions as well as other control variables. Olson et 
al. (2000) findings indicate that a country’s structure of incentives, given by good institutional 
governance and economic policy regimes, is a major determinant of their rates of growth of 
productivity (TFP) and economic performance. Olson et al. (2000, p. 360) conclude that 
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“Valuable as both the neoclassical and endogenous growth theories are, they do not by 
themselves provide a simple and straightforward explanation of the general failure of 
convergence at the same time that a subset of developing countries has much the fastest rates of 
economic growth.” The governance and growth hypothesis that they set forth and empirically 
test, seem to provide a better explanation of the facts actually observed. 
  
1.2.2.  Empirical Findings of Non-Transition Studies 
 
The past decade has seen numerous empirical studies seeking to explain the observed 
wide differences in output growth patterns across countries and over time, including as 
determinants factor inputs (investment, human capital); government policies (monetary and 
fiscal policy, price distortions); and the legal, political and institutional framework (indicators of 
property rights security, tax burden and its fairness, corruption, transparency, political stability, 
etc). The list of factors is long, and a good summary and discussion can be found in Barro 
(1997). Sala-I-Martin et al. (1997, 2004) summarize the empirical findings of previous studies 
and identify a broad set of variables that pass the robustness tests. Out of 67 variables subjected 
to testing, 18 appear to be significantly and robustly partially correlated with long-term growth. 
The variables analyzed in their (1997) study can be grouped into nine categories: (1) regional 
variables, (2) political variables, (3) religious variables, (4) market distortions and market 
performance, (5) types of investment, (6) primary sector production, (7) openness, (8) type of 
economic organization, and (9) former Spanish colonies. Transition economies, due to data 
limitations, were not included in either of Sala-I-Martin et al. (1997, 2004) studies. A discussion 
worth pursuing here is related to the robustness of the binary variables (dummies) for East Asian 
countries, Sub-Sahara African, and Latin American countries, as well as Spanish colonies. What 
lies underneath this robustness? The robust presence of country dummies in itself only makes us 
ask deeper questions. What is it that makes these groups of countries so different and drives the 
prevailing divergence in their long-run growth rates? Is it institutions, geography, or culture, the 
fundamentals behind long-run growth? Rodrick et al. (2004) estimate the relative contributions 
of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income levels around the world using in 
instrumental variables for institutions and trade. Their results suggest that the quality of 
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institutions “trumps” everything else. Once institutions are controlled for, geography and trade 
have weak direct effects on income levels (Rodrick et al., 2004). 
The security of property rights, the enforcement of contracts, governments’ efficiency in 
managing the provision of public goods and good economic policies are important determinants 
of economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1995, Olson 1996 and Olson et al. 2000). Nevertheless, 
mainly because of data limitations, the empirical research on sources of economic growth has 
been restricted to a narrow examination of the role of institutions (Knack and Keefer 1995 and 
Olson et al. 2000). This has made it difficult to robustly test North’s proposition that an 
important part of the cross-country differences in economic growth is due to different levels of 
institutional development.  (Knack and Keefer 1995 and Olson et al. 2000). The lack of direct 
measures of institutional data has made researchers rely upon measures of political stability, such 
as Barro (1991), including coups and revolutions and political assassinations. Knack and Keefer 
(1995) compare more direct measures of the institutional environment with the political 
instability measures used by Barro (1991), comparing their effects on both growth and private 
investment. Knack and Keefer (1995) use indicators provided by country risk evaluators to 
potential foreign investors (ICRG indicators), including evaluations of contract enforceability 
and risk of expropriation. Using such variables, property rights and contract enforcement 
institutions were found to have a greater impact on investment and growth than was previously 
found using less direct institutional measures, such as coups and revolutions and political 
assassinations. Rodrick (1999) also uses more direct measures of institutions of conflict 
management (proxied by indicators of the quality of governmental institutions, rule of law, 
democratic rights and social safety nets) to provide econometric evidence that countries that 
experienced the sharpest drops in growth after 1975 were those with divided societies (as 
measured by indicators of inequality and ethnic fragmentation) and with weak institutions of 
conflict management. 
 
1.2.3  Empirical Literature Survey of Transition Studies 
 
Though positive GDP growth in transition economies is a very recent phenomenon, a 
considerably large number of studies have used econometric analysis to analyze the determinants 
of growth in transition. After more than a decade since transition started, some consensus began 
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to emerge from the transition literature on output growth determinants. Even though the 
institutional approach has received a lot of attention in theoretical papers on transition (see for 
example Kornai, 2000, Popov, 2000, and Roland, 2000), empirically, only minor contributions 
have been made to test the impact of institutional building as a potential growth determinant. The 
unavailability of data made Berg et al. (1999, p. 21) assert that “the most obvious absentee from 
our list of right-hand side variables is a measure of property rights and the quality of the legal 
framework. Several sources have recently constructed related indices, but they are only available 
for the last few years of our sample period (typically from 1994 or 1995 onward) and do not exist 
for all countries.” Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) provide a simple econometric analysis that tries to 
capture the impact of market-enhancing institutions on growth. Their findings indicate that 
institutions matter for output growth in transition economies, but the effect of liberalization 
policies dominates that of institutional measures. 4  
While some empirical work has been done in explaining the variation in GDP growth 
rates in the CEE and CIS economies through macroeconomic variables, structural policy reforms 
and initial conditions, the recent empirical literature on transition has dealt little with the 
interaction of institutional, political, and social developments with GDP growth rates in 
transition countries. Recent empirical analysis on growth in transition explains growth 
differences in terms of macroeconomic variables, such as the level of inflation and the size of the 
budget deficit (see for example Fischer et al. 1996a, 1996b and 2000, Berg et al. 1999, 
Radulescu et al. 2002 and Falcetti et al. 2002), variables describing progress made with 
structural reforms, particularly liberalization and privatization, (see for example De Melo et al. 
1997a, 1997b, Havrylyshyn et al.1997,  Jaros, 2001, Radulescu et al. 2002, Falcetti et al. 2002 
and Merlevede, 2003) and variables characterizing initial conditions, such as the degree of 
macroeconomic distortions like repressed inflation, black market exchange rate premium, and 
trade dependency, structural distortions, like over-industrialization and measures of general level 
of development, like per capita income and urbanization rates (De Melo et al. 1997b, Berg et al. 
1999, Falcetti et al. 2002 and Merlevede, 2003). The latest category of factors to impact growth 
                                                          
4 Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) estimation results pertain to the transition period up to 1998 and yield different 
implications for the impact on output growth that liberalization policies have versus measures of institutions, when 
compared to the estimation results in this dissertation. 
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in transition, tested in a simple econometric regression analysis by Havrylyshyn et al. (2000), has 
been institutional development.  
The empirical findings of De Melo et al. (1997a, 1997b), Jaros (2001) and Havrylyshyn 
et al. (1998, 2000) indicate that liberalization policies are the main determinant of GDP growth 
variation among transition economies. In all these and other more recent studies structural policy 
reforms (known as liberalization policies) enter the growth regression analysis in a non-linear 
fashion. De Melo et al. (1997a, 1997b), Jaros (2001) and Havrylyshyn et al. (1998, 2000) find 
that liberalization policies have a negative contemporaneous impact on GDP growth, but a 
stronger positive effect on growth over time (i.e., the coefficient on the lagged liberalization 
index is positive and greater than the absolute value of the negative coefficient on the 
contemporaneous liberalization index). 
On the other hand, Falcetti (2002) and Merlevede (2003) model structural reforms and 
growth as simultaneously affecting one another, and thus use a simultaneous equation system 
approach as opposed to a singe growth regression analysis. Falcetti (2002) and Merlevede (2003) 
find that the positive impact of structural policy reforms on output growth in transition 
economies is less robust than previously thought and that, due to simultaneity bias, previous 
studies have exaggerated the positive impact of the lagged liberalization index on growth. 
Radulescu et al. (2002) arrive at similar conclusions, that robustness with respect to structural 
policy reforms is not confirmed, employing both a general-to-specific methodology (Hendry, 
1980, 1995) and extreme bounds analysis (Leamer, 1983) to check the robustness of the 
relationship between growth and variables used in previous studies. The reason for this lack of 
robustness could rest in imperfections in constructing the reform index, in particular the 
exclusion of measures of institutional performance (Radulescu et al. 2002, p. 740). Stigliz (1999) 
reports that simple cross-sectional results show growth in transition economies is positively 
influenced by progress in privatization only if there has been concomitant improvement in 
governance. The most recent empirical studies mentioned above suggest that the results of 
empirical growth studies undertaken prior to year 2000 must be regarded with caution. 
Moreover, these later studies point to the need for widening the perspective to take into account 
the creation and functioning of market supporting institutions (see for example Radulescu et al. 
2002). 
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As outlined above, the existing literature has pointed out two other important factors 
explaining output growth variation in transition economies, apart from structural policy reform 
variables. These variables are initial conditions and macroeconomic variables. With respect to 
initial conditions, most studies find their positive effect on output growth to be statistically 
significant. Better initial conditions lead to better output growth performance. Moreover, De 
Melo et al. (1997b) and Havrylyshyn et al. (1998, 2000) find a decreasing role of initial 
conditions over time. Apart from their direct effect on growth, initial conditions are found to 
impact growth indirectly through structural policy reforms (De Melo et al. 1997b, Falcetti, 2002 
and Merlevede, 2003). 
Last, macroeconomic variables, such as the level of inflation and the size of the budget 
deficit, have been widely used in empirical papers as determinants of growth in transition. 
Fischer et al. (1996a), (1996b) and (2000) focus more than other papers on the role of inflation 
on growth in transition and finds that high inflation rates impede growth and that macroeconomic 
stabilization is a prerequisite for positive output growth to occur. 5 
The above three groups of variables (initial conditions, structural policy reforms and 
macroeconomic variables) constitute the “consensus” set of variables to affect output growth in 
transition. Other variables used in growth regression analysis, and found to significantly affect 
growth, include regional tensions, wars and conflicts (see for example De Melo et al. 1997a, 
1997b, and Popov, 2000) and membership in the ruble zone (Popov, 2000). Depending on the 
research question at hand, different studies have emphasized one or another variable, often 
creating other related variables to their variables of interest, but the main approach has been that 
of parsimonious models with a few variables, including the three “consensus” variables 
described above. However, some controversy over these “consensus” variables has not ceased 
since transition started. Studies that took into account a number of initial conditions found that 
these initial conditions do matter for growth in transition, and that in some cases liberalization 
policies become insignificant. Aslund, Boone and Johnson (1996) contend that overall attempts 
to link differences in output changes during transition to the cumulative liberalization index and 
to macro stabilization (rates of inflation) did not yield any impressive results. It turned out that 
binary variables, such as membership in the ruble zone (i.e., FSU) and war destruction, were 
much more important explanatory variables than either the liberalization index or inflation. 
                                                          
5 Berg et al. (1999) also pays close attention to macroeconomic variables, particularly the role of budget deficits. 
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Popov (2000) similarly concludes that after controlling for the non-policy factors, namely initial 
conditions, the impacts of liberalization policies become insignificant. Furthermore, inflation 
rates and institutional capacities of the state (as measured by the change in the share of 
government revenues in GDP) remain important determinants of the growth performance (Popov 
2000). The above findings seem to indicate that liberalization policies’ effect on growth is more 
important in the presence of a market supporting institutional framework. 
Several theoretical papers have pointed out the role of market supporting institutions as 
the missing ingredient for the explanation of output performance variation across transition 
economies. The theoretical literature on transition seems to suggest that after the efforts for 
macroeconomic stabilization and the implementation of structural policy reforms (such as 
liberalization and privatization policies), the transition economies are challenged with the 
intermediate phase of the transition process, the establishment of market-oriented economic 
institutions via the institutional reform. We can think of the institutional reform as the 
foundations of the ‘transition bridge,’ responsible for a successful transition and a more efficient 
allocation of natural and human resources (than under the planned economy).  
Researchers working on transition issues should not limit the span of factors effecting 
output performance by examining only economic factors and ignoring the impact of politics, 
ideology, culture and especially deep institutional transformations (Marangos, 2004 and Roland 
2002).  In contrast with the advanced economies that already have the successful institutions of 
capitalism in place, when analyzing the transition economies or developing economies in 
general, one should keep in mind that such institutions are in an embryonic state or even absent. 
Roland (2002, p. 49) contends that “the transition experience has very much reinforced the 
institutional perspective in economics and a shift in emphasis in economic thinking from the 
analysis of markets and price theory to that of contracting and to the legal, social, and political 
environment of contracting. Transition has forced economists to think about institutions not as 
static, but in a dynamic way: how momentum for reform is created and how institutions can 
evolve, and how momentum can be lost and one can get stuck in inefficient institutions.” This is 
in line with North (1990) and Acemoglu et al. (2004) discussions on the two possible sets of 
institutions that can emerge and perpetuate themselves, efficient institutions and inefficient 
(wasteful of a country’s human and natural resources) institutions. 
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As transition countries are walking along the ‘transition bridge,’ several institutions and 
organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street 
Journal, have tried to emphasize on and to some extent quantify the building of several 
dimensions of new economic, political and legal institutions in transition economies. According 
to World Bank, IMF and Heritage Foundation, it is the good quality of institutions that supports 
the functioning of a market economy and low institutional capacity is a key constraint on growth 
in the long term. Without further advances in the building of institutions, transition economies 
might not have sustainable economic growth and could fall behind the expected level (Heritage 
Foundation/Wall Street Journal, 2005). EBRD and World Bank Transition Reports also put great 
emphasis on institutional building and consider it a major factor in achieving positive GDP 
growth rates. It is because of these views that in recent years these organizations and others have 
increased their efforts and resources devoted to gathering more institutional data and compiling 
several indicators of institutional development for developing and transition countries. The 
resulting availability of the data in the recent years, together with a better understanding of the 
channels through which institutions (particularly property rights and contract enforcement 
institutions) impact output and output growth performance, is used in this dissertation to measure 
the extent to which institutions can explain differences in economic performance across 
transition economies.  
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II.  The Role of Institutions in Economic Performance 
 
2.1  Theoretical Background and Definition of Institutions  
 
Douglas North’s pioneering work sets the analytical framework that integrates 
institutional analysis into economics. “Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that 
structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, law, 
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics” (North 1994, p. 360). Together they define the 
incentive structure of societies and economies. Institutions may be created, as was the United 
States Constitution; or they may simply evolve over time, as does the common law (North, 1990, 
p. 4). 
Institutional arrangements constitute under what conditions individuals are allowed to 
undertake certain activities. In the same way institutions set the constraints on what individuals 
are prohibited from doing. Clague et al. 1997a describe how obeying to institutional constrains 
could be liberating rather than constraining at the community level, when compared to the 
individual level. “Defining institutions as the constraints that human beings impose on 
themselves makes the definition complementary to the choice theoretical approach of 
neoclassical economic theory…  Institutions are a creation of human beings. They evolve and are 
altered by human beings” (North, 1990, p. 5). Hence, North’s theory of institutions begins with 
the individual and the integration of individual choices with the constraints institutions impose 
on the choice sets, making this way a contribution in unifying social science research. 
If we look at a broader definition of institutions we understand that institutions can be many 
things. According to Nabli and Nugent (1989), institutions can be organizations or sets of rules 
within organizations; they can be markets or particular rules about the way a market operates; or 
they can refer to the set of property rights and rules governing exchanges in a society. North, 
however, distinguishes between institutions and organizations. As defined by North (1990, p. 4) 
“institutions are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a competitive team sport. If 
institutions are the rules of the game, organizations and their entrepreneurs are the players”. 
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Different authors have used quite different definitions of institutions, emphasizing 
different characteristics of institutions. “Among the characteristics of institutions which vary, are 
the degree to which they are (a) organizational, i.e., the extent to which organizations and 
institutions coincide, (b) formal, (c) created at a specific time and place by a specific means, as 
opposed to having evolved from more diffuse sources, (d) embedded in, as opposed to 
differentiated from other institutions, (e) universal, as opposed to particularistic, in the interests 
they serve, (f) creating, as opposed to simply maintaining a certain public good, and (g) 
technology linked” (Nabli and Nugent, 1989, p. 1334). In any case, in most definitions of 
institutions there appear to be three more or less explicitly stated characteristics that may be 
considered basic to the concept of a social institution. The first such characteristic is the rules 
and constraints nature of institutions. Moreover, “it is as sets or configurations that rules are 
considered as basic characteristics of institutions” (Nabli and Nugent 1989, p. 1335). The second 
characteristic of institutions is their ability to govern the relations among individuals and groups, 
which implies obedience and applicability in social relations (Nabli and Nugent 1989, and 
Clague et al., 1997a). Last, institutions are predictable. This constitutes their third characteristic. 
“The rules and constraints have to be understood, at least in principle, as being applicable in 
repeated and future situations. Agents should expect these rules and constraints to have some 
degree of stability, otherwise, they would not have an institutional character (Nabli and Nugent 
1989, p. 1335).  
Examples of institutions range from formal organizations, such as labor unions and 
employers’ organizations, markets such as stock exchanges, labor markets, credit markets or 
wholesale markets, contracts, cultural rules and codes of conduct (Nabli and Nugent 1989). They 
are all institutions in that they lay down sets of rules governing specified activities of the parties 
involved. It is useful, however, to distinguish between the different categories of institutions. 
Following North (1981), Clague et al. (1997a) identify three broad categories of institutions: (1) 
the constitutional order, containing the fundamental set of written and unwritten rules; (2) 
cultural endowments, which include the normative behavioral codes of society and the mental 
models that people use to interpret their experience; and (3) the institutional arrangements. Given 
that the constitutional order and the cultural endowments of a society change slowly, except 
during revolutionary periods, most of the institutional analyses focuses on institutional 
arrangements (Clague et al., 1997a). 
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2.2 Economic Institutions 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2004) set forth the hypothesis that differences in economic institutions 
are the fundamental cause of different patterns of economic growth and development by 
providing a general conceptual framework of what determines economic institutions, and what 
are the channels through which economic institutions in turn affect economic performance. At its 
core, this hypothesis is based on the notion that it is the way that humans themselves decide to 
organize their societies that determines whether or not they prosper. The importance of economic 
institutions stands in that they influence the structure of economic incentives in society. “Without 
property rights individuals will not have the incentive to invest in physical or human capital or 
adopt more efficient technologies.” (Acemoglu et al., 2004, p. 2). On the other hand, the 
importance of economic institutions stands in that they help to allocate resources to their most 
efficient uses, reduce transaction costs and determine who gets the profit, revenues and the rights 
of control. (Acemoglu et al., 2004 and North, 1990). When markets are missing or ignored (as 
they were in the Soviet Union and CEE countries) the gains from trade, as elaborated in North 
(1990) and Acemoglu et al. (2004), are not exploited and resources not allocated efficiently. 
Basically, economic institutions facilitate and encourage factor accumulation, innovation and the 
efficient allocation of resources (Acemoglu et al., 2004).  
But what are the channels through which institutions affect economic performance? To 
address this question Acemoglu et al. (2004, p. 3) start their analysis by contending that 
“economic institutions not only determine the aggregate economic growth potential of a country, 
but also other economic outcomes, including the distribution of resources in the future (i.e., the 
distribution of wealth, of physical capital or human capital).” Schematically, denoting t as the 
current period and t+1 as the future period, the condensed framework in Acemoglu et al. (2004, 
p. 6) is given as: 
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Figure 1 
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“The two state variables are political institutions and the distribution of resources, and the 
knowledge of these two variables at time t is sufficient to determine all of the other variables in 
the system. While political institutions determine the distribution of de jure political power in 
society, the distribution of resources influences the distribution of de facto political power at 
time t. These two sources of political power, in turn, affect the choice of economic institutions 
and influence the future evolution of political institutions. Economic institutions determine 
economic outcomes, including the aggregate growth rate of the economy and the distribution of 
resources at time t + 1. Although economic institutions are the essential factor shaping economic 
outcomes, they are themselves endogenous and determined by political institutions and 
distribution of resources in society.” (Acemoglu et al. (2004, p. 6). 
This abstract, but highly simple framework enables Acemoglu et al. (2004) to answer the 
question, Why do some societies choose “good economic institutions”? In discussing what good 
economic institutions are, Acemoglu et al. (2004)  try to avoid the danger of defining good 
economic institutions as those that generate economic growth, potentially leading to a tautology. 
“This danger arises because a given set of economic institutions may be relatively good during 
some periods and bad during others. For example, a set of economic institutions that protects the 
property rights of a small elite might not be inimical to economic growth when all major 
investment opportunities are in the hands of this elite, but could be very harmful when 
investments and participation by other groups are important for economic growth.” (Acemoglu et 
al., 2004, p. 9). To avoid such a tautology and to simplify and focus the discussion, Acemoglu et 
al. (2004) provide a definition of good economic institutions as “those that provide security of 
property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-section of 
society. Although this definition is far from requiring equality of opportunity in society, it 
implies that societies where only a very small fraction of the population have well-enforced 
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property rights do not have good economic institutions.” (Acemoglu et al., 2004, p. 9). 
Moreover, Acemoglu et al. (2004, p. 13) believe that the structure of markets itself is partly 
determined by property rights, contending that “Once individuals have secure property rights and 
there is equality of opportunity, the incentives will exist to create and improve markets (even 
though achieving perfect markets would be typically impossible). Thus we expect differences in 
markets to be an outcome of differing systems of property rights and political institutions, not 
unalterable characteristics responsible for cross-country differences in economic performance. 
This motivates our focus on economic institutions related to the enforcement of property rights 
of a broad cross-section of society.” 
Good economic institutions can be a cluster of interrelated things. The search for what 
constitutes a good set of economic institutions needs to start from North’s (1981) pioneering 
work. North (1981, pp. 20-27) distinguishes between a “contract theory” of the state and a 
“predatory theory” of the state. A summarized notion of the “contract theory” of the state 
corresponds to the situation where the state and associated institutions provide the necessary 
legal framework for the private contracts to emerge and in turn facilitate economic transactions 
via the reduction in transaction costs. Moreover, North’s “contract theory” implies that good 
institutions, apart from supporting private contracts, provide checks against expropriation by the 
government or other politically powerful groups. Instead, the “predatory theory” of the state 
implies that the state is an instrument for transferring resources from one group to another. 
Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2001) distinguish between the institutions of private property, a 
cluster of economic institutions, including the rule of law and the enforcement of property rights, 
and the extractive institutions, defined as institutions under which the rule of law and property 
rights are absent for large majorities of the population. In Clague et al.’s (1997) definition, the 
good economic institutions of a market economy include the legal provision for rights to 
property, the mechanisms to enforce contracts, and the government entities that can provide 
physical security of property and impartial enforcement of contracts. This implies that the rights 
must exist on paper, and government entities (such as police and courts) must be capable of 
enforcing them. The existence of these rights depends on a set of political arrangements.6 If these 
political arrangements are property rights and contract enforcement institutions friendly, then 
                                                          
6 Acemoglu et al. (2004) provide a framework for understanding the relationship between political arrangements and 
property rights and contract enforcement institutions. 
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they give government officials the incentives to use their power to protect the members of the 
private sector from one another, and not to expropriate or defraud private parties (Clague et al. 
1997). Similarly, addressing the issue of what good economic institutions consist of, Murrell 
(1996) points at one particular set of institutions central to capitalism, those pertinent to property 
rights, contract enforcement, corporate governance and creditors’ rights. Some contributions to 
the growth literature have incorporated stylized notions of property rights into formal growth 
models. Tornell (1997) introduces endogenous institutional change (in the form of property 
rights) into a neoclassical growth model to explain the growth paths of most developing and 
developed countries.  
Olson (1996) is concerned with finding the sources of poor economic performance in 
developing countries. The absence of institutions that enforce contracts impartially, and make 
property rights secure over the long run make developing countries lose most of the gains from 
trade (where third-party impartial enforcement is needed), and most of the gains from capital-
intensive production (Olson, 1996). Similarly, Clague et al. (1997) contend that differences in 
property rights and contract enforcement mechanisms are an important part of the explanation of 
why some countries prosper while others do not.  
The contemporary literature has documented the importance of a “cluster” of institutions 
that include both contract enforcement and private property protection elements (Acemoglu et 
al., 2004)7. This is the approach used in this dissertation as well, mainly due to data 
discrepancies and the conceptual and empirical challenges in measuring these two categories of 
institutions separately. Acemoglu et al. (2003a), however, are among the first authors to 
unbundle this cluster of institutions, using historical European colonies data and employing an 
instrumental variable approach to find that property rights institutions are the driving element of 
the cluster that matters for economic growth.8 
 
2.3  Review of Empirical Studies Using Institutional Measures 
 
History has performed some experiments that lead to some important conclusions about 
the role of institutions in explaining income differences across countries. During most of the 
                                                          
7 These categories of institutions often have been measured together using as proxies, indicators of rule of law 
(known also as rules and regulations). 
8 Acemoglu et al. (2003a, p. 4) find that once they control for the effects of property-rights institutions, contracting 
institutions seem to have no impact on income per capita, but rather only affect the form of financial intermediaries. 
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postwar period, China, Germany and Korea have been divided, so that different parts of nations 
with about the same culture and geography have had different institutions and economic policies. 
The economic performances of Hong Kong and Taiwan, West Germany and South Korea have 
been incomparably better than the performances of mainland China, East Germany and North 
Korea. These examples are cited by Olson et al. (1996) and Acemoglu et al. (2004) as typical 
historical examples in support of the hypothesis that differences in institutions and economic 
policies account for much of the unexplained variation in per capita incomes across countries. 
When we look over a wider range of countries, it is more difficult to find clear-cut 
examples as the ones above. Nevertheless, research focusing on the relative importance of 
institutional measures in explaining the variability of economic performance, such as per capita 
incomes or per capita growth rates, across countries, has been abundant. In their pioneering 
empirical work of the new growth theory, Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1994) include a variable 
measuring political instability. Their results show that an increase of political instability by one 
standard deviation from the mean in a sample of 97 countries lowers the growth by a substantial 
amount, 0.4 percentage points per year. Easterly and Levine (1998) also find statistical 
significance of political instability on growth for African countries.  
Other studies have focused on the effect of corruption on economic growth. Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997) show how corruption results in low expenditures on health and education (where 
bribery opportunities are limited), and large but poorly executed public investment projects 
(where bribery opportunities are legion). Mauro (1997) has summarized how corruption indexes 
explain statistically various performance measures such as growth or investment ratios. “But 
political instability is surely too narrow a definition of institutional development, and corruption 
too all encompassing and more of a result of institutional conditions than a measure of those 
conditions” (Havrylyshyn et al. 2000, p. 5). A few other studies go well beyond the use of 
political instability or corruption indices. Among the earlier ones are Keefer and Knack (1995), 
who use several different measures of effective governance from the privately compiled 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Olson et al. (2000) explain growth in 68 countries 
over the period 1960-87 by conventional neo-classical and new growth theory variables, and then 
explain the remaining productivity growth residual using several measures of institutional 
governance: the risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, quality of bureaucracy, level 
of government corruption, and rule of law.  
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An area of increasing interest to economists has become the investigation of the channels 
through which institutions and economic performance are interrelated. Glaser et al. (2004) 
question the reverse causation between political institutions and growth and argue that it is in 
fact output growth and human capital that lead to political institutional improvements. Moreover, 
Glaser et al. (2004) raise the concern that most indicators of institutional quality are “outcome” 
measures suffering from the subjectivity of their creators. 
Fewer studies have tried to measure the effect of institutional measures on output and 
output growth performance in transition countries. Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) are among the first 
authors attempting to empirically measure the impact of market-friendly institutions on output 
growth across transition economies. Havrylyshyn et al. (2000, pp. 5-6) propose three categories 
of market friendly institutions that are separately measurable in principle and that have separate 
effects on economic performance. The first category consists of the legal framework for 
economic activity, which includes the establishment of the legislation for free economic activity, 
bankruptcy, contract law and most importantly the enforcement of such legislation even-
handedly and transparently. This first category is analogous to the “rule of law” and “security of 
property rights” categories used in institutional literature papers. Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) 
second category of institutions is political and civic freedom, which is a category of political 
institutions consisting of the democratic processes, freedom of assembly and speech, equal 
treatment by political and judicial bodies, etc. Last, and particularly in the context of transition 
economies, Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) list a third category of institutional reform as it relates to 
economic decentralization and liberalization. We can think of this third category of institutional 
reform as one that enhances enterprise restructuring, governance, competition policy, and 
restructuring of the financial sector. Havrylyshyn et al. (2000, p.6) are among the first to make a 
distinction between structural policy reforms (SPR), consisting of price and trade liberalization 
policies and small and large scale privatization policies, and institutional reforms leading to the 
development of market-enhancing institutions. Moreover, Havrylyshyn et al. (2000, p.6) argue 
that structural policy reforms (labeled by them as “good policies”) capture measures that can be 
introduced within a short time frame, while institutional reforms, by their very nature, take much 
longer to develop. “Consistent with the institutional approach, the effect on performance of the 
above three categories of institutions is not a simple one, but involves a rather more complex 
model where the pace of development of each could be different, where the three interact in both 
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a substitution and complementary fashion, and one in which threshold effects may exist” 
(Havrylyshyn et al. 2000, p. 6). Even though Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) do not build a clear-cut 
model of the sort they refer to, they argue that it is useful to have the three different categories of 
institutional development  
measured separately whenever possible.9  Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) empirical findings suggest 
that the development of an institutional framework indeed has a significantly positive impact on 
growth, but that progress in achieving macroeconomic stabilization and implementing broad-
based economic reforms remain (up to year 1998) the key determinants of growth in transition 
economies. 
A study by Poirson (1998) uses the same approach as Havrylyshyn et al. (2000), which is 
to add to the conventional variables several institutional measures of “economic security.” These 
measures are taken from the ICRG and are similar to those used by Olson et al. (1998), but also 
include the degree of civil liberty from Freedom House publications.  
Pfefferman and Kisunko (1999) use recent World Bank survey data of what managers see 
as obstacles to doing business in different countries. Their results demonstrate that the level of 
private investment is greater where the predictability of the judiciary is highest and regulations 
for starting new operations are simple.  
Johnson et al. (2000) use survey data to examine new firms in Poland, Slovakia, 
Romania, Russia and Ukraine. Their findings suggest that a lack of bank finance does not seem 
to prevent private-sector growth and that more inhibiting than inadequate finance are insecure 
property rights. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Contrary to this argument, in their paper Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) use principal component analysis to compile an 
overall institutional indicator and test its significance in a growth regression framework.  
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III.  Methodology 
 
Modeling the evolution of output in transition as a function of its many possible 
determinants gives rise to a number of methodological problems. The main empirical 
methodology employed by researchers working on output performance in transition has been 
stylized growth regression analysis. It is clear, however, that with little guidance from economic 
theory, there is a large potential for misspecifying the regression model by omitting relevant 
variables (Berg et al. 1999). This suggests the need to either “test down” from more general to 
more specific structures following Hendry’s approach,10 or to explore the robustness of the 
estimated coefficients in a systematic way, using the Extreme Bounds analysis, as it has been 
done in the empirical literature on long-term growth,11 or to do both, as it is the case in 
Radulescu et al. (2002). As a result of these studies and the others cited in the previous chapters, 
some consensus regarding the determinants of output growth in transition has emerged. We take 
this consensus as a starting point in the theoretical model and the empirical specifications and 
proceed with addressing other unresolved methodology concerns. 
First, medium-run growth rates in transition might not be the only and best representation 
of economic performance. As some researchers have argued, there are no conclusive test results 
whether the depended variable should be GDP growth rate or GDP level, particularly as the GDP 
level (GDPI) relates to the pre-transition level (Berg et al. 1999). If we think of the transition 
process in terms of a heuristic model, we realize that medium run growth rates, observed 
throughout the first 13-15 years of transition so far, are not more indicative than the level of 
output compared to the pre-transition level for the purposes of intermediate economic 
performance (Sachs et al. 2000a, 2000b). Thus, both output and output growth rates will be the 
main dependent variables in this dissertation. 
Second, we are faced with potential endogeneity problems, both through the presence of 
unaccounted country-specific effects and because some of the right-hand side determinants of 
                                                          
10 Berg et al. (1999) employee such an approach and label it the ‘Hendry’s approach’, in honor of Prof. David 
Hendry’s work (Hendry, D. 1995, “Dynamic Econometrics,” Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press). 
11 Levine and Renelt 1992, and Sala-I-Martin 1997 and 2004 employ such an approach known as the Extreme 
Bounds Analysis (EBA), which was first advocated by Leamer (1983). It consists of starting with a small number of 
‘free variables’ which appear in all regressions and testing up by adding combinations of the ‘doubtful variables.’ 
Coefficients on the variables of interest are monitored across growth regressions and the extreme bounds of each 
coefficient are calculated taking into account the sampling uncertainty. 
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output and output growth could depend on output performance (Berg et al. 1999, Merlevede, 
2003 and Falcetti et al. 2002). The endogeneity of both structural policy reforms and institutional 
measures with respect to output growth is a crucial issue for the growth literature in transition 
economies. Some studies, such as De Melo et al. (1997b), Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) and 
Radulescu et al. (2002) take structural policy reforms (SPR) to be exogenous to growth. This is 
problematic because failure to account for the feedback of growth to SPR biases the estimates of 
structural policy reforms’ changes on growth. Heybey and Murell (1999) and Wolf (1999) 
recognize this problem and allow for feedback of growth to structural policy reforms, using a 
cross-country analytical framework. Merlevede (2003) models structural policy reforms as 
endogenous to growth, with output growth and structural policy reforms jointly determining and 
affecting one-another. On the other hand, there is a lack of studies that address the endogeneity 
of institutional development to output performance. Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) are among the 
first authors to empirically estimate the impact of the market-friendly institutional framework on 
output growth in transition economies and make a clear distinction between structural reform 
policies and institutions. However, they fail to take into account potential endogeneity problems 
arising from better economic performance (expressed, among other variables, through GDP 
growth rates) to increased resources and efforts of transition governments to devote more of 
these resources to institutional building, resulting in higher scores for institutional indicators. 
Third, while most papers treat the transition experience, encompassing a decline stage 
and a recovery stage, as only one period, with transition countries starting the transition process 
at the same transition year base (corresponding to different calendar years for CEE and FSU 
countries),12 an alternative method is to consider the two stages of the transition process 
separately. The transition period covered up to date is long enough to allow separate econometric 
analysis of two sub-periods. Havryslyshyn et al. (1999) use a somehow ad hoc definition of these 
two sub periods defining the decline period as encompassing years 1989-1993 and the recovery 
period encompassing years 1994 and on. Their specifications include measures of institutional 
reform only under the recovery stage, while the rest of the determinants in the two stages are 
overlapping. 
We might think that the determinants of the decline and the recovery stages in transition 
are overlapping, but when it comes to variables measuring progress with institutional reform and 
                                                          
12 See Table 4 for more details. 
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property rights and contract enforcement institutions, it is reasonable to think that their effect on 
output performance comes into play mostly during the recovery stage. This is in line with the 
very nature of institutions taking time to develop. Keeping in mind that in transition economies a 
market-oriented institutional framework was missing in the beginning of transition and during 
most of the decline stage, it makes sense to focus mainly on the recovery stage if we are 
interested in exploring the relationship between output performance and institutions. Therefore, 
first this dissertation estimates the empirical specification system (presented in Chapter 4) using 
the whole transition period dataset, and then it uses only the recovery stage period dataset to 
estimate the same system.  
Fourth, there exist other potential explanatory variables that could gain more explanatory 
power over output performance as transition proceeds. Several papers, such as De Melo et al. 
(1997b), Jaros (2001) and Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) have already shown that structural policy 
reforms, initial conditions and macroeconomic stabilization policies have a great explanatory 
power over output and output growth variation when the transition dataset covers data through 
year 1998. Such a period covers both the decline and the recovery stages. As the transition of 
centrally planned economies to market economies proceeds, differences in institutional reforms 
are expected to acquire more importance as determinants of economic performance compared to 
measures of market liberalization and small scale privatization (Falcetti et al., 2002). Other 
factors that are expected to acquire importance are conventional growth determinants such as 
investment, labor and human capital expansion, trade openness and foreign direct investment. It 
is questionable, however, when these factors will have a significant explanatory power over 
output performance in general, and output growth rates in particular. If we are referring to the 
long run, most likely these factors will play a crucial role. But, when studying the determinants 
of output performance in transition economies, with only 13 to15 years of data available, the 
focus shifts from long-term growth to the short term, or at the best to the medium term 
(Radulescu et al., 2002). Thus, even though the existing literature has not found an important 
effect of conventional growth determinants yet, this doesn’t mean that these determinants will 
not gain explanatory power over output performance as the transition process reaches its 
completion and transition economies fully become market economies. These determinants could 
have already started to play an important role on the output performance of the more advanced 
transition economies of CEE, but the purpose of this dissertation will not include the empirical 
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testing of this hypothesis. The existing transition literature suggests that for the over-
industrialized, distorted, and inefficient transition economies, output recovery comes only after 
some elimination of the wasteful old production. Moreover, this output recovery usually cannot 
be based on a large investment effort to build the new product, before the necessary incentives 
for efficient resource use are in place (Hernandez-Cata, 1999). Thus, investment, one of the 
conventional growth determinants, does not seem to be a candidate in the list of transition growth 
determinants. Trade openness is another popular conventional growth determinant. Wolf (1997) 
tests for the effect of trade (export) openness on GDP growth and finds no significant effect. The 
explanation for this lack of significance may be that almost all transition economies implemented 
trade and exchange rate liberalization policies and became relatively open quickly. Moreover, 
those countries that achieved earlier restructuring were able to reorient their trade quickly to new 
markets, which means that exports may not so much have led to growth, but rather restructuring, 
which was necessary for recovery, tended to promote exports (Havrylyshyn et al., 1999). 
At the beginning of transition several expectations were raised regarding the effect of 
foreign direct investments on output performance. Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) have argued and 
Wolf (1999) has tested that foreign direct investment has not had the expected explanatory power 
on output growth during the first 7-8 years of transition. The reason for this finding may be that 
the relationship between growth and foreign direct investments is mutually reinforcing. While 
there is little doubt that foreign direct investment promotes growth, those factors that promote 
greater structural policy reforms and macroeconomic stabilization also attract foreign direct 
investments (Havrylyshyn et al., 1999). It is due probably to this simultaneity that the 
econometric analysis of growth in transition has been unable to isolate the foreign direct 
investment as an explanatory factor, in the sense that once structural policy reforms and 
macroeconomic stabilization are accounted for, controlling for the effect of foreign direct 
investment doesn’t yield any important results. 
Other conventional growth determinants include changes in the labor force participation 
and human capital that usually take place over long periods of time. If we closely observe 
changes in population during the first decade of transition we might agree that significant 
population changes have not occurred. A common phenomenon, however, has been the brain 
drain, which in terms of population numbers is compensated by population growth. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that human capital has remained unaffected by this brain drain, 
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especially in countries like Albania, Romania, Bulgaria or countries in the CIS. Thus, we may 
think that while significant changes in the quantity of labor force in transition economies have 
not occurred, the quality of the labor force has been affected due to the brain drain phenomena. 
On the other hand, changes in human capital have occurred as a result of the decentralization of 
health care and education systems in transition countries. Education and health care were among 
the proudest achievements of socialism.13 As a result of a significant change in the state’s control 
over health and education expenses (as compared to the pre-transition period), these sectors have 
undergone significant changes. Lack of studies quantifying the effect of health or human capital 
indicators on output performance in transition makes the task of including such measures in an 
empirical analysis daunting.  
Fifth, most transition studies focusing on the impact of structural policy reforms on 
growth use average (or weighted) structural policy reforms indices developed by EBRD and 
World Bank. A number of recent studies have divided these indices into their subcomponents 
(Radulescu et al. 2002, Raiser et al. 2001, Falcetti et al. 2002 Merlevede et al. 2003). This 
allows us to test which of these SPR indices best explains growth performance in transition. 
Radulescu et al. (2002) show that growth over the first decade of transition is best explained by a 
simple average of all EBRD’s reform indices, and that none of the subcomponents by itself has 
any greater explanatory power than this average. This is consistent with Havrylyshyn et al. 
(1999) who contend that it has not been possible to isolate one subcomponent as more important 
than others. Similarly, for non-transition economies, Aziz and Wescott (1997) show that it is a 
combination of policies that is more critical for growth than any individual type of policy. On the 
other hand, Falcetti et al. 2002 assert that a narrower definition of reforms, including only price 
and trade liberalization and small scale privatization has the most explanatory power over GDP 
growth performance in transition economies. In this dissertation, both a broad and a narrow 
definition of an average indicator of structural policy reforms are used and experiments are run 
with individual SPR indicators as well. 
Sixth, the way in which initial conditions are to enter the regression model poses some 
questions. In particular, one would like a specification that allows for the possibility that the 
same initial conditions might have quite different effects at the beginning of transition or well 
into the transition (De Melo et al. 1997b and Berg et al. 1999). Imposing that initial conditions 
                                                          
13 See World Bank (1996) for more details. 
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continue to play the same role throughout the transition process is not accurate (De Melo et al., 
1997b). In order to account for the changing effects that initial conditions play on output 
performance, institutional development and SPR, an interaction variable of initial conditions 
with a time trend is included in the three equations of the empirical specification system. 
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IV.  Theoretical Model and Empirical Model Specifications 
 
4.1 The Theoretical Model 
 
Suppose the structural model of aggregate output and output growth during transition is 
as follows: 
 
Y i,t = F (SPR i,t, SPR  i,t-1, ….; I i,t; M i,t; X i) + Z i +ε  i,t   (1) 
SPR i,t = G (Y i,t, Y i,t-1….; SPR i,t-1; P i,t; X i) + Z i + η i,t   (2) 
I i,t = H (Y i,t, Y i,t-1,….; SPR i,t, SPR i,t-1, ….; Pi,t; Si,t; X i) + Z i + υ i,t (3) 
 
In equation (1), Yit is the main dependent variable, either output or output growth rate. 
SPRi,t  represents structural policy reform variables, such as price and trade liberalization and 
privatization. Mi,t denotes macroeconomic policy variables, such as inflation stabilization or 
government fiscal balance. Ii,t represents the institutional development, which is different in 
nature from SPRi,t.14 Xi denotes observable country-specific effects (including initial conditions), 
and Zi stands for the unobservable country-specific effects. Last, ε  is the disturbance term and t 
and i index the time period and the country, respectively.  
In equation (2), SPRi,t, representing structural policy variables such as market and trade 
liberalization and privatization, is a function of current and past output level or output growth, 
political reform, Pi,t, as well as observable and unobservable country-specific characteristics. 
In equation (3) institutional development, Ii,t (representing either the institutional reform, 
or property rights and contract enforcement institutions) is a function of current and past output 
level or output growth, a vector of institutional demand factors, consisting of political reform, 
and structural policy reforms, a vector of institutional supply factors, Si,t, as well as observable 
and unobservable country-specific characteristics. 
 In the above system, the three equations are identified and can in principle be consistently 
estimated, provided that we take care of potential fixed effects problems entering through the 
correlation of Zi (the unobservable country effect) with the remaining right-hand side variables, 
                                                          
14 This is in line with Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) distinction. 
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and the endogeneity of SPR and institutional development on output performance. In addition, in 
order to address the presence of fixed effects, a large set of initial conditions (i.e., observable Xi) 
are included in the model. Another way to address the latter problem would be to explicitly 
estimate the model including binary variables (country dummies). 
 
4.2 Estimation Techniques 
 
The most general empirical model specification used in this dissertation is drawn from 
the theoretical system of equations model presented in (1), (2) and (3) and is given below. 
 
 
+++++++= − 254,31.2,10, tttititiiti TimeTimeINSTSPRSPRGDPG αααααµα   
        titititi RTINFLxTimeIC ,,8,76 εααα ++++     (4) 
++++++= −− titititiiti POLREFSPRGDPGGDPGSPR ,41.31,2,10, ββββϕβ   
  tititt xTimeICTimeTime ,7
2
65 ηβββ ++++      (5) 
+++++++= −− titititiiti POLREFSPRSPRGDPGGDPGINST ,51.431,2,10, δδδδδρδ  
        tititititt GOVEXPSTABxTimeICTimeTime ,,10,98
2
76 γδδδδδ ++++++  (6) 
 
In matrix form (4) (5) and (6) could be written as:  
 
111
11
01
1
NTxNxNTXNKxNTxKNTNTx X εµαια µ +Ζ++=Υ      (4’) 
111
12
01
2
NTxNxNTXNKxNTxKNTNTx X ηϕβιβ ϕ +Ζ++=Υ      (5’) 
111
13
01
3
NTxNxNTXNKxNTxKNTNTx X γρδιδ ρ +Ζ++=Υ      (6’) 
 
Let g* be the number of endogenous variables in each of the above equations. Let k* be 
the number of exogenous variables in each of the above equations and let K* be the total number 
of exogenous variables in the above simultaneous equation system. 
In (4’), [ ] *** 352411331)247(31 Kkg ==+<=−++=−+ , which means (4’) is over-
identified.  
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In (5’), [ ] *** 352411311)246(21 Kkg ==+<=−++=−+ , which means (5’) is over-
identified. 
In (6’), [ ] *** 352411341)248(31 Kkg ==+<=−++=−+ , which means (6’) is over-
identified. 
 
Condensing the matrix notations we get: 
 
εµα µ +Ζ+Ζ=Υ 211         (4’’) 
ηϕβ ϕ +Ζ+Ζ=Υ 222         (5’’) 
γρδ ρ +Ζ+Ζ=Υ 233         (6’’) 
 
If we explicitly introduce N-1 country binary (dummy) variables to capture the fixed 
effects, then we can rewrite the above system as: 
 
εα +Ζ=Υ 41           (4’’) 
ηβ +Ζ=Υ 52           (5’’) 
γδ +Ζ=Υ 63           (6’’) 
 
[ ]µΖΖ=Ζ 14 , [ ]ϕΖΖ=Ζ 25 , and [ ]ρΖΖ=Ζ 36  
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= µ
αα 2 , ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ϕ
ββ 2  and ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ρ
δδ 2  
 
Let X be a matrix of exogenous and predetermined variables as shown in Figure 3. A 
simple Instrumental Variable estimator (IV) could be used to estimate (4’’), (5’’) and (6’’) 
provided that each equation of the system is at least identified (Greene 2003, Chapter 15, 
sections 15.3 and 15.5) 
The simple IV estimators for each of the three equations are given by the following: 
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[ ] 1'14'ˆ ΥΧΖΧ= −IVα  
[ ] 2'15'ˆ ΥΧΖΧ= −IVβ  
[ ] 3'16'ˆ ΥΧΖΧ= −IVδ  
 
If equations (4’’), (5’’) and (6’’) are over-identified, like in our case, then the Generalized 
IV estimator known also as the two stage least squares estimator (2SLS), could be used to get: 
 
[ ] 1'1''414'1''4 )()(ˆ ΥΧΧΧΧΖΧΧΧΧ= −−− ZZGIVα  
[ ] 2'1''415'1''5 )()(ˆ ΥΧΧΧΧΖΧΧΧΧ= −−− ZZGIVβ  
[ ] 6'1''416'1''6 )()(ˆ ΥΧΧΧΧΖΧΧΧΧ= −−− ZZGIVδ  
 
If we assume that the error terms have some common element, than a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) technique can improve the efficiency of the 2SLS instrumental 
variable estimator (Greene, 2003, Chapter 14). The structure of the error terms is given below: 
 
[ ]Ω=
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
= ,0,0
333231
232221
131211
NTNTNT
NTNTNT
NTNTNT
III
III
III
e
ψψψ
ψψψ
ψψψ
γ
η
ε
 
 
The three stages least squares (3SLS) estimation procedure (Greene 2003, Chapter 15.6) 
consists in first using the 2SLS estimator to estimate: 
 
SLS241 ˆˆ αΖ=Υ           (7) 
SLS252
ˆˆ βΖ=Υ           (8) 
SLS263
ˆˆ δΖ=Υ           (9) 
 
Next we can recover:  
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⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
γ
η
ε
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
eˆ  and use these residuals to estimate the following: 
 
NT
εεψ ˆˆˆ
'
11 =  , NT
ηηψ ˆˆˆ
'
22 =  , NT
γγψ ˆˆˆ
'
33 =  , NT
ηεψψ ˆˆˆˆ
'
2112 == , NT
γεψψ ˆˆˆˆ
'
3113 ==  and  
NT
γηψψ ˆˆˆˆ
'
3223 ==  
 
klψˆ  are consistent estimates for klψ  for k = 1,2,3 and l = 1,2,3 and we can use them to 
formulate the 3SLS estimator. 
 
Now we have the stacked model: 
 
e+Ζ=
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
+
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
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⎢
⎣
⎡
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⎥
⎦
⎤
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⎦
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⎣
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Υ
Υ
Υ
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δ
β
α
6
5
4
3
2
1
00
00
00
     (10) 
 
And we are assuming that: 
 
012 ≠ψ , 013 ≠ψ , 023 ≠ψ  
 
Next, we multiplying (10) by 
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
Χ
Χ
Χ
=Χ
00
00
00
,  
where Χ  is the IV matrix shown in Appendix 1, containing the exogenous and the 
predetermined variables that are not contemporaneously correlated with the error term. 
 
After the multiplication we get: 
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The 3SLS estimator is given as follows: 
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 We can rewrite the three stages least squares estimator as: 
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The variance of SLS3ˆξ  is given by: 
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 As shown below SLS3ˆξ is consistent: 
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4.3 Empirical Models Used by Other Authors 
 
The purpose of this section is to highlight some of the most related empirical 
specifications to the one that we use in the next section (section 4.4). We use these empirical 
specifications as a starting point for the empirical specifications (4), (5) and (6), and relate to 
them in Chapter 6, when we present and compare our estimation results to the findings of these 
authors. 
The first related empirical specification model is the one given by De Melo et al. 
(1997b), who analyze how the degree of political freedom determines structural policy reform, 
which in turn is a very important determinant of GDP growth.15 De Melo et al. (1997b) estimate 
a recursive system of two equations, assuming that the error terms are not correlated.16 De Melo 
et al. (1997b, p. 18) model economic performance (GDP growth and inflation) and structural 
policy reforms (labeled as liberalization policies, LIB), in the following fashion: 
 
                                                          
15 Wolf (1997) uses a similar approach by first identifying some underlying factors (or initial conditions such as 
distance to market economies, years of communism, Lutheran/Catholic/Orthodox influence) which explain the 
amount of “correct” policy effort in transition countries, and then measuring the effect of the resulting good policies 
on growth. 
16 Thus, they estimate each regression separately using OLS. 
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1,4,3211,0, 21 ε++++++= − titiiititi RTbFREEDOMbPRINbPRINbLIBbaLIB   (D-1) 
2,41,3,210, 21 ε++++++= − tititiiiti RTyLIByLIByPRINyPRINyzEPERFORMANC  (D-2) 
 
In (D-1), LIB is the liberalization index (a weighted average of price liberalization, trade 
and exchange liberalization, privatization and reform of the banking sector), PRIN1 and PRIN2 
the two time-invariant principal component indicators for initial conditions, RT is a binary 
variable recording the presence of regional tensions such as wars and other conflicts, and 
PERFORMANCE represents economic performance captured by GDP growth and inflation.17 In 
our empirical specifications, we rely on (D-1) to model structural policy reforms (equivalent to 
the LIB index), and partially on (D-2) to model GDP growth (GDPG). 
The other group of related empirical specifications is found in Falcetti et al. (2002) and 
Merlevede (2003), who argue that growth and structural policy reforms (referred to simply as 
“reforms”) are jointly determined and affect one another. Merlevede (2003, p. 656) estimates the 
following system: 
 
+++++∆++++=∆ − iititititiiti tICtICttDRIRIRIGDP 21 76254,,31.2,10, ααααααααα        
      titiSTAB ,,8 εα ++          (M-1) 
tiiitititiiti tICtICFSGDPGDPRI ,54,31,2,10, 21 ηβββββββ ++++∆+∆++= −   (M-2) 
 
In (M-1), real GDP growth ( GDP∆ ) is related to a constant, a country effect, a quadratic 
time trend, initial conditions IC1 and IC2 multiplied by a linear time trend, a stabilization 
variable, tiSTAB , ,
18 current and lagged aggregate reform,19 and finally a reversal variable, 
constructed as titi DRI ,,∆ .20  
                                                          
17 De Melo et al. (1997b) estimate a recursive system of three equations with LIB, GROWTH and INFLATION as the 
left-hand side dependent variables. 
18 Inflation and fiscal balance are the two variables used as proxies for stabilization. 
19 Merlevede (2003) uses both structural policy reform indexes and institutional reform indexes in an aggregate 
reform index, RI, just like Radulescu et al. (2002). Raiser et al. (2001) distinguish between these two types of 
indicators and use structural policy reform indicators as explanatory variables for the simple average indicator of 
institutional reform. 
20 tiRI ,∆  is the change in the aggregate reform index and 0<∆RI  is defined as reform reversal. The dummy 
variable tiD , takes the value 1 if a reversal occurs and 0 otherwise. 
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The level of the reform index, RI, is specified as a function of a country’s specific effect, 
current and lagged real GDP growth, initial conditions interacted with a time trend, and the 
freedom status, FS.21 Merlevede’s system above is closely related to the panel specification in 
Falcetti et al. (2002). If 3α is set to zero, only one initial condition index is selected, and this 
initial condition index enters once by itself and once interacted with the time variable, then the 
Falcetti et al. (2002, p. 240) system is obtained22.  
 
4.4 Empirical Model Specifications 
 
In our empirical specifications, following from the theoretical model, we allow output 
performance, institutional development and SPR to jointly determine and affect one another. The 
following general empirical model was first introduced in section 4.2 and is provided again 
below for reference purposes. 
 
 
+++++++= − 254,31.2,10, tttititiiti TimeTimeINSTSPRSPRGDPG αααααµα   
       titititi RTINFLxTimeIC ,,8,76 εααα ++++     (4) 
++++++= −− titititiiti POLREFSPRGDPGGDPGSPR ,41.31,2,10, ββββϕβ  
    tititt xTimeICTimeTime ,7
2
65 ηβββ ++++      (5) 
+++++++= −− titititiiti POLREFSPRSPRGDPGGDPGINST ,51.431,2,10, δδδδδρδ  
        tititititt GOVEXPSTABxTimeICTimeTime ,,10,98
2
76 γδδδδδ ++++++  (6) 
 
The above equations constitute one set of specifications. The other set is similar to the 
one shown except it has GDPI instead of GDPG. Following Berg et al. (1999) I use GDPI, the 
level of output compared to the pre-transition level (GDP1989 or GDP1991 = 100%) as another 
variable of economic performance. Thus, we can think of the above empirical specification 
system as representing both sets.  
                                                          
21 The freedom status is calculated as the average of the ratings of the Freedom House political liberties and civil 
rights indices.  
22 In the empirical specifications reported, Falcetti et al. (2002) use country binary variables (dummies) instead of 
ICi to account for specific country effects. 
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While (4) could be thought as a combination of (M-1) and (D-2) adding the presence of 
institutions, and (5) as a combination of (D-1) and (M-2), specification (6) is based on the work 
of Raiser et al. (2001), who identifies the (6) right hand side variables as the main explanatory 
variables of institutional change (reform) in their model. In addition to Raiser et al. (2001) 
determinants, in (6) we allow for the presence of output/output growth and the presence of a 
uniform non-linear time trend. 
In (4), GDPG stands for GDP growth, SPR represents structural policy reforms, INST 
represents institutional development (either institutional reform, or property rights and contract 
enforcement institutions), Time and Time2 represent a quadratic time trend, IC1 is the first 
principal component indicator of initial conditions indicator, representing the degree of 
macroeconomic and structural distortions ( i.e., repressed inflation, black market exchange rate 
premium, trade dependency, and over-industrialization) at the beginning of the transition 
process. IC1xTime is an interaction term between the first principal component indicator of 
initial conditions and time, included to capture the changing effect of initial conditions on output 
performance over time. Either IC1 or 24 country binary variables (to avoid the dummy trap, we 
should drop one dummy variable) could be used to capture the individual country effects of the 
25 transition economies, as modeled by Zi. In the presence of a fixed effects model, the direct 
effect of initial conditions on growth is captured by the country fixed effects. Following Falcetti 
et al. (2002) we have omitted IC1 from the above specification and include only IC1xTime to 
measure the changing effect of initial conditions on output performance through time.  
 INFL represents inflation and RT represents regional tensions, wars and conflicts. Lastly, 
iµ represents the fixed country-specific error component, treated as a constant, and ti,ε  is the 
remaining disturbance (error) term.  
In (4), both SPR and institutional development (including institutional reforms and 
property rights and contract enforcement institutions) are not exogenous to output performance. 
If De Melo et al.’s (1997b) assumptions of exogeneity of SPR to growth in the first 5 years of 
transition could be somehow maintained, the further each country moves away from its transition 
year base the more reasonable it is to assume that reforms are endogenous to growth. This is also 
the view that Falcetti et al. (2002) and Merlevede et al. (2003) share. Higher growth may ease 
resistance against structural and especially institutional reforms and increase resources available 
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to compensate losers from measures of liberalization or institutional reform. Thus, we take both 
structural policy reforms and institutional development to be endogenous to growth. 
Most researchers have argued about the non-linear relationship between structural policy 
reforms and output growth. Greater degrees of structural policy reforms as represented by SPR 
are expected to have a positive overall effect on growth (De Melo et al., 1997b, Berg et al., 1999 
and Havrylyshyn et al., 2000). Earlier empirical studies have shown that reforms may have at 
first a negative effect on growth, known as the Schumpeter’s “destruction”, but after a lag, the 
effect becomes positive. This lagged effect increases in proportion to the accumulated stock of 
reforms, resembling to the Schumpeter’s “creation” effect (De Melo et al., 1997b). Hence, while 
we expect contemporaneous SPR to have a negative effect on growth ( 1α < 0), lagged SPR is 
expected to have a positive effect on growth ( 2α > 0). Other theoretical grounds supporting this 
expectation come from Gomulka (1992) and Kornai (1993) who argue that the output contraction 
in sectors experiencing a decline in relative prices is not compensated by an output increase 
(which takes more time) in sectors where relative prices go up. Roland and Verdier (1999) 
provide other micro-founded explanations of why liberalization initially leads to short-term 
macroeconomic contractions.23 
The expected effect of institutional development (INST) is positive, i.e., 03 >α . The 
channels through which a market oriented institutional framework and property rights and 
contract enforcement institutions affect output performance were explained broadly in Chapter 2. 
Summarizing, progress with competition policy, governance and enterprise restructuring, and 
banking reform would complement liberalization and privatization policies towards the 
transformation of formally planned economies into market economies. Property rights and 
contract enforcement institutions, on the other hand, could be viewed as measures of long-term 
institutional development expected to positively affect output performance as the transition 
process comes towards its completion for all the transition economies. 
                                                          
23 Assuming markets in transition economies do not yet exist when prices are liberalized, Roland and Verdier (1999) 
put forward an explanation for the output fall based on a search model. According to this model liberalization 
policies create the freedom of the enterprises to search for new clients and suppliers. This search process involves 
externalities, as search by many bad clients may reduce the quality of the overall matches. Assuming relation-
specific investments in the Williamsons sense, Roland and Verdier (1999) argue that investments will only take 
place when a new long-term partner is found. If many enterprises prefer to keep on searching for at least one more 
period, they will not invest while searching and as a result aggregate output may fall after liberalization due to the 
failure of enterprises to replace the obsolete capital in the immediate period and due to a fall in investment demand. 
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The effect of initial conditions on output performance over time is expected to decrease. 
Recalling that the more negative the value of initial conditions indicator, the better (more 
favorable) initial conditions are, we expect 6α >0. Moreover, although the direct effect of bad 
initial conditions on output performance is expected to diminish, initial conditions continue to 
affect output performance negatively through their impact on SPR and INST. 
In general, one would expect higher inflation to have a negative impact on growth 
( 07 <α ). 
 Last, regional tensions, wars and conflicts (RT) are expected to negatively affect output 
performance ( 08 <α ). 
In (5), structural policy reforms (SPR) are determined by current and lagged output 
performance, lagged SPR, initial conditions and political reform (POLREF).  
It is difficult to form expectations on the sign of current and lagged output performance 
on SPR. This will depend largely on whether transition governments will be committed to a 
package of structural policy reforms regardless of output performance or whether output 
performance surprises lead to revisions of SPR plans. It is reasonable to assume that in the 
beginning of transition, most transition governments were committed for political reasons as well 
as economic grounds to a package of structural policy reforms often under the support of the 
IMF. Under this assumption both current and lagged output performance will affect SPR 
negatively. The lower the past output performance, the higher the commitment of transition 
governments to implement higher levels of structural policy reforms in order to improve output 
performance in the future. This expectation is based on a forward looking behavior of transition 
governments, which places greater value on future benefits making it easier to bear any 
immediate cost of liberalization policies in expectation of its future benefits. Another potential 
outcome is that especially after structural policy reforms have been implemented for a couple of 
years, and their effects on output performance are made noticeable, output performance surprises 
might lead transition governments to revise SPR plans. Thus, we may think the better current and 
lagged output performance, the greater the commitment of transition governments to a set of 
SPR-s and the greater the tolerance on the part of the populace for higher levels of SPR-s. On the 
other hand, a negative output performance might also lead to a reversal in structural policy 
reforms. Thus, we can think of a positive effect of current and lagged output performance on 
SPR, especially during the recovery stage. 
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The hypothesis that output performance depends negatively on the level of 
contemporaneous SPR, but positively on the accumulated stock of SPR, also has implications for 
the effect of past SPR on current SPR, in the context of output smoothing behavior (De Melo et 
al. 1997b). Given this trade-off, a higher level of achieved SPR allows a larger contemporaneous 
SPR step for a targeted GDP growth rate. Thus, we would expect contemporaneous SPR to 
depend positively on the extent of past SPR ( 03 >β ). 
Radical political change from autocracy to democracy may be associated with greater 
tolerance on the part of the population to economic hardships in the short run. Political reform 
can therefore support more forward-looking behavior which places greater value on future 
benefits making it easier to bear any immediate cost of liberalization policies or privatization. 
Thus, we expect 04 >β .  
Initial conditions negatively affect SPR, while their effect on SPR over time is expected 
to decrease over time ( 07 >β ). Lastly, the linear and quadratic time trend is used in (5) to check 
for any spurious relationships.   
In (6) institutional development (INST) is determined by three main categories of 
exogenous variables; initial conditions, demand factors and supply factors and the endogenous 
output performance (either GDP level or GDP growth rate). Better output performance means 
more resources for transition governments to allocate to institutional reform, or the building of 
property rights and contract enforcement institutions. We expect 01 >δ  and 02 >δ .  
Institutions are historically specific24 and for this reason it is necessary to be sensitive to 
the historical context. The inclusion of initial conditions among the causal factors of institutional 
reform in the transition economies reflects the possibility that history could matter a lot for 
institutional development trajectories followed by transition countries since the early 1990s 
(Raiser et al. 2001). The set of initial conditions used in specification (6) is the same as the one 
used in specifications (4) and (5). Details of the preparation of the principal component indicator 
for initial conditions are found in Chapter 5, section 5.2.4 of this dissertation. Of particular 
interest, from the set of initial conditions are geographical factors, such as location in terms of 
proximity to a thriving market economy (LOCAT) and natural resources (NRES). Proximity to 
                                                          
24 “History matters. It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the future are 
connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions. Today’s and tomorrow’s choices are shaped by the 
past. And the past can only be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolution. Integrating institutions into 
economic theory and economic history is an essential step in improving that theory and history” (North, 1990, p. vii) 
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the modern, democratic and business-oriented societies of the European Union could help in the 
process of institutional adoption through spill over effects, learning and cultural familiarity. 
Richness in natural resources, on the other hand, may slow down the institutional reforms, as 
natural resource abundance tends to diminish the perceived need for institutional reform, while 
vested interests gain control over the policy agenda (Raiser et al. 2001).  
Another group of factors relates to the legacy of central planning, which may affect 
institutional reform primarily by shaping individual behavior. The number of years spent under 
central planning (YUPLAN) and a categorical variable for the degree of established national 
sovereignty (STATE) are among the initial conditions indicators that would affect institutional 
reform substantially. The STATE indicator captures the fact that new nations would need to 
spend considerable resources on consolidation, leaving less resources available for institutional 
reform. 
Rather than separately measuring the effect of each category of initial conditions on 
institutional development, in (6) we only investigate how the effect of the overall principal 
component indicator of initial conditions (IC1) changes through time. Either IC1 or 24 country 
binary variables could be used to capture the individual country effects of the 25 transition 
economies, as modeled by Zi in the theoretical structural equation (3). In the presence of a fixed 
effects empirical specification model, such as (6), we capture the direct effect of initial 
conditions on institutional development by the country fixed effects. Just like in (4) and (5), we 
have omitted IC1 from (6) and include only IC1 x Time to control for the changing effect of 
initial conditions on institutional development through time. Following North (1989) and (1991) 
and Acemoglu et al. 2004, we expect 8δ < 0, which means an increasing effect of initial 
conditions over time. (The more negative the value of initial conditions indicator, the more 
favorable initial conditions are). 
Variables on the demand factors’ side include the structural policy reforms (including 
liberalization and privatization) and the political reform.25 Structural policy reforms determine 
institutional development, and not vice-versa. Most transition economies engaged in structural 
reforms either in shock therapy or gradual fashion, but in both instances institutional reforms 
took place after structural reforms and macro stabilization were achieved (Marangos, 2004). The 
                                                          
25 The terms “demand factors” and “supply factors” come from Raiser et al. (2001), who identify liberalization and 
privatization policies, and political reform among their set of demand factors, and government expenditures and 
macroeconomic stabilization as representative variables of the supply factors. 
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dominant view among reformers and their advisors during the early transition period was that 
because institutions would necessarily take time to develop, it was best to focus first on 
liberalization and privatization. Moreover, this advice was predicated on the expectation that the 
creation of markets would result in some endogenous adaptation of institutions and at least make 
institutional reform easier further down the road (Raiser et al. 2001). Thus we expect 3δ > 0 and 
4δ > 0. Political reform (as captured by Polity) is the other demand factor used to model 
economic institutional development. This variable represents Acemoglu et al.’s (2004) de jure 
political power which refers to power that originates from the political institutions in society.26 
The demand for economic institutions by economic actors will to some extent be determined by 
the political reform process. If the political institutions in a  given country do not grant 
individuals the political rights to express their views and the civil liberties to follow new 
opportunities in line with their preferences, the impact of market liberalization and privatization 
on the demand for institutions may be fundamentally altered (Raiser et al. 2001). Thus, we 
expect 05 >δ . 
 Among the supply factors for institutional reform, (6) contains two variables; GOVEXP 
and STAB. Institutional reform would be impossible without a state that enacts and enforces new 
rules and regulations. Thus, the role of the state as the “supplier” of institutional reform and its 
capacity to implement the necessary legal framework are of primary importance to the 
institutional reform. Following Popov (2000) and Raiser et al. (2001) the ratio of general 
government expenditures to GDP (GOVEXP) captures the time varying aspects of the state’s 
capacity. We expect 010 >δ . The other variable used to measure changes in state’s capacity over 
time is macroeconomic stability. For many transition economies, macroeconomic stabilization 
was the primary task at the beginning of the transition and institutional reforms only started to be 
considered once macroeconomic stabilization had been successfully secured. Hence, it may be 
argued that a state’s capacity for institutional reform is higher in countries that have successfully 
stabilized inflation. Following Raiser et al. (2001) we create a macroeconomic stability variable, 
STAB, which gives the number of years for each country since transition started in which 
inflation rate was below 30% and budget deficit below 5%. We expect 09 >δ .  
Lastly, a non-linear time trend is included in (6) to check for any spurious relationships.  
                                                          
26 See section 2.1.4 for more details.   
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V.  Data  
 
5.1.  Methodological Issues with Transition Data 
 
5.1.1 The Presence of an Unofficial Economy 
 
Before discussing data trends for transition economies five issues related to data need to 
be mentioned. First, data on output and output growth in transition economies should be treated 
with caution. Statistical measurement remains poor in many cases especially when dealing with 
the new private sector, much of which may be operating in the informal economy (Falcetti et al., 
2002). Filer and Hanousek (2000) argue that if more accurate data were available, they might 
reveal that the severity of the transition recession was greatly exaggerated. By taking into 
account estimates of the size of the unofficial economy, the variation of economic performance 
in general and growth rates in particular tends to be reduced. The only practical alternative to 
using official GDP data is to use output measures based on electricity consumption as suggested 
by Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996). This approach seems even more problematic not only 
because electricity consumption data are not available for all transition countries, but because in 
the case of transition economies other problems arise if we try to use electricity consumption 
data. Studies using electricity consumption-based estimates point out two assumptions that 
should hold: first, these studies assume constant output elasticities of electricity consumption 
along time, and second, these studies involve arbitrary assumptions about the magnitude of this 
elasticity across countries (see for example Koen, 1995). These are implausible assumptions for 
transition economies undergoing fundamental structural changes, including drastic changes in 
relative prices, a large potential for energy savings, and substantial shifts in the structure of 
production (i.e., strong growth in service sectors) (Koen, 1995). However, Loungani and Sheets 
(1997) and Selowsky and Martin (1997) correct GDP data with electricity consumption data as 
suggested by Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996). After testing the sensitivity of their results 
regarding the determinants of output growth after such a correction, Loungani and Sheets (1997) 
find no significant effect. Moreover, this kind of correction does not work well for the post 1995 
period when electricity consumption was falling dramatically as a result of reforms in a number 
 49
of countries. This correction leads to negative growth estimates for the unofficial economy, and 
as such is avoided by most authors. In this dissertation we use official GDP and GDP growth 
data because there are no satisfactory time series estimates for the unofficial economy beyond 
1995. 
 
5.1.2 Transition Period and Transition Recovery Stage 
 
The data set used in this dissertation starts in 1989 for all countries, thus all regressions 
could be estimated over the same period for each country. However, the introduction of reforms 
took place at different times across countries. Hungary and Poland, for example, introduced key 
reforms 2 or 3 years before countries in the FSU (Marangos, 2004). Recent studies, such as 
Falcetti et al. (2002), Merlevede et al. (2003) prefer a definition of transition time based on the 
year in which the break with the past political regime occurred. For CEE countries this was the 
year of the democratic revolutions and the election of a new government. The transition base 
year is 1989 for Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Romania, 
1990 for Albania and 1991 for Croatia Slovenia. The first transition year is the one following the 
transition year base T(0), as shown in Table 6. For the CIS and the Baltic states, most papers 
define the start of transition in 1991. However, given that independence was achieved only late 
in 1991, for most countries the true beginning of transition in CIS is considered 1992, and thus 
we consider T(1) to be the year 1992 for the CIS economies. 
 The transition period from 1989 to 2003 is long enough to allow for a separation in two 
sub-periods, namely the decline stage and the recovery stage. During the decline stage almost all 
GDP growth rates observed were negative. In this dissertation, the recovery stage dataset 
contains series of observations for each transition economy, where positive GDP growth rates 
were registered for at least the first two years. This definition of recovery stage only requires the 
positive GDP growth rates to be maintained for the first two consecutive years. Negative growth 
rates may occur thereafter. The negative growth rates that occurred in the beginning of transition 
were due to factors explained in Kornai (1994) and Blanchard (1997) and described in Chapter 1, 
(section 1.1).  Institutional reform, on the other hand, was not implemented until after these 
countries had stabilized inflation, kept budget deficits under some control, and liberalized prices 
and trade. Moreover, because of the very nature of institutions, it takes time for institutional 
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change to take place and in turn affect economic performance. Thus, it might be inappropriate to 
measure the effect of institutional reforms and even more so the effect of property rights and 
contract enforcement institutions on output growth, considering the whole transition period. 
Instead, it makes more sense to investigate whether institutional reforms and property rights and 
contract enforcement institutions have any important effect on output performance using only the 
transition recovery stage data. The length of the recovery stage differs across transition 
economies. Moreover, for countries like Albania, Bulgaria and Romania that have experienced 
growth reversals, negative growth rates were observed during the recovery stage for two or more 
consecutive years (from 1995-1998), while for other transition countries, negative growth rates 
have typically been recorded only for a year, followed by positive rates for the rest of the 
recovery stage. Hence, even in the recovery stage, negative growth rates were observed, but their 
nature is different from the nature of negative growth rates observed during the decline stage. 
Under the decline stage institutional reform was in an embryonic state, while property rights and 
contract enforcement institutions were almost nonexistent. 
 
 
5.2 Data Trends 
 
The data used in this dissertation are gathered or compiled from a number of sources. 
Detailed data definitions are provided in the Appendix, while data sources, data coverage and 
summary statistics are provided in Table 1.  
 
5.2.1 GDP Growth Rates 
 
The negative growth rates the CEE and FSU experienced during the initial phase of 
transformation to a market economy were lower than most economists expected. By 1995, 
however, some of the more advanced economies were enjoying positive growth rates. Figures 
1.1 to 1.4 show the trend for the growth rates of output throughout the first decade of transition. 
Explaining the great decline in output in the beginning of transition (or the U-shape pattern of 
GDP during 1991-96), has been the major theoretical challenge facing economists working on 
transition economies. The decline has been attributed to an institutional vacuum, low labor 
productivity, the collapse of CMEA trade flows , the decline in the demand for low-quality, 
 51
domestically produced goods, and the decline in the output state-owned firms due to lack of 
suppliers. By looking at Table 2, one can readily see that for Central Europe and the Baltics the 
growth rate performance has been much different from those of the FSU and especially Ukraine, 
which only in 2000 seem to have stopped the decline in output. Other countries like Romania, 
Bulgaria, Albania and Croatia experienced a premature burst of growth suffering a reversal in 
later years, followed by prospects of positive growth.  Moreover, growth recovery is just very 
recent. Only by 1995 had half of the 25 transition countries reached positive growth rates. 
However, even for the leading growing economies, with exceptions maybe of Poland, Slovenia, 
and Armenia, growth rates are not high enough to catch-up quickly even with low income 
Western European countries. Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996) estimate that with a per-capita 
growth rate of 4.75% annually, it would take about 35-45 years to catch up with the average 
OECD level, and if the current investment rate is increased to 30%, it would take only 30 years. 
The best-placed countries, Czech Republic and Estonia, would converge in around 20-25 years.  
 
5.2.2 Inflation Performance  
 
Negative rates of growth of output in the beginning of transition were associated with 
high rates of inflation, which spiraled in hyperinflation in most FSU economies, making 
transition a very painful process for the Central and Eastern Europeans and especially for the 
newly Independent Commonwealth States citizens. In CEE, inflation reached its peak in 1992 
and low rates of inflation were established by 1994. In CIS, this process took place on average 
one to two years later, in line with the start of reforms. What differentiates the performance of 
inflation in CEE and the Baltics from that of CIS countries is hyperinflation. Inflation was still 
on the three-digit level in Turkmenistan in 1996 and in Tajikistan in 1997. Belarus’ inflation 
performance has been the worst since 1998, and with exception of Tajikistan and Belarus, all 
CIS countries reached inflation levels below 45% in 1999. 
 
5.2.3 Structural Policy Reforms  
 
There are remarkably wide differences among transition economies in the pace and extent 
of structural policy reforms. The starting point is the last year before the initial post-communist 
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transitions, although Poland, Hungary and former Yugoslavia had previously initiated significant 
reforms.  The countries in CEE and the Baltics as well as Albania, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan and 
Moldavia liberalized domestic prices very early in their transition and sustained these reforms. 
(EBDR Transition Report 2000). These countries also liberalized trade and access to foreign 
exchange, albeit more gradually than they freed domestic markets. According to EBRD 
transition Report 2000, these relatively early and sustained “liberalizers” have maintained 
markets and trade free of government administration for more than two-thirds of the period since 
the transition began for their respective countries. The rapid and sustained approach to 
liberalization stands in contrast to the more uneven progress in much of Southeastern European 
and the FSU. Among these countries, Bulgaria, and Russia attempted to liberalize both domestic 
and external markets relatively early in the transition, but temporarily backtracked on these 
reforms. However, towards the end of 1999, Russia had regained its 1997 level of price 
liberalization, following the abolition of most of the temporary restrictions on domestic flows of 
goods and services introduced after the crisis in August 1998.  Also, foreign trade and access to 
foreign exchange have been freed considerably from restrictions but this progress has been 
partially offset by the re-introduction of oil export quotas. 
De Melo et al. (1997) have received most of the credit in building a structural policy 
reform index that they labeled “liberalization index,” which can be compiled from EBRD 
indicators for every following year after their calculations, by assigning them specific weights. 
The original liberalization index created by De Melo et al. (1997) was constructed as a weighted 
0.3:0.3:0.4 index of: (1) liberalization of domestic prices and abolition of state trading 
monopolies, (2) liberalization of the foreign trade regime, including elimination of export 
controls and taxes and substitution of low to moderate import duties for import quotas and high 
import tariffs and currency convertibility, and (3) privatization of small-scale and large-scale 
enterprises and banking reform. EBRD publishes annual indices of structural policy reform and 
institutional reform grouped in eight categories: price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange 
system liberalization, small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization, competition policy, 
governance and enterprise restructuring banking reform and interest rate liberalization and 
securities markets and non-bank financial institutions liberalization. Later studies have 
distinguished between the first four indices listed above and the last four. 27  In this dissertation 
                                                          
27 See for example Raiser et al. (2001)  
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we use a simple average of price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system liberalization, 
small-scale privatization to create the indicator of narrow structural policy reforms (SPR 
Narrow), and a simple average of all the above and large-scale privatization to create the 
indicator of broad structural policy reforms (SPR Broad). Each of the four indices mentioned 
above takes values between 1 implying little progress and 4.3 implying standards and 
performance typical of advanced market economies. Table 4 reports the value of each of the 
indices used to compile SPR for year 2003 and for year 1991, the first year in which they were 
reported by EBRD, revealing considerable differences in structural policy reform, since 
transition started.  
 
5.2.4 Initial Conditions 
 
The transition economies started the transition process under different circumstances. 
Substantial differences include differences in the initial level of development, macroeconomic 
distortions, integration into the trading system of the socialist countries and extent of prior 
reforms (De Melo et al. 1997b). While in Eastern Europe, the beginning of the transition process 
followed the peaceful political revolutions in 1989, for the CIS republics, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 was the defining political and economic event, as a result of which these 
countries gained their independence and began their transition to market economies.  
Table 6 presents the transition base year for all CEE and FSU. According to De Melo and 
Gelb (1996), transition year base for CEE was 1989, for Albania 1990 and for the FSU including 
the Baltics 1991. We could consider the transition year base as another important difference in 
initial conditions among CEE and CIS economies. 
Table 7 summarizes the set of initial conditions for transition economies, as it was 
originally given by de Melo et. al. (1997b) and used by most other authors. Table 7 presents 
indicators for initial levels of development like per capita income levels (INC), measured in 1989 
US$ but reflecting purchasing power parity incomes in the base year, and urbanization (URB) as 
a proxy for level of development, with lower income countries being on average more rural. 
Industrialization (IND) is another indicator of development. Over-industrialization or the 
industrial distortion (INDO), as defined by the difference between the actual share of industry in 
GDP and the share predicted by the regression analysis in Chenery and Syrquin (1989) given 
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from PIND, was  common in socialist countries. According to De Melo et al. (1997b), industrial 
shares were often high because, trade financial services and business and consumer services were 
typically repressed in socialist countries. The resource indicator (NRESD) considered 
encompasses the richness of natural and energy  resources characterized by poor (1), moderate 
(2) and rich (3). Location (LOCAT) is defined as geographical proximity to thriving market 
economies, and is considered to be especially important during transition because it facilitates 
the import of market institutions and the adjustment of trade patterns. In this context, countries 
from Central Europe and the Baltics may have benefited from better access to Western markets 
as well as stronger incentives to adopt the institutional framework of the European Union 
because of prospective membership. At the other end of the spectrum are the remote and 
landlocked countries from Central Asia and the Tran Caucasus, with essential connections routed 
through Russia. A binary variable is used to indicate whether a country has a thriving market 
economy as a neighbor or not.  The AVGR indicator in Table 7 presents prior economic growth 
rates in CEE and FSU during the second half of the 1980s, which were mostly positive. Growth 
tended to be higher in the poor economies (Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan). This 
indicator is included to capture the ranking of the socialist economies along the different stages 
of the process of socialist accumulation (De Melo et al., 1997b). The more mature economies 
were experiencing stagnation, if not declining growth, whereas poor countries were still 
benefiting from higher growth. Other variables that table 7 summarizes reflect initial economic 
distortions and institutional characteristics. Open inflation was chronic only in Poland and 
Yugoslav Republics in 1989, but repressed inflation (REPINFL), in the form of a monetary 
overhang, was high in most of the CEE and FSU (De Melo et al., 1997b). The indicator of 
repressed inflation used is computed as the increase in deflated wages less the change in real 
GDP from 1987 through 1990. Repressed inflation was high in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland 
but the highest was in FSU republics. Trade share in GDP (TDEP) is another indicator of 
macroeconomic distortion. These shares were high for most CEE and FSU countries and trade 
flows were concentrated within the CMEA area, while trade outside this area was very small (De 
Melo et al. 1997b).  The breakdown of CMEA and the collapse of the USSR caused tremendous 
disruptions in the international trade and payments of these countries. The CEE countries were 
less dependent on CMEA than the FSU countries, and therefore suffered less from these 
disruptions (De Melo et al. 1997b). Another measure of economic distortions is the black market 
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exchange rate premium (BLMKT). A high black market exchange rate premium is an indicator 
of expectations of depreciation. A high difference between the official and the free exchange rate 
can also be interpreted as a distortionary tax on exports and subsidy on imports (De Melo et al. 
1997b). It stimulates the diversion of resources from the official to the informal sector, a process, 
which is often associated with consumption of real resources in directly unproductive activities. 
Black market premium was especially high in FSU, Bulgaria and Romania and relatively modest 
in countries that had some previous experience with reforms like Hungary and the former 
Yugoslav republics of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia (De Melo et al., 1997b).  
Table 7 includes two other variables reflecting initial institutional characteristics. STATE 
is a categorical variable differentiating among countries that were independent states prior to 
1989, those that were members of decentralized states, like the former Yugoslav republics or 
core countries of centralized federal states like Russia, and the newly born FSU states. This 
variable takes values from 0 to 2 with 0 representing the newly born states and 2 those who were 
independent prior to 1989. The need to differentiate between the second and third groups 
described above follows from the difference in national political institutions between the non-
Baltic FSU republics which were territories in a highly centralized political union and the new 
nation states arising from the former Yugoslavia and former Czechoslovakia. The last ones were 
not faced with the same problems, because the federal systems in these countries gave substantial 
powers and responsibilities to the constituent republics (De Melo et al,. 1997b). Moreover, the 
historical ties and political affiliation of CEE countries with Western Europe have given them a 
sense of direction that was lacking to the newly born states of FSU. The other institutional 
variable, years under central planning (YUPLAN), captures in fact the so called “market 
memory”. In particular, the lack of familiarity of the non-Baltic FSU economies with market 
institutions is associated with their longer period under central planning. De Melo et al. (1997b) 
argue that it is likely for market memory to have an important influence on the reform process, 
particularly on the ability of societies to deal with the disequilibria of the transition. The decision 
of the Baltic countries to leave the ruble zone quickly illustrates this argument very well. Last, 
the importance of market memory for transition economies could be further emphasized if we 
view the transition process, mainly as a process of large scale institutional change, which is the 
approach used in this dissertation.  
The eleven initial condition variables can be used individually in regression equations, 
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but the interpretation of any individual coefficient is only meaningful when everything else is 
held constant. On the other side, the previously described initial conditions often are related to 
each other and exert their effect jointly, so that if we try to include them individually in a 
regression analysis, our estimation coefficients will be biased because of the omitted variables 
problem. If we would try to use all the eleven initial conditions (ICs) together in the same 
regression, then the correlations that exist among some of them makes the estimation impossible. 
The principal component analysis helps to address the above two problems. First it reduces the 
dimensionality of the ICs and second, it deals with the multicollinearity problem present in the 
eleven indicators of initial conditions.  
Table 7.1 shows the correlations among all of the ICs. High positive correlations exist 
between INC and URB, REPINF and BLKMAR, REPINF and TRADEP, REPINF and 
YUPLAN (MARMEM), BLKMAR and TRADEP, BLKMAR and YUPLAN. High negative 
correlations exist between BLKMAR and STATE, TRADEP and STATE and some significant 
negative correlation between YUPLAN and STATE. 
Table 7.2 shows the proportion of the overall variability of eleven ICs explained by each 
principal component as well as the cumulative proportion. There exist several possible criteria 
which determine elimination rules for the latter principal components (Dunteman, 1989). One 
criterion is that the cumulative proportion of variance explained is above a threshold level, 
usually set to 70%. INPC1 and INPC2 together explain 65 per cent of the total variability of 
initial conditions. Given this relatively high overall total variability explained and constrained by 
a limited number of observations available for this study, we can focus only on INPC1 and 
INPC2 for the rest of the analysis. Table 7.3 shows the correlations of INPC1 and INPC2 with 
the eleven ICs. INPC1 has high positive correlations with macroeconomic distortions (TRADEP, 
REPINF, BLKMAR) and YUPLAN (MARMEM). Therefore INPC1 can be interpreted as an 
index of the degree of macroeconomic distortions at the beginning of transition and a measure of 
unfamiliarity with market processes. On the other hand, the correlations of INPC1 with STATE, 
LOCAT and INDO (industrial overhang) are negative. Most transition countries reached 
diminishing returns to investment before transition began, because of structural distortions 
reflected in over-industrialization. (De Melo et al. 1997b) Thus, we can think of over-
industrialization, also known as the socialist development overhang, as another type of structural 
distortion that transition economies were faced with at the start of transition. This typical 
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distortion for transition economies is captured to some degree from INPC1, with a correlation 
between INDO and INPC1 of -0.45. INPC2 has a negative correlation of -0.34 with INDO as 
well, but the principal component that would best capture the over-industrialization distortion is 
clearly INPC4 with a correlation of -0.74. Moreover, INPC4 has very low correlations with the 
rest of initial conditions except LOCAT, which is not the case for either INPC1 or INPC2, 
making this way difficult the interpretation of INPC1 or INPC2 in the presence of INDO. An 
alternative to this interpretation challenge would be to not include INDO in the set of 11 initial 
conditions, which is then used to draw the principal component indicators, but rather use INDO 
as a separate initial conditions indicator, together with the other resulting INPC1 and INPC2. 
Summarizing, countries with higher scores on trade dependence, black market exchange 
rate premium, repressed inflation and market memory, and with lower values for STATE, 
LOCAT, and INDO will tend to have higher values for INPC1. Indeed, all of the non-Baltic FSU 
countries have values for INPC1 in the range of 0.09 (Russia) to 0.55 (Uzbekistan) as shown in 
Table 4.6, and Figure 2. 
INPC2 has high negative correlations with per capita income (INC) and urbanization 
(URBAN), and a lower negative correlation with over-industrialization (INDO). INPC2 might be 
interpreted as an index of the overall level of development. Countries with higher initial per 
capita income, higher urbanization rates, and over-industrialization, will tend to have lower 
values for INPC2. This is true for Poland and Hungary, both developed and over-industrialized 
socialist economies prior to year 1989, and especially Slovenia, Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania and Armenia.  
INPC1 and INPC2 can be thought of as two measures of initial conditions grouping the 
transition economies along the two dimensions of macroeconomic distortions and general level 
of development, including over-industrialization. While the non-Baltic FSU countries had high 
values for macroeconomic distortions, some of the CEE had high values for general level of 
development and over-industrialization. Table 7.4 lists values of INPC1 and INPC2 for the 25 
transition economies at the beginning of transition, calculated using principal component 
analysis, and compares them to the EBRD staff calculations (see EBRD Transition Report 1999, 
Box 2.1) used in Falcetti et al. (2002). Given that among the INPC1 and INPC2, INPC1 captures 
both the dimensions of macroeconomic distortions and over-industrialization distortions present 
in the set of initial conditions we can refer to INPC1 as the most representative principal 
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component indicator of initial conditions. 
Angjellari (2002) and EBRD’s staff calculations of principal component indicators of 
initial conditions in Table 7.4 are highly correlated. The correlation coefficient between INPC1 
and IC1 is 0.97, while the correlation coefficient between INPC2 and IC2 is -0.92. Moreover IC1 
explains almost 50% of the total variance of the set of initial conditions given in De Melo et al. 
(1997b), while INPC1 explains only 46% of the total variation. Given the additional total 
variability explained by IC1 (compared to INPC1) and for comparative purposes with previous 
studies, the empirical specifications of this dissertation use the EBRD’s staff calculations, IC1, 
following the Falcetti et al. (2002) claim that using only IC1 will suffice in significantly 
capturing the dimensionality of the set of eleven initial conditions to influence output growth and 
structural policy reforms.28 
Using the two principal components for initial conditions INPC1 and INPC2, we can plot 
the 25 transition economies in the two-dimensional space as shown in Figure 2. The first 
quadrant has positive values for both INPC1 and INPC2, thus including those FSU countries that 
at the beginning of transition had high macroeconomic distortions and lower general level of 
development. According to the interpretations provided above, high (positive) values of INPC1 
correspond to “bad” initial conditions. High values imply high distortions, and low (negative) 
values represent low distortions.  
On the other hand, higher values of INPC2, correspond to lower levels of per capita 
income and urbanization (unfavorable initial conditions) and lower levels of industrial overhang 
(favorable initial conditions). In the second quadrant is placed the other group of FSU countries, 
together with the Baltic countries, differing from the countries positioned in the first quadrant, by 
having negative values for INPC2, which means higher levels of per capita income and 
urbanization, but also more industrial overhang. In the fourth quadrant we find the CEE 
economies characterized by smaller macroeconomic distortions (negative INPC1) when 
compared to countries in the first and second quadrants. The third quadrant includes the Czech 
and Slovak Republics and Slovenia, countries that differ from the fourth quadrant countries by 
having higher general levels of development, especially when compared to Albania, Romania 
and Macedonia.  
                                                          
28 Falcetti et al. (2002) compute the simple cross-sectional correlations between the second principal component on 
the one hand, and output growth and structural policy reforms on the other, and found that both were statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level, with correlation coefficients of -0.22 and 0.11, respectively. 
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Summarizing, the first quadrant economies at the beginning of transition had the worst 
initial conditions, characterized from both macroeconomic distortions and lower general level of 
development. The third quadrant economies had the best initial conditions, with lesser 
macroeconomic distortions and greater general level of development. Countries like Hungary, 
Poland Croatia and Bulgaria also had very good initial conditions compared to the rest of 
transition economies. Figure 2 illustrates the positions that transition economies were holding at 
the beginning of the ‘transition race’, as they were carrying over their macroeconomic and 
socialist industrial overhang distortions. At the beginning of transition, Belarus and 
Turkmenistan were placed in the ‘back stage’ or on the very last spot. Most of the CIS 
economies can be thought of as in pretty much the same starting position, with the exception of 
maybe Russia and Estonia as being positioned somehow better. At the beginning of the 
‘transition race’ the CIS economies are so far away from the CEE economies, as if their 
geographical distance together with their late calendar transition year (1991 as opposed to 1989) 
had already predetermined their starting spots. Among the CEE countries, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Albania and Macedonia are the ones holding less favorable spots. The ‘front runners’ at the 
beginning of transition seem to be Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and 
Croatia. Comparing the latest economic performance (in terms of GDPG and GDPI) of the 
transition economies, it is sparkling to see that the transition race results in year 2003, place 
Hungary and Czech Republic among the front runners, the same as they were in 1989, which is a 
clear indication that initial conditions do matter for GDP growth performance. But, if we look at 
the economic performance of the Baltic countries throughout the 12 years of transition, we 
would agree that this performance definitely does not match the initial conditions position, the 
Baltic countries were holding in 1991. This is an indication that there are other factors 
influencing the economic performance of transition countries in general (such as SPR, 
institutional development, and macroeconomic stabilization) and accelerating the speed of the 
Baltic transition in particular. 
 
5.2.5 Institutional Indicators 
 
Before discussing the set of institutional indicators used in this dissertation, it is 
important to realize that finding or compiling such indexes from available sources is a daunting 
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task. Glaser et al. (2004) particularly addresses the problems related to the quality and potential 
subjectivity, present in most of the institutional indicators used to establish the effect of political 
institutions on long-run economic growth. Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) also point out at the 
potential subjectivity of the institutional indices used in their study. But, the high correlations 
between institutional indices compiled by different agencies yield some assurance that they 
cannot all be subjective. Partly for this reason, Havrylyshyn et al. (2000) use principal 
component analysis to compile principal component indicators of institutional development. 
While the advantages of this approach stand in that it addresses both the dimensionality and the 
correlations of a potentially large number of institutional indicators, as well as it eliminates some 
of the subjectivity concerns, the interpretation of principal components is not always clear cut. 
Moreover, it is more important to separately measure the effect of each category of institutions 
on economic performance, than to measure the overall effect of an institutional principal 
component when it comes to policy recommendations. A principal component approach was 
chosen in Angjellari (2002) to measure the effect of two institutional principal components on 
output growth in transition economies from 1989 to 2000.  
The first category of institutional development used is the institutional reform measured 
by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) indices of institutional reform 
(INSTREF). The second category is property rights and contract enforcement institutions. Two 
proxies are used to measure this category of institutions. The first one is a compiled indicator of 
contract intensive money, defined by Clague et al. (1997) as the ratio of non-currency money to 
the total money supply. The higher this ratio, the more favorable the contract enforcement and 
property rights institutions are judged to be. This index is compiled using the data available from 
the IMF CD-RAM 2004 for 19 transition countries and is labeled PCINST. We also use the 
International Risk Country Guide (ICRG) political risk indicator rule of law (ROLINST) as a 
proxy for property rights and contract enforcement institutions.  
 
5.2.5.1  EBRD Indicators of Institutional Reform 
 
The first group of institutional indicators considered in this dissertation is an average 
indicator of the EBRD institutional reform indices. Apart from the four institutional reform 
indices that EBRD has constructed for transition economies, there exist two other ones, the 
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overall legal effectiveness and overall legal extensiveness, which we did not use because of lack 
of sufficient data.29 There exists a distinction between these five dimensions of institutional 
performance and the indicators of structural reform, presented by market and trade liberalization, 
and small scale and large scale privatization. The distinction arises from the fact that while in all 
of the five institutional dimensions, new rules need to be created and credibly enforced by the 
state, market and trade liberalization and privatization of a state’s assets require predominantly 
that the state relinquish control (Raiser et al., 2001).We use a simple average of competition 
policy, governance and enterprise restructuring banking reform and interest rate liberalization 
and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions liberalization to compile the 
institutional reform index (INST). We can think of this indicator as capturing the extent of a 
market-friendly institutional framework creation for the 25 transition countries. Each of the four 
indices used to compute INST takes values between 1, implying little progress, and 4.3, implying 
standards and performance typical of advanced market economies. Table 5 reports the value of 
each of the indices used to compile the institutional reform indicator for 2003 and for 1991. 
 
5.2.5.2 Property Rights and Contract Enforcement Institutions: Contract-Intensive 
Money (PCINST) 
 
Clague et al. (1997a) are among the first authors that use contract-intensive money to 
measure the effect of institutional quality on investments and per capita income growth in a 
cross-country regression analysis. The reason for using such a measure stands in the belief that 
the same property rights and contract enforcement institutions that support complex and non-
self-enforcing transactions also influence the form in which people hold their assets. In societies 
where an unstable legal and policy environment makes it sensible to conceal one’s activities and 
assets from the government, people will make extensive use of currency to carry out their 
transactions. Currency is frequently less convenient than checks, credit cards, or other formal 
means of payment, but the risks of government confiscation or taxation can easily outweigh 
                                                          
29 While for the first four institutional measures data availability ranges from 1991 – 2003, data for the two legal 
indicators are available only from 1997-2001 for most transition economies, except Kyrgyzstan, with data coverage 
from 1997-2000, Turkmenistan with only the 2001 observation, and Tajikistan with the 1998, 2001 and 2001 
observations. 
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these considerations. Moreover, if formal contracts are of little advantage because they cannot be 
reliably enforced in court, or are avoided because they leave written records of transactions that 
one wishes to conceal from the government, then currency becomes more attractive because it 
completes the concealment of the transaction. People may also prefer to hold assets in the form 
of currency rather than financial claims because they lack confidence in the integrity of banks or 
other issuers of financial claims or because they doubt the government’s competence in the 
prudential regulation of financial institutions (Clague et al., 1997a). On the other hand, in 
societies with secure property rights and contract enforcement, people have little reason to either 
use or maintain currency for large transactions. In such a case, “they prefer that transactions be 
formally recorded in case there is a dispute to be resolved, and they are relieved of the 
inconvenience and danger of dealing in large amounts of currency.” (Clague et al., 1997a, p. 70). 
Such a discussion motivates the finding of measures that capture how conducive the institutional 
environment is for contract intensive activity. Clague et al. (1997a, 1997b) use the contract-
intensive money ratio, or CIM, as a measure of the state of contract compliance and security of 
property rights in a country. The Clague et al. (1997a) line of reasoning, presented above, 
suggests that this ratio is a reflection of the state of both contract enforcement and property rights 
institutions in a society. This variable is defined as the ratio of non-currency money to the total 
money supply, or (M2 – C)/M2, where M2 is a broad definition of the money supply and C is 
currency held outside banks. The numerator of this ratio consists of financial assets such as 
checking accounts, time deposits, and other financial claims on financial institutions, while the 
denominator is the sum of these assets and currency holdings. The higher this ratio, the more 
favorable these contract enforcement and property rights institutions are judged to be. 30 
 
5.2.5.3 Property Rights and Contract Enforcement Institutions: Political Risk 
Indicators (ROLINST) 
 
The third group of institutional indicators used also falls under the property rights and 
contract enforcement institutions. Knack and Keefer (1995) were among the first authors to use 
                                                          
30 “The CIM measure may be confused with measures of financial development, but it is quite distinct. A country 
may have a simple financial system, with the bulk of financial assets in the form of savings deposits and without a 
stock market or other manifestations of a modern financial system, and yet have a high CIM ratio. Finland, Iceland 
and Botswana are examples of such countries. The simple correlation of CIM with M2/GDP (a common measure of 
financial development) is only 0.44 in our sample of countries” (Clague et al., 1997a, p. 71) 
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institutional indicators obtained from two private international investment risk services, 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI). 
While these companies publish cross-country ratings for investor risk, the virtue of these two 
sources is the detailed ratings provided for large samples on various dimensions of investment 
climate that are closely related to those institutions emphasized by North (1990) and Olson 
(1996) (Knack and Keefer, 1995). We can interpret the ICRG variable rule of law as a proxy for 
the security of property rights and contract enforcement (Knack and Keefer, 1995). “If countries 
score low on these dimensions, they are likely to suffer a reduction in the quantity and efficiency 
of physical and perhaps even human capital investment. As the probability increases that an 
investor will lose the proceeds from the investment, or even the original investment itself, 
investors reduce their investment and channel their resources to activities that are more secure 
from the threat of expropriation, although they may be less profitable.” (Knack and Keefer, 1995, 
p. 210). 
 
5.2.6  Political Reform 
 
Political reform has been modeled by most researchers as a determinant of structural 
policy reforms (see for example De Melo et al. 1997b). Freedom House indexes of political 
freedom and civil liberties, combined together, have been used as a proxy for political freedom 
and political reform. While political freedom itself could be used as a proxy for political reform, 
we use Polity, a variable that captures changes in the political reform more in depth than indexes 
political freedom, as a proxy for political reform and a determinant of both SPR and institutional 
development. This variable captures Acemoglu et al.’s (2004) de jure political power, which 
refers to power that originates from the political institutions in society.31 
Polity IV is a dataset that includes constructed annual measures for both institutionalized 
democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC), as many polities exhibit mixed qualities of both 
of these distinct authority patterns. Table 8 contains transition countries’ data for polity. 
Acemoglu et al. (2003b) and (2004) use the Polity IV dataset to investigate the relationship 
between political power, institutions and income levels. The Polity IV measures are composite 
indices derived from the coded values of authority characteristic component variables. (See the 
                                                          
31 See section 2.1.4. for more details.   
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2004 Polity IV Project manual for a detailed description of how the polity score is derived).  
Polity is derived by subtracting the autocracy value from the democracy, thus providing a single 
regime score that ranges from +10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy).  
 
VI. Empirical Estimation Results 
 
6.1        Estimation Results for the Whole Transition Period 
 
6.1.1  Fixed Effects Estimation Results for the GDP Growth Equation 
 
 
Table 11 presents the estimation results when the single equation fixed effects estimator 
is used to estimate the GDP growth equation in (4). The reason for estimating this equation 
separately from (5) and (6) is to see whether there is a need for other estimation techniques, such 
as the two stages least squares (2SLS) and the three stages least squares (3SLS). Table 11 
presents estimation results for the four empirical specifications FE(1) through FE(4). Depending 
on whether the broad definition of structural policy reforms (SPR), or the narrow one were used, 
two groups of empirical models were estimated. FE(1) and FE(2) use the broad definition of 
SPR, while FE(3) and FE(4) use the narrow definition. Moreover what distinguishes FE(1) from 
FE(2) and FE(3) from FE(4) is the presence of the uniform non-liner time trend (Time and Time 
Squared).  The SPR Broad coefficient is positive while the SPR Narrow coefficient is negative, 
but in both cases coefficients are statistically insignificant. As expected, Lagged SPR Broad and 
Lagged SPR Narrow are positive and significant, indicating that structural policy reforms do 
bring positive growth rates after a one year lag.  
Empirical specifications FE(2) and FE(4) control for a non-linear time pattern. Time and 
Time Squared are significant and their inclusion reduces the positive effect of Lagged SPR 
(under both narrow and broad definitions) on GDP growth.  This is in line with Falcetti et al. 
(2002) findings. The Time coefficient is positive and the time squared coefficient is negative, 
indicating steeper growth at the beginning of transition followed by a slowdown towards the later 
period. This also is in line with Hernandez-Cata (1997), who introduces a similar non-linear time 
trend to capture the falling productivity of the inherited capital stock. Thus we could interpret 
this decreasing trend both as the decreasing role of SPR on growth and as the falling productivity 
of the inherited capital stock. 
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The regional tension dummy that accounts for the disruptions of economic activity 
caused by regional tensions has a negative sign as expected but its statistical significance is 
confirmed only under FE(3) and FE(4). 
Initial conditions appear as interacted with Time in the four empirical specifications of 
Table 11. There are two approaches to account for country specific characteristics. The first one 
is to use the index of initial conditions and the second one is to use country fixed effects (country 
dummies).32 The preferred specification in this dissertation is to use the second approach, and 
include Initial Conditions x Time to investigate whether the impact of differences in initial 
conditions is declining over time. The positive coefficient on the interaction between initial 
conditions and time shows that countries with weak initial conditions, i.e., high values of initial 
conditions, have their recovery later and are now catching up. Thus we can say that the effect of 
initial conditions on GDP growth is declining over time. This is in line with the findings of most 
researchers (see for example De Melo et al., 1997b, and Berg et al.,1999) 
The coefficient of inflation is negative as expected but statistically insignificant in all the 
reported specifications of Table 11. 
The coefficient of institutional reform is positive but insignificant in FE(1) and FE(3), but 
contrary to our expectations is negative (and significant at the 10% level) in FE(2) and FE(4). 
Keeping in mind that growth rates were negative in the first 3 years for the CEE economies and 
in the first 6 to seven years for the CIS economies, these results, more than anything, could 
indicate the need for a separation of the decline stage of transition from the recovery one. 
Estimations of the recovery stage are presented in sections 6.2.1 through 6.4.4 of this chapter. 
Indeed these estimations show a positive effect of institutional reform and property rights and 
contract enforcement institutions on GDP growth.  
 
6.1.2 Fixed Effects Estimation Results for the GDPI Equation 
 
Table 12 contains single equation estimations using the fixed effects estimator with GDPI 
as the dependant variable. The SPR (under both definitions) coefficient is negative as expected, 
while the Lagged SPR coefficient is positive, except in FE(8), but statistically insignificant in the 
four specifications of Table 12. Only in FE(5) this coefficient is significant at 10% level. The 
                                                          
32 Country effects are not reported, but are available 
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coefficient of institutional reform is positive and significant in all the specifications reported. 
When the time trend is introduced, the magnitude of the institutional reform coefficient decreases 
significantly as does the magnitude of the (negative) SPR coefficient. If we were to combine the 
effects of institutional reform and SPR on GDPI, we would notice that the institutional reform 
gains outweigh SPR losses in terms of GDP levels, yielding a net effect close to zero, and that 
without institutional reforms, structural policy reforms alone cannot bring positive effects on 
output. 
The Time coefficient is negative and significant, while the Time Squared coefficient is 
positive and significant. This increasing time trend indicates that on average, output levels in 
transition initially declined and later kept increasing more than the observed decline. The 
significant effect of this time trend on GDPI is an indication that there exist other underlying 
factors accounting for GDPI path not captured by the variables included in the four specifications 
of Table 12, that are correlated with the time pattern introduced. Domestic investment together 
with foreign direct investment in physical and human capital could be thought of as potential 
variables correlated with this time trend. 
The regional tension dummy has a negative sign as expected and is statistically 
significant. 
The negative coefficient on the interaction between initial conditions and time shows that 
countries with weak initial conditions, i.e., high values of initial conditions, are doing more 
poorly than countries with better initial conditions in terms of reaching pre-transition levels. 
There seems to be a divergence over time in GDP levels across transition countries with different 
initial conditions. 
The coefficient of inflation is negative, but statistically insignificant in the four 
specifications reported. 
 
6.1.3 Three Stage Least Squares Estimation Results for the GDPG, SPR and 
Institutional Reform (INSTREF) Equations 
 
Table 13 shows the estimation results for the three equations (4), (5) and (6) estimated 
jointly using a three stage least square (3SLS) procedure in the presence of a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SUR) methodology that improves the estimation efficiency when the 
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error terms of the three equations are correlated. Four 3SLS models are reported. 3SLS(1) and 
3SLS(2)  use the broad definition of SPR while 3SLS(3) and 3SLS(4) use the narrow definition. 
3SLS(1) and 3SLS(3) use only current GDP growth as an independent variable for the SPR and 
institutional reform equations, while 3SLS(2) and 3SLS(4) use the current and lagged GDP 
growth. By looking at the estimation results for the GDPG equation it can be noticed that 
3SLS(1) corrects the sign of SPR Broad to negative as expected, but the SPR coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. Moreover, the magnitude of the Lagged SPR Broad coefficient is 
smaller compared to the one obtained in the corresponding single equation specifications FE(1) 
and FE(2) of Table 11. This is in line with Falcetti et al. (2002) warning that the presence of 
endogeneity, causes the Lagged SPR coefficient to be upward biased in single equation 
specifications. 
The institutional reform coefficient is negative, contrary to our expectations. We interpret 
this result as an indication that the whole transition period dataset is inappropriate for measuring 
the effect of the institutional reform on GDP growth. 33 
The uniform non-liner time trend was added to all four GDP growth equations. The Time 
coefficient is positive and the Time squared coefficient is negative, just like in the single 
equation case, indicating steeper growth at the beginning of transition followed by a slowdown 
towards the later period.  
By looking at the estimations for the SPR equation, a couple of striking results emerge. 
Both the GDP growth coefficient and the Lagged GDP growth coefficient are negative in all the 
four reported specifications. These estimation results point at a statistically significant negative 
effect of lagged GDPG on SPR, while the negative contemporaneous effect of GDPG is 
statistically significant at the 5% level only in 3SLS(3). An interpretation for the negative 
relationship between SPR and lagged GDP growth could be that the lower past GDP growth 
rates, the higher the commitment of transition governments to implement higher levels of 
structural policy reforms. Or put it differently, the higher the cost of non-reforming in terms of 
GDP growth, the higher the incentives of governments to commit to structural policy reforms to 
bring positive growth. On the other hand, the higher GDP growth in the past year, the lower the 
incentives of governments to commit to more structural policy reforms, which are well known 
for their immediate negative effect on output growth rates. 
                                                          
33 See Chapter 5, section 5.1.2, for more details. 
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The most important determinants of SPR seem to be Lagged SPR and polity. Lagged 
SPR and polity positively affect current SPR even at the 1% significance level. This is in line 
with De Melo et al. (1997b). These findings indicate that commitments to structural policy 
reforms on average have been steady. Political reform, on the other hand, seems to determine the 
remaining component of the variation in the current year’s level of structural reforms that 
transition governments have decided to commit to. An increase in the polity index, which implies 
a movement from the autocracy extreme towards the democracy extreme of the polity spectrum, 
positively impacts current SPR. The more democratic and multiparty composed the transition 
governments become, the more they are willing to commit to structural policy reforms.  
The third equation estimated in Table 13 is that of institutional reform. In models 
3SLS(2) and 3SLS(4) where lagged GDP growth rates are included, the contemporaneous GDPG 
coefficient is negative, while the lagged GDPG coefficient is positive, but statistically 
insignificant. The positive Lagged GDPG coefficient in the INSTREF equation could be 
interpreted as positive association of past GDP growth rates with higher commitments of 
transition governments to implement institutional reforms. This result is intuitive as higher past 
GDP growth rates, mean more resources available for institutional reforms. Comparing this 
effect with the effect of lagged GDPG on the SPR, an interesting finding emerges regarding the 
different ways past GDP growth rates affect structural policy reforms and institutional reforms. 
While SPR can be thought of as short-run policies, institutional reforms are long-run 
commitments.  
SPR and Lagged SPR positively affect institutional reform. This is in line with World 
Bank’s hypothesis, and could be regarded as empirical evidence that SPR do affect institutional 
reform positively as expected. The World Bank’s hypothesis elaborated in (Raiser et al., 2001) 
states that structural policy reforms, including price and trade liberalization and privatization 
would lead to the creation of markets, which would then result in some endogenous adaptation of 
institutions. Moreover, the successful implementation of SPR was thought of as making the 
institutional reform easier further down the road (Raiser et al. 2001). The empirical evidence 
from this study leads us to believe that as considerably high levels of SPR accumulate, this 
determines a series of incentives for sound institutional reform building. 
The significant negative coefficient of the interaction term between initial conditions and 
time indicates divergence over time in institutional reform levels across transition countries with 
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different initial conditions. This is in line with North’s (1990) and Acemoglu’s et al. (2004) 
approaches of the historic context of institutional building.  
Macroeconomic stability (STAB) and government expenses (GOVEXP), the factors 
determining institutional reform supply, positively affect institutional reform as expected. 
Last, the polity coefficient is negative in all four empirical specifications, contrary to our 
expectations. 
 
6.1.4.  Three Stage Least Squares Estimation Results for the GDPI, SPR and 
Institutional Reform Equations 
 
Table 14 differs from Table 13 in one of the dependent endogenous variables used. In 
Table 14 this dependent variable is GDPI, instead of GDPG used in Table 13. When compared to 
Table 12, the first part of Table 14, covering estimations of the GDPI equation, offers the 
following results. The negative effect of SPR on GDPI is greater than in Table 12, followed also 
by a greater positive effect of institutional reform on GDPI. The net effect of SPR and 
institutional reforms on GDPI is positive when the system of equations is estimated jointly, as 
compared to the close-to-zero net effect in FE(6) and FE(8) in Table 12. 
The second part of Table 14 covers estimations for the SPR regression. Current GDPI 
negatively affects institutional reform, while the Lagged GDPI coefficient is positive, but 
insignificant. Lagged SPR and polity remain the most important determinants of SPR. 
The third part of Table 14 covers estimations for the institutional reform regression. 
Current GDPI is positively affecting institutional reform, while the Lagged GDPI coefficient is 
positive, but insignificant. Thus, current GDPI seems to be an important determinant of both 
SPR and institutional reform, supporting the assumption of endogeneity of SPR and institutional 
reforms to GDP level. SPR and Lagged SPR continue to positively impact institutional reform in 
all the specifications reported in Table 14, supporting the World Bank’s hypothesis.  
Macroeconomic stability and government expenses positively affect institutional reform 
as expected. 
Last, the polity coefficient is negative in specifications 3SLS(5) and 3SLS(5) and positive 
in 3SLS(5) and 3SLS(5), but statistically insignificant in either case. 
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6.2 Estimation Results for the Transition Recovery Stage Using INSTREF  
as a Measure of Institutional Development      
 
6.2.1 Fixed Effects Estimation Results for the GDPG Equation 
 
Estimating (4) separately, using the recovery stage dataset, we get the estimation results 
presented in Table 15 under FE(9). In comparison with the single equation estimations of the 
whole transition period, these estimations show a clear distinction with respect to the effect of 
institutional reform (INSTREF) on GDPG. This effect is positive and significant, as expected. 
Given concerns over endogeneity of SPR and institutional reform to GDPG, the results in FE(5) 
and FE(9) should be treated with considerable caution. The inflation coefficient remains negative 
and is now statistically significant even at the 1% significance level. The signs of SPR and 
Lagged SPR coefficients are the opposite of what was found when the whole transition period 
was used. However, the SPR and Lagged SPR coefficients are not significant, except maybe in 
3SLS(9).  
Given the fact that the regional tension binary variable was 1 mostly in the beginning of 
transition, the recovery stage includes only a few observations where this variable takes the value 
1. Moreover, institutional data (especially the CIM indicator) for some transition countries that 
have experienced wars and civil conflicts such as Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were not available, which renders the inclusion of the regional 
tensions variable even more questionable when the CIM indicator is used as a proxy for property 
rights and contract enforcement institutions in Table 16. Thus, it makes sense not to include the 
RT variable in the estimations of the recovery stage. However, experiments were run with the 
presence of RT, and whenever it was included, its coefficient was insignificant.  
  
6.2.2 Two Stages and Three Stages Least Squares Estimation Results  
 
The second column of Table 15, 2SLS(9), lists estimation results of the transition 
recovery stage, when the EBRD institutional reform indicator is used as a measure of 
institutional development for the GDPG equation. Using the matrix of exogenous and 
predetermined variables, shown in Figure 3, we obtain the 2SLS estimation results.  
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In comparison to the estimation results under FE(9), the 2SLS estimator yields generally 
inflated standard errors. In particular, the institutional reform coefficient in 2SLS(9) is greater 
than the same coefficient in FE(9), but its standard deviation is also greater (smaller t-statistics). 
This result is to be expected in the presence of seemingly unrelated regression, like in our case. 
The existing correlations between the error terms of equations (4), (5) and (6) call for the use of a 
3SLS estimator, in the presence of a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) modeling 
procedure. Indeed, when the 3SLS-SUR estimation technique explained in Chapter 4, section 
4.2, is used, as under the 3SLS(9) specification, standard errors are generally smaller (all 
coefficients except Lagged SPR Broad are statistically significant at least at 5% level). The 3SLS 
estimation results for the GDPG equation, when the INSTREF is used as a measure of 
institutional development are found under 3SLS(9) and 3SLS(10). In comparison to Table 13, 
the most striking difference is the positive and significant (even at the 1% level) effect of 
institutional reform on GDPG. These results clearly indicate that if we focus only on the 
transition recovery stage, institutional reform is an important determinant of GDP growth 
variation across transition economies. Given the fact that economic institutions take time to 
build, we might think that before INSTREF affect GDP growth, a threshold level of institutional 
reform must be reached. Once this level is reached, further increases in INSTREF positively 
affect GDP growth. 
Positive and significant is the effect of SPR Broad on GDPG, while the coefficient of 
Lagged SPR Broad is negative, but statistically insignificant. Hence, the nonlinear relationship of 
SPR reforms (a positive lagged SPR followed by a negative current SPR) is no longer supported 
when the recovery stage dataset is used.  
The time trend is significant, with the Time coefficient being negative and the Time 
Squared coefficient positive. This increasing time trend during the recovery stage might 
represent the increasing effect that factors like investments in physical capital, including both 
domestic and foreign direct investments, and a reorientation of already high human capital 
levels, could be attaining during the recovery stage. 
The interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is positive and significant, indicating 
that the effect of initial conditions on GDP growth is declining over time.  
Last, inflation negatively affects recovery stage growth as expected. 
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The 3SLS estimation results for the SPR equation are found in the second section of 
Table15 (under the second and third columns). GDPG positively affects SPR. Lagged SPR 
positively determines current SPR, like in the whole transition period dataset was used, but now 
the respective coefficient is somehow smaller (0.58 versus 0.68). 
The effect of polity on SPR is positive as expected and greater under the recovery stage 
compared to the whole transition period.  
The time trend is decreasing and significant and the interaction variable between IC1 and 
Time is positive, but insignificant.  
The estimation results for the INSTREF equation are found in the third section of Table 
15 (under the second and third columns). GDPG is indeed positively affecting INSTREF 
significantly indicating the existence of endogeneity between INSTREF and GDPG. 
While the current SPR coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant, the Lagged 
SPR coefficient is positive and significant even at the 1% level under the 3SLS(10) specification. 
3SLS(10) is similar to the 3SLS(9) except it excludes the current SPR and the time trend. The 
significant positive effect of Lagged SPR Broad on INSTREF may be an indication that once a 
certain level of SPR-s is accumulated, this level affects INSTREF positively. Hence, there exists 
some evidence that SPR affect INSTREF by a one year lag, rather than contemporaneously. 
The interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is negative and statistically significant 
even at the 1% level, indicating an increasing effect of initial conditions on institutional reform. 
Transition countries with different initial conditions are diverging in terms of their institutional 
reform levels. 
The time trend is significant and decreasing (the Time coefficient is positive and the 
Time squared coefficient is negative). 
The effect of polity on INSTREF is positive as expected, and significant even at the 1% 
level in 3SLS(10). Compared to the whole transition period, the effect of polity on INSTREF is 
as expected when the transition recovery stage dataset is used. This gives us some assurance that 
it was probably the inappropriate use of the whole transition period dataset, yielding estimation 
results for the effect of polity to INSTREF that were contrary to our expectation. 
Macroeconomic stabilization (STAB) and government expenditures (GOVEXP) 
coefficients are positive as expected, but GOVEXP is not statistically significant.  
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6.2.3 3SLS Estimation Results for the GDPI, SPR and INSTREF Equations 
 
The fifth column of Table 14 lists the estimation results for the GDPI, SPR and 
INSTREF equations, jointly estimated using the transition recovery stage dataset, with the EBRD 
institutional reform indicator used as a measure of institutional change. The estimation results for 
the GDPI equation are found in the first section of Table 14 under 3SLS(Rec).  
In comparison with 3SLS(5) and 3SLS(6), the estimations when the recovery stage data 
set are used yield a smaller negative effect of SPR (under the broad definition). Moreover, the 
Lagged SPR coefficient is also negative, but statistically insignificant.  
Institutional reform again positively affects GDPI, but its effect is smaller when 
compared to and 3SLS(5) and 3SLS(6). The net effect of SPR and INSTREF on GDPI is not 
very different from zero, implying that without institutional reforms, SPR alone would result in 
further declines in output. 
The time trend during the recovery stage is significant and increasing. 
The interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is positive indicating that the effect of 
initial conditions on GDP level is declining over time.  
Last, inflation negatively affects recovery stage output as expected, but its coefficient is 
not statistically significant. 
The estimation results for the SPR equation are found in the second section of the fifth 
column of Table 14. GDPI significantly affects SPR negatively, indicating the existence of 
endogeneity between SPR and GDPI.  
Lagged SPR positively determines current SPR, as expected, indicating steadiness of 
commitments (of transition governments) to structural policy reforms in the recovery stage as 
well as under the whole transition period. 
The effect of polity on SPR is positive as expected. 
The coefficient on the interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is negative and 
significant, indicating that the effect of initial conditions on SPR is increasing over time.  
The estimation results for the INSTREF equation are found in the fifth column of the 
third section of Table 14. GDPI is indeed significantly affecting INSTREF positively like in 
3SLS(5) and 3SLS(6), indicating the existence of endogeneity between INSTREF and GDPI. 
Both current SPR and Lagged SPR positively affect INSTREF. 
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The interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating an increasing effect of initial conditions on institutional reform. This means that 
transition countries with different initial conditions are diverging in terms of their institutional 
reform levels. 
The effect of polity on INSTREF is significant and positive as expected, compared to the 
negative but insignificant whole transition period estimations in 3SLS(5) and 3SLS(6). 
Macroeconomic stabilization (STAB) and government expenditures (GOVEXP) 
coefficients are positive as expected, but GOVEXP is not statistically significant.  
 
6.3 Estimation Results for the Transition Recovery Stage Using Property  
Rights and Contract Enforcement Institutions as Measures of  
Institutional Development 
 
6.3.1 Estimation Results Using Contract Intensive Money (PCINST) as a Proxy for 
Property Rights and Contract Enforcement Institutions  
 
Estimating (4) separately we get the estimation results presented in Table 16, under 
FE(10). The signs of all coefficients are as expected, but they are all insignificant.  
 When included, the non-linear time trend was insignificant, and the estimations shown 
are the ones when this trend was removed.  
The 2SLS estimator in comparison to the FE estimator of Table 16 yields a higher effect 
of PCINST on GDPG, but higher standard errors when compared to the 3SLS estimator. Thus in 
what follows, comments will be made to the 3SLS estimator results.  
In comparison with the 3SLS estimations of the whole transition period, these 
estimations, like the ones when the INSTREF was used, show a positive and significant effect of 
property rights and contracting institutions (using the indicator of contract intensive money 
(CIM) as a proxy) on GDPG.  
The estimation results of the transition recovery stage, when the CIM indicator is used as 
a proxy for property rights and contracting institutions (PCINST) are listed in the second column 
of Table 16 (section 1) under 3SLS(10). In comparison with the single equation estimations in 
FE(10), the PCINST coefficient is positive and significant. Negative and significant is the 
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coefficient of SPR Broad, while the coefficient of Lagged SPR Broad is positive and significant. 
Thus, the expected nonlinear relationship of SPR reforms (a negative current SPR followed by a 
positive lagged SPR) is supported by the recovery stage data, when PCINST is used, as opposed 
to when INSTREF is used. When included, the time trend was insignificant. This trend was 
removed in the reported empirical specifications.  
The interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is positive and significant indicating 
that the effect of initial conditions on GDP growth is declining over time.  
The 3SLS estimation results for the SPR equation are found in the second section of 
Table 16 (second column). GDPG affects SPR negatively. Lagged SPR positively determines 
current SPR. The effect of polity on SPR is negative but statistically insignificant. The 
interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is positive, and significant, indicating that the 
effect of initial conditions on SPR is declining over time.  
The 3SLS estimation results for the PCINST equation are found in the third section of 
Table 16 (second column). The GDPG coefficient is positive, but statistically insignificant. 
While current SPR is negatively affecting PCINST, the Lagged SPR coefficient is positive and 
the net effect of SPR on PCINST is close to zero. The interaction variable Initial Conditions x 
Time is positive and significant, indicating a decreasing impact of initial conditions on property 
rights and contract enforcement institutions. The effect of polity on PCINST is positive as 
expected. Macroeconomic stabilization (STAB) and government expenditures (GOVEXP) 
coefficients are also positive as expected and statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
        
6.3.2 Estimation Results Using ICRG Rule of Law Indicator (ROLINST) as a 
Proxy for Property Rights and Contract Enforcement Institutions  
     
Estimating (4) separately we get the estimation results presented in Table 16, under 
FE(11). Just like the case with FE(10), the signs of all coefficients are as expected, but they are 
all insignificant. The only significant coefficient is the one belonging to the interaction variable 
Initial Conditions x Time. This coefficient is positive, indicating divergence between transition 
countries with different initial conditions in terms of GDP growth. 
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Similar to the case when the PCINST was used to proxy property rights and contract 
enforcement institutions, the 2SLS estimator in the 2SLS(11) specification compared to the FE 
estimator yields a higher effect of ROLINST on GDPG, but higher standard errors when 
compared to the 3SLS estimator. Thus what follows, describes the 3SLS estimator results.  
In comparison with the 3SLS estimations of the whole transition period, the estimations 
when ROLINST are used to capture changes in institutional development, like the ones when the 
INSTREF and the PCINST were used, show a positive and significant effect of property rights 
institutions on GDPG. The first section of the fourth column of Table 16 under 3SLS(11), lists 
estimation results of the transition recovery stage, when the ICRG index of rule of law is used as 
a proxy for property rights and contract enforcement institutions. The negative and significant 
effect of SPR is compensated by the positive effect of Lagged SPR, so that the net effect of SPR 
on GDPG is close to zero. Thus, the expected nonlinear relationship of SPR reforms (a negative 
current SPR followed by a positive lagged SPR) is supported by the recovery stage data, when 
ROLINST (and PCINST) is used, as opposed to the case when INSTREF is used.  
The interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is positive and significant, indicating 
that the effect of initial conditions on GDP growth is declining over time.  
The estimation results for the SPR equation are found in the second section of Table 16’s 
fourth column, under 3SLS(11). GDPG affects SPR negatively. Lagged SPR positively 
determines current SPR, as in previous specifications. The effect of polity on SPR is positive, but 
statistically insignificant. The interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is positive and 
significant, indicating that the effect of initial conditions on SPR is declining over time.  
The estimation results for the ROLINST equation are found in the third section of Table 
16’s fourth column. The GDPG coefficient is positive, but statistically insignificant. The current 
SPR coefficient is negative, but statistically insignificant, while the Lagged SPR coefficient is 
positive and significant. Thus, lagged SPR affect ROLINST positively as expected. The 
interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is negative and significant indicating an increasing 
effect of initial conditions on property rights institutions. The effect of polity on ROLINST is 
negative, contrary to our expectations. Macroeconomic stabilization (STAB) positively affects 
ROLINST, while the government expenditures (GOVEXP) coefficient, contrary to our 
expectations, is negative. 
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6.4 Estimation Results for the Transition Recovery Stage Using Both Categories 
of Institutions  
 
An important question worth addressing is whether the two categories of institutions used 
in this dissertation have separate measurable effects on GDP growth. Institutional reform, 
(INSTREF), as given by a simple average indicator of the EBRD indices of competition policy, 
enterprise restructuring and governance, and banking reform and non-bank financial institutions 
reform is overlapping with measures of property rights and contract enforcement institutions, 
PCINST and ROLINST. It is worth, however, investigating whether these two categories of 
institutions cover institutional development areas that are not overlapping. The presence of both 
INSTREF and ROLINST in the list of right hand side variables of the GDPG equation, requires 
additional modeling techniques to the 3SLS-SUR technique used so far. The apparent overlap 
between INSTREF and ROLINST or PCINST makes the addition of a forth equation into our 
system questionable. Thus, a simpler approach would be to estimate the GDPG equation via a 
single equation approach using both the FE and 2SLS estimator. Given the existing endogeneity 
of SPR and institutional development to GDPG, the results of Table 17 should be treated with 
caution. These estimation results show a positive and significant effect of INSTREF on GDPG, 
and a positive but statistically insignificant (except for maybe 2SLS(12)) effect of ROLINST.  
The SPR effect on GDPG is negative and statistically significant in FE(13) and especially 
2SLS(13), while the Lagged SPR coefficient is positive, but statistically insignificant. Thus, the 
expected nonlinear relationship of SPR reforms is supported by Table 17’s specifications. The 
interaction variable Initial Conditions x Time is positive and significant, indicating that the effect 
of initial conditions on GDP growth is declining over time.  
When PCINST was included instead of ROLINST, the effect of PCINST on GDPG was 
negative, but statistically insignificant. Our interpretation of this result is that INSTREF and 
PCINST have more overlapping areas than INSTREF and ROLINST. Thus once INSTREF is 
controlled for, the presence of PCINST does not seem to yield any significant results. 
 Last, Table 18 is prepared to summarize the empirical findings of this dissertation, and 
conclusions on these findings are drawn in Chapter 7. 
 
 78
 
VII. Summary, Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
 
This dissertation has explored the relationships between three groups of variables in the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), from 1989 to 2003. The first group consists of output level and output growth as 
measured by gross domestic product index (GDPI) and gross domestic product growth (GDPG). 
The second group consists of two categories of institutional development. The first category is 
the institutional reform (INSTREF), measured by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) indices of institutional reform. The second category is property rights and 
contract enforcement institutions. Two proxies are used to measure this category of institutions. 
The first proxy is a compiled indicator of contract intensive money, defined by Clague et al. 
(1997) as the ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply. The higher this ratio, the 
more favorable the contract enforcement and property rights institutions (PCINST) are judged to 
be. The second indicator used as a proxy for property rights and contract enforcement institutions 
is the International Risk Country Guide (ICRG) political risk indicator rule of law (ROLINST). 
The third group of variables studied in this dissertation consists of EBRD indices of structural 
policy reform, often known as liberalization policies. These indices are combined under a broad 
and a narrow definition to create SPR Broad and SPR Narrow. 
This dissertation’s theoretical and empirical framework explicitly account for the 
endogeneity between output performance variables, the measures of institutional development 
and SPR. Several empirical specification models of the theoretical simultaneous system of three 
equations are estimated. In the first group of specification models the dependent endogenous 
variables are GDPG, SPR and INST (either INSTREF, PCINST, or ROLINST), while in the 
second group the dependant endogenous variables are GDPI, SPR and INST. Moreover, two 
datasets are used. The first dataset has data from 1989 to 2003, thus covering the whole transition 
period, while the second dataset is a subset of the first one, containing data for the recovery stage 
of transition only. The recovery stage data series are data for which a positive growth rate is 
maintained consecutively for at least the first two years of the period for each transition 
economy. 
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The empirical methods used in this dissertation include panel data analysis, principal 
component analysis, two stages least squares approach and three stage least squares approach in 
the presence of a SUR modeling procedure. 
With respect to the output performance equation, the findings of this research, indicate 
that institutional reform (INSTREF), and property rights and contract enforcement institutions 
(PCINST and ROLINST) are very important determinants of output level when the whole 
transition period dataset is used, and very important determinants of both the output level and 
output growth when the recovery stage dataset is used. Table 18 shows that the expected positive 
effect of institutional development (either INSTREF, PCINST, or ROLINST) on GDPG and 
GDPI is confirmed 100 percent of the times when the transition recovery period dataset is used. 
While the effect of current SPR is ambiguous, the effect of lagged SPR on output and output 
growth is positive. Moreover, SPR continue to affect output performance via their indirect effect 
on institutional development.  
With respect to the institutional reforms, and property rights and contract enforcement 
institutions, two sets of determinants were found to be important. On the side of the demand 
factors, SPR, and especially lagged SPR is found to be an important determinant of both 
institutional reforms and property rights and contract enforcement institutions. As shown in 
Table 18, the expected positive signs of SPR and Lagged SPR in the equations having 
institutional development (either INSTREF, PCINST, or ROLINST) as the dependent 
endogenous variable, is confirmed in all estimated specifications (100 percent of times). On the 
side of supply factors, macroeconomic stabilization, a measure of the state’s capacity to 
implement institutional reform, was especially important in explaining the variation in 
institutional reform and property rights and contract enforcement institutions. Political reform, in 
terms of a shift from the autarkic political regime to a democratic political regime, is found to 
positively affect institutional reforms and property rights and contract enforcement institutions in 
the recovery stage, but this effect was not statistically significant in all of the specification 
models. Moreover, in the set of institutional development equations using GDPG (versus GDPI) 
as one of the explanatory variables, the expected positive sign of Polity is confirmed 90 percent 
of the times, when the transition recovery period dataset is used, and only 50 percent of times 
when the whole transition period dataset is used.  
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With respect to the structural policy reforms’ equations, this dissertation’s main finding is 
that political reform positively affects SPR in both datasets, in all of the empirical specifications 
estimated (100 percent of times). Moreover, lagged SPR is found to positively affect SPR, which 
is an indication of transition governments’ maintained commitment to a package of SPR-s.  
This dissertation has also explored the interaction of political reforms with structural 
policy reforms, institutional reforms and property rights and contract enforcement institutions in 
transition economies. The empirical findings suggest that a political economy approach 
embodied in both the SPR and institutions development equations is appropriate for analyzing 
and understanding the economic performance of transition economies. The political reform 
dimension is too important not to be taken into consideration. Movements toward 
democratization have positive direct effects on institutional development and structural policy 
reforms, and several indirect effects on output performance. Thus, if we were interested in 
achieving higher levels of institutional development, one way to achieve this target is via 
increased efforts of transition governments to first of all further democratize themselves. In the 
presence of vested interests of transition governments’ officials in the political-economic 
processes, an altruistic and forward looking behavior is needed to overcome lack of progress 
with political reform. The development of political institutions that place checks on those who 
hold political power, is a useful tool for the emergence of good economic institutions, as it is the 
situation when political power is in the hands of a relatively broad group with significant 
investment opportunities (see for example Acemoglu et al. 2004).  
Some implications for the important role of government in transition economies follow 
from this dissertation. On the one side, the government has to initiate the structural policy 
reforms, which tend to decentralize the government’s power. Since transition started, 
international organizations such as World Bank and IMF, as well as independent researchers 
have emphasized how transition governments need to pull back from economic involvement in 
enterprises, price intervention, taxation, and external and domestic trade regulation. The general 
progress with price and trade liberalization and privatization in all transition economies, has 
shown that most transition governments have been committed to a package of structural policy 
reforms, often supported by IMF programs. On the other side, the transition government has to 
be leading the institutional reform by establishing the necessary legal framework that ensures the 
security of property rights and the enforcement of contracts. The indicators of institutional 
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development used in this dissertation have shown a great variation in levels of institutional 
development across transition economies. There seems to be an institutional divide between 
countries such as Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary which have high scores for institutional 
development, and other countries, especially the ones in the CIS, which generally score much 
lower. This is an indication that the CIS transition governments are doing too little to ensure 
security of property rights and the enforcement of contracts. At the same time that transition 
governments are advised to pull back from a direct intervention in the economy, they seem not to 
be doing enough in terms of institutional legal effectiveness and implementation. Thus it is clear 
that the role of governments in transition is as crucial and delicate as it could be. We can say that 
a successful transition to a market economy depends a lot on the balance between the non-
intervention in economy and the ensuring of property rights and contract enforcement that 
transition governments should maintain. On the other hand, the continuous technical and 
financial support that World Bank, IMF, EBRD and other international organizations give to the 
institutional reform programs that transition governments are implementing is another important 
element that could enhance the so much needed institutional development in transition 
economies. This dissertation has shown that institutional reform and property rights and contract 
enforcement institutions are important determinants of the variation of output performance in the 
transition recovery stage. The failure of economists to take institutions into account has been 
blamed for the poor performance of several transition countries (Zinnes et al. 2001). Russia, 
Albania and Bulgaria experienced severe financial crises in 1997 – 1998. These examples 
indicate that lack of progress with institutional reform and the building of property rights and 
contract enforcement institutions weakens the macroeconomic performance gains from 
liberalization and privatization. While structural policy reforms are a necessary condition for the 
transition output growth recovery to occur, they are not sufficient to ensure growth sustainability. 
On the other hand, structural policy reforms are an important determinant of institutional 
development. This dissertation has shown that countries that quickly and consistently adopted a 
package of SPR-s were the ones that also achieved higher levels of institutional development. 
Thus it seems that SPR-s are a precondition for institutional change to occur, and in a 
complimentary fashion, SPR and institutional development affect output performance in 
transition, with the latter gaining more explanatory power over the variation in output growth 
rates and output levels as transition proceeds. 
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This dissertation also has explored the effect of initial conditions through time on the 
three endogenous variables of the system, and important findings were drawn in each case. 
Transition economies generally had similar initial conditions of macroeconomic distortions and 
industrial overhang inherited from the centrally planned economic system. However, initial 
condition differences across transition economies were apparent at the beginning of transition. 
On the other hand, output growth performance during the transition period has varied greatly 
across countries and time and different levels of institutional development (including differences 
in institutional reform and property rights and contract enforcement institutions) were registered 
across transition countries throughout the transition period as well. This dissertation has shown 
that the effect of initial conditions over time has declined in the output performance equations, 
meaning that countries are converging in terms of growth rates regardless of their initial 
conditions. Different results were found regarding the institutional development equations. The 
effect of initial conditions over time has increased in the institutional development equations, 
indicating divergence across countries with different initial conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 83
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J. Robinson, 2004 “Institutions As the Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Economic Growth,” forthcoming in Handbook of Economic Growth edited by 
Aghion, P. and S. Durlauf. URL:  
http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/index.htm?prof_id=acemoglu&type=paper 
 
Acemoglu, D., and S. Johnson, 2003a, “Unbundling Institutions,” forthcoming, Journal of 
Political Economy. URL:  
http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/index.htm?prof_id=acemoglu&type=paper 
 
Acemoglu, D, 2003b, “The Form of Property Rights: Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies,” 
NBER Working Paper No.10037.  
 
Acemoglu, D., J. Robinson and S. Johnson, 2001, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, 91, pp. 1369-1401. 
 
Angjellari, F., 2002 “Institutional Determinants of GDP Growth in Central Eastern Europe and 
Former Soviet Union from 1989 to 2000: The Role of Democratization in Achieving Positive 
Growth,” Master’s Thesis, Kansas State University, Dec 2002. 
 
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt, 1998, “Endogenous Growth Theory,” Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Aslund, A., 2002, “Building Capitalism,” Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
Aslund, A., P. Boone and S. Jonson, 1996, “How to Stabilize: Lessons from Post-Communist 
Countries,” Brookings papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 217-313. 
 
Aziz, J. and R. Wescott, 1997, “Policy Complementarities and the Washington Consensus,” 
Washington: IMF Working Paper 97/118. 
 
Barro, R., 1991, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 5, pp. 407-43. 
 
________, 1996, “Democracy and Growth,” Journal of Economic Growth, 1(1), pp. 1-27. 
 
________, 1997, “Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study,” 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Barro, R. and X. Sala-I-Martin, 1995, “Economic Growth,” New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
_________, 2004, “Economic Growth,” Second edition, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
 84
Berg, A., E. Borensztein, R. Sahay and J. Zettelmeyer, 1999, “The Evolution of Output in 
Transition Economies: Explaining the Differences,” Working Paper WP/99/73, Washington, DC: 
IMF. 
 
Blanchard, O., 1997, “The Economics of Post-Communist Transition,” Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Blanchard, O. and M. Kremer, 1997, “Disorganization,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 
(4), pp. 1091-126. 
 
Borensztein E., J. De Gregorio and J. Lee, 1994, “How does Foreign Direct Investment Affect 
Economic Growth?,” Journal of International Economics, 45(1), pp. 115-35. 
 
Chenery H. and M. Syrquin, 1989, “Patterns of Development 1950-1989,” World Bank. 
 
Clague, C., P. Keefer, S. Knack, and M. Olson, 1997a, “Institutions and Economic 
Performance: Property Rights and Contract Enforcement,” in Clague C., ed., “Institutions and 
Economic Development,” Johns Hopkins Press, pp.67-90. 
 
Clague, C., P. Keefer, S. Knack, and M. Olson, 1997b, “Democracy, Autocracy, and 
Institutions Supportive of Economic Growth,” in Clague C., ed., “Institutions and Economic 
Development,” Johns Hopkins Press, pp. 91-120. 
 
De Melo, M. and A. Gelb, 1996, “A Comparative Analysis of Twenty-eight Transition 
Economies in Europe and Asia,” Post –Soviet Geography and Economics, 37 (50), pp. 265-85. 
 
De Melo, M., C. Denizer and A. Gelb, 1997a, “From Plan to Market: Patterns of Transition,” 
Washington: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1564. 
 
De Melo, M., C. Denizer, A. Gelb and S. Tenev, 1997b, “Circumstance and Choice: The Role 
of Initial Conditions and Policies in Transition Economies,” Washington: World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 1866. 
 
Dewatripont, M., and G. Roland, 1996 “Transition as a Process of Large-Scale Institutional 
Change,” Economics of Transition, 4, (1), pp. 1-30. 
 
Dunteman, G., 1989, “Principal Component Analysis,” Sage University Paper Series on 
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, Series No. 07-069, Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications.  
 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 1994, Transition Report 
1994, London: EBRD 
 
________, 1995, Transition Report 1995, London: EBRD 
 
________, 1996, Transition Report 1996, London: EBRD 
 
 85
________, 1997, Transition Report 1997, London: EBRD 
 
________, 1998, Transition Report 1998, London: EBRD 
 
________, 1999, Transition Report 1999, London: EBRD 
 
________, 2000, Transition Report 2000, London: EBRD 
 
________, 2001, Transition Report 2001, London: EBRD 
 
________, 2002, Transition Report 2002, London: EBRD 
 
________, 2003, Transition Report 2003, London: EBRD 
 
________, 2004, Transition Report Update 2004, London: EBRD 
 
 
Falcetti, E., M. Raiser, P. Safney, 2002, “Defying the Odds: Initial Conditions, Reforms, and 
Growth in the First Decade of Transition,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 30, pp. 229-250. 
 
Filer R. and J. Hanousek, 2000, “Output Changes and Inflationary Bias in Transition,” 
CERGE-EI, Prague Working Paper No. 167. 
 
Fischer, S., R. Sahay and C. Vegh, 1996a, “Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: 
The Early Experience,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (2), pp. 45-66. 
 
________, 1996b “Economies in Transition: The Beginning of Growth,” American Economic 
Review, 86 (2), pp. 229-33. 
 
Fischer, S. and R. Sahay, 2000, “The Transition Economies after Ten Years,” IMF Working 
Paper No. 30. 
 
Glaeser, E., R La Porta, F. Lopez-De-Silanes and A. Shleifer, 2004, “Do Institutions Cause 
Growth?,” Journal of Economic Growth, 9, pp. 271-303. 
 
Greene, W., 2003, “Econometric Analysis,” fifth edition, Prentice Hall. 
 
Gros, D., and M. Suhrcke, 2000, “Ten Years After: What is Special About Transition 
Countries?,” EBRD Working Paper No. 56. 
 
Haggard, S., 1999, “Democratic Institutions, Economic Policy, and Development,” in Clague 
C., ed., “Institutions and Economic Development,” Johns Hopkins Press, pp. 121-149. 
 
Havrylyshyn, O, I. Izvorski, and R. Van Rooden, 1998, “Recovery and Growth in Transition 
Economies 1990-1997 – A Stylized Regression Analysis,” Washington: IMF Working Paper, 
WP/98/141. 
 86
 
Havrylyshyn, O., T. Wolf,  I. Izvorski, and R. Van Rooden, 1999, “Growth Experience in 
Transition Countries 1990-1998,” Washington: IMF Occasional Paper 184. 
 
Havrylyshyn, O., and R. Van Rooden, 2000, “Institutions Matter in Transition, But So Do 
Policies”, Washington: IMF Working Paper WP/00/70. 
 
Hendry, D., 1980 “Econometrics – Alchemy or Science?,” Economica, 47, pp. 387-406. 
 
Hendry, D., and J. Richard, 1982 “On the Formulation of Empirical Models in Dynamic 
Econometrics,” Journal of Econometrics, 20, pp. 3-33. 
 
Hendry, D., 1995, “Dynamic Econometrics,” Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal, 2005, “2005 Index of Economic Freedom,” URL: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index 
 
Hernandez-Cata, E., 1997, “Liberalization and the Behavior of Output During the Transition 
from Plan to Market,” IMF Staff Papers, 44, pp. 405-429. 
 
Heybey B., and P. Murrell, 1999, “The Relationship Between Economic Growth and the Speed 
of Liberalization during Transition,” Journal of Policy Reform 3, (2) pp. 121-137. 
 
International Monetary Fund, 2000, “World Economic Outlook,” Chapter 4, Washington DC: 
IMF 
 
_______, 2004, IFS CD-RAM. 
 
Jaros, J., 2001, “Decade in Transition Economies: Comparative Analysis of Economic Growth,” 
Prague Economic Papers, 10(3), pp. 253-77. 
 
Johnson, S., D. Kaufmann, and A. Shleifer, 1997, “The Unofficial Economy in Transition,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 159-239. 
 
Kaufmann D. and A. Kaliberda, 1996, “Integrating the Unofficial Economy into the Dynamics 
of Post-Socialist Economies: A Framework of Analysis and Evidence,” World Bank Policy 
Research Paper No. 1691. 
 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer, 1995, “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests 
using Alternative Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics, 7, pp. 207-227. 
 
Koen, V., 1995, “Flawed Conclusions,” Transition, 6, (4) pp. 11-23. 
 
Kornai, J., 1994, “Transformational Recession: The Main Causes,” Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 19, pp. 39-63. 
 
 87
________, 2000, “What the Change of System from Socialism to Capitalism Does and Does Not 
Mean,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14 (1) pp. 27-42.  
 
_________, 2000, “Ten Years After the Road to a Free Economy - The Author’s Self-
Evaluation,” Paper presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, April 
18-20, Washington DC. 
 
Leamer, E., 1985 “Sensitivity Analysis Would Help,” American Economic Review, 75 (3) pp. 
308-13. 
 
Lougani, P. and N. Sheets, 1997, “Central Bank Independence, Inflation and Growth in 
Transition Economies,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 29, pp. 381-99. 
 
Mauro, P., 1997, “The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government 
Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis,” in K. Elliot, ed., “Corruption and the Global 
Economy,” Washington: Institute of International Economics. 
 
Merlevede, B., 2003, “Reform Reversals and Output Growth in Transition Economies,” 
Economics of Transition, 11 (4), pp. 649-669. 
 
Murell, P., 1996, “How Far Has Transition Progressed?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 
(2) pp. 25-44. 
 
Nabli, M. and J. Nugent, 1989, “The New Institutional Economics and Its Applicability to 
Development,” World Development, 17 (9), pp. 1333-1347. 
 
North D. and R. Thomas, 1973, “The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History’” 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge UK. 
 
North, D., 1981 “Structure and Change in Economic History,” New York: W.W. Norton & Co.  
 
North, D., 1990, “Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance,” Cambridge 
University Press, New York.  
 
North, D., 1993, “Institutions and Credible Commitment,” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, 149 (1), pp. 11-23. 
 
North, D., 1994, “Economic Performance Through Time,” American Economic Review, 84, pp. 
359-68. 
 
Olson, M., 1996, “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others 
Poor,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (2), pp. 3-24. 
 
Olson, M., N. Sarna and A. Swamy, 2000, “Governance and Growth: A Simple Hypothesis 
Explaining Cross-Country Differences in Productivity Growth,” Public Choice, 102, pp. 341-
363. 
 88
 
Parente, S. and E. Prescott, 2002, “Barriers to Riches,” Walras-Pareto Lectures, The MIT 
Press: Cambridge, MA. 
 
Pfefferman, G. and G. Kisunko, 1999, “Perceived Obstacles to Doing Business: Worldwide 
Survey Results,” Paper presented at the 1999 International Society for New Institutional 
Economics Congress. URL: http//www.isnie.org 
       
Polity IV Project, 2004, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) Program, 
Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of 
Maryland, College Park. URL: www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity 
 
Poirson, H., 1998, “Economic Security, Private Investment, and Growth in Developing 
Countries,” Washington: IMF working Paper, WP/98/4. 
 
Popov, V., 2000, “Shock Therapy Versus Gradualism: The End of the Debate,” Comparative 
Economic Studies, 42 (1), pp. 1-57. 
 
Radulescu, R. and D. Barlow, 2002, “The Relationship Between Policies and Growth in 
Transition Countries,” Economics of Transition, 10 (3), pp. 719-745. 
 
Raiser, M., Di Tommaso M., and Weeks M., 2001, “A Structural Model of Institutional 
Change: Evidence from the Transition Economies,” Working Paper No. 60, London: EBRD. 
 
Rodrick, D., 1999, “Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and 
Growth Collapses,” Journal of Economic Growth, 4, pp. 385-412. 
 
Rodrick, D., Subramanian, A., and Trebbi, F., 2004, “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,” Journal of Economic 
Growth, 9, pp. 131-165. 
  
Roland, G., 2000, “Transition and Economics,” MIT Press. 
 
Roland, G., 2001, “The Political Economy of Transition,” William Davidson Working Paper 
No. 413. 
 
Roland G., 2002, “The Political Economy of Transition,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 
(1), pp. 29-50. 
 
Roland, G. and T., Verdier, 1999, “Transition and the Output Fall,” Economics of Transition, 7 
(1) pp. 1-28.  
 
Sachs, J. and A. Warner, 1996, “Achieving Rapid Growth in the Transition Economies of 
Central Europe,” Harvard Institute for International Development, Discussion Paper No. 544. 
 
Sachs, J., C. Zinnes and Y. Eilat , 2000a “Patterns of Economic Reform and Its Determinants 
in Transition Economies,” CAER Discussion Paper. URL: 
 89
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/caer2/htm/framsets/fr_num.htm 
 
Sachs, J., C. Zinnes and Y. Eilat , 2000b “The Gains from Privatization in Transition 
Economies: Is Change of Title Enough?,” CAER Discussion Paper. URL: 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/caer2/htm/framsets/fr_num.htm 
 
Selowski M. and R. Martin, 1997, “Policy Performance and Output Growth in the Transition 
Economies,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, pp. 349-58. 
 
Stiglitz, J., 1999, “Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition,” Paper presented at the World 
Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, Washington DC. 
 
Tanzi, V. and H. Davoodi, 1997, “Corruption, Public Investment and Growth,” Washington: 
IMF Working Paper, WP/97/139. 
 
Tornell, A., 1997, “Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights,” Journal 
of Economic Growth, 2(3), pp. 219-250. 
 
Williamson, O., 2000 “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” 
Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII, pp. 595-613. 
 
Wolf, H., 1999, “Transition Strategies: Choices and Outcomes”, Princeton Studies in 
International Finance No. 85., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, International Finance 
Section. 
 
World Bank, 1996, “From Plan to Market,” World Development Report 1996, Oxford 
University Press. 
 
_________, 1997, “The State in a Changing World,” Oxford University Press.   
 
_________, 2002, “Building Institutions for Markets,” World Development Report 2002, Oxford 
University Press   
 
Zinnes, C., Y. Eilat and J. Sachs, 2001, “Benchmarking Competitiveness in Transition 
Economies,” Economics of Transition, 9 (2), pp. 315-353. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 90
 
Appendix   Data Definitions  
 
GDPG – Real GDP growth: annual percentage change in real GDP) 
 
GDPI - Real GDP level: annual percentage change from transition base year  
 
INFL – Inflation: percentage change in year-end retail/consumer price level  
 
SPR - EBRD ratings of structural policy reforms ranging from 1 (no reform) to 4.3 (standards 
typical of market economies). See for example EBRD Transition Report 1998 for a detailed 
score definition of each indicator. 
 
SPR Broad – The simple average of EBRD reform ratings for price liberalization, trade and 
exchange rate liberalization, small-scale and large scale privatization. 
 
SPR Narrow - The simple average of EBRD reform ratings for price liberalization, trade and 
exchange rate liberalization and small-scale privatization. 
 
INSTREF – EBRD ratings of institutional reform, ranging from 1 (no reform) to 4.3 (standards 
typical of market economies). INSTREF is the simple average of reform ratings for competition 
policy, enterprise restructuring and governance, banking reform and non-bank financial 
institutions reform. See various issues of EBRD Transition Reports for a detailed score definition 
of each indicator. 
 
PCINST - A compiled indicator of contract intensive money, defined by Clague et al. (1997) as 
the ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply, used as a proxy for property rights 
and contract enforcement institutions. 
 
ROLINST – The International Risk Country Guide (ICRG) political risk indicator rule of law 
used as a proxy for property rights and contract enforcement institutions.  
 
AVGR – Average Real GDP growth 1985-1989. 
 
INC – 1989 per capita GDP at PPP. 
 
BLKMAR – Black market exchange rate premium. 
 
INDO – Industrial overhang calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted share 
of industry in GDP. 
 
LOCAT – A binary variable taking the value 1 if a country has a thriving market economy as a 
neighbor, and 0 otherwise. 
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NRESD – A categorical variable measuring the richness of natural and energy resources, taking 
values 1 (poor), 2 (moderate) and 3 (rich). 
 
REPINF – A measure of repressed inflation, calculated as the difference between growth of real 
wages and real GDP growth over 1987-1990. 
 
STATE – A categorical variable taking the value 2 if a country was an independent state at the 
beginning of reform, 1 if a country was a member of a decentralized federal state (such as the 
Yugoslav republics) or was the core state of a centralized federal state (such as Russia and Czech 
Republic), and 0 otherwise. 
 
TRADEP – A measure of trade dependency, calculated as the ratio between the average of 
exports and imports and GDP. 
 
URB – Share of urban population to total population. 
 
YUPLAN – The number of years a transition country has been under central planning related to 
the market memory. 
 
INPC1 – Country score calculations from the first principal component of a cluster analysis over 
the 11 initial conditions explained above. The country score is calculated by multiplying each 
initial condition variable with a factor loading. INPC1 measures macroeconomic distortions at 
the beginning of transition. 
 
INPC2 - Country score calculations from the second principal component of a cluster analysis 
over the 11 initial conditions explained above. The country score is calculated by multiplying 
each initial condition variable with a factor loading. INPC2 measures the general level of 
development. 
 
IC1 – EBRD staff calculations of country score calculations from the first principal component 
similar to INPC1, used in Falcetti et al. (2002). 
 
IC2 – EBRD staff calculations of country score calculations from the second principal 
component similar to INPC2, used in Falcetti et al. (2002). 
 
Time – Number of years since transition (or transition recovery stage) started. 
 
Time2 – Time squared. 
 
IC1 x Time – An interaction variable obtained by multiplying IC1 with Time. 
 
RT – Regional tensions, a binary variable taking the value 1 if a country has experienced war, or 
blockade in a particular year. 
 
Polity – A proxy for political reform, a combined score computed by subtracting the AUTOC 
(autocracy) score from the DEMOC (democracy) score. The resulting unified polity scale ranges 
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from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). For a detailed description of how the 
polity score is derived, see the Polity IV Project, 2004, manual. URL: 
www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity 
 
STAB - Macroeconomic stabilization, measured by number of years when inflation was below 
30% and government budget deficit below 5%. 
 
GOVEXP - Ratio of government expenditures over GDP. 
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Note: Higher values of INPC1 indicate higher levels of macroeconomic distortions, while higher values of INPC2 indicate lower 
general levels of development, corresponding (in both cases) to unfavorable (bad) initial conditions. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Ranking of Transition Economies by Initial Conditions
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Figure 3 
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Note: For lack of space ALLD represents the 24 vectors (to avoid the dummy variable trap) of country binary variables
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Table 1. Data Sources, Data Coverage and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Source      Coverage 
 
Mean 
 
Standard Deviation 
GDPG EBRD Transition 
Reports 
CEE 1989-2003 
CIS 1991-2003 
-0.61 9.48 
GDPI EBRD Transition 
Reports 
CEE 1989-2003 
CIS 1991-2003 
81.31 21.97 
INFL EBRD Transition 
Reports 
CEE 1989-2003 
CIS 1991-2003 
285.06         1036.88 
SPR Broad EBRD Transition 
Reports 
CEE 1989-2003 
CIS 1991-2003 
3.04 1.01 
SPR Narrow EBRD Transition 
Reports 
CEE 1989-2003 
CIS 1991-2003 
3.26 1.01 
INST EBRD Transition 
Reports 
CEE 1989-2003 
CIS 1991-2003 
1.93 0.67 
PCINST IFS CD RAM  Data available for 19 
transition economies, 
from 1994-2003 
0.77 0.15 
ROLINST 
 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) 
dataset 
1991-2003 2.21 0.89 
IC1 x Time De Melo et al. 1997b, 
EBRD staff 
calculations, and 
author’s calculations 
1989 and 1991  0.003 18.23 
RT De Melo and 
Gelb1996, and EBRD 
Transition Report 
2003 
1989 - 2003  0.13 0.34 
Polity University of 
Maryland 
1989-2003 3.25 6.33 
STAB EBRD Transition 
Reports 
1989-2003 1.66 2.39 
GOVEXP EBRD Transition 
Reports 
1989-2003 0.38 0.11 
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Table 1.1 Pair-Correlations of Variables in Table 15 
 
 
 SPR INSTREF LSPR POLITY STAB GOVEXP INFL TIME TIMESQ IC1 GDPG GDPI 
SPR 1.00            
INSTREF 0.65 1.00           
LSPR 0.92 0.72 1.00          
Polity 0.65 0.69 0.66 1.00         
STAB 0.25 0.55 0.33 0.28 1.00        
GOVEXP 0.21 0.67 0.28 0.47 0.29 1.00       
INFL -0.17 -0.12 -0.26 -0.04 -0.24 0.004 1.00      
TIME 0.14 0.36 0.29 0.27 0.50 0.08 -0.15 1.00     
TIMESQ 0.10 0.35 0.26 0.29 0.47 0.09 -0.15 0.98 1.00    
IC1 -0.33 -0.63 -0.42 -0.67 -0.33 -0.70 0.02 -0.34 -0.37 1.00   
GDPG -0.23 -0.31 -0.25 -0.33 -0.02 -0.35 -0.25 -0.07 -0.05 0.40 1.00 -0.13 
GDPI 0.09 0.53 0.21 0.24 0.47 0.58 -0.12 0.46 0.45 -0.60 -0.133 1.00 
 
 
Table 1.2 Pair-Correlations of Variables in Table 16 
 
 SPR LSPR INSTREF PCINST ROLINST POLITY STAB GOVEXP INFL TIME TIMESQ IC1 GDPG GDPI 
SPR 1.00              
SPR 0.89 1.00             
INSTREF 0.57 0.65 1.00            
PCINST -0.01 0.08 0.52 1.00           
ROLINST 0.36 0.40 0.70 0.32 1.00          
POLITY 0.46 0.49 0.64 0.41 0.50 1.00         
STAB 0.38 0.49 0.66 0.39 0.47 0.49 1.00        
GOVEXP -0.02 0.04 0.52 0.70 0.33 0.32 0.30 1.00       
INFL -0.25 -0.36 -0.19 0.01 -0.07 -0.078 -0.26 -0.04 1.00      
TIME 0.06 0.22 0.37 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.54 0.01 -0.15 1.00     
TIMESQ 0.00 0.17 0.35 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.52 0.01 -0.15 0.98 1.00    
IC1 -0.18 -0.29 -0.59 -0.67 -0.38 -0.58 -0.54 -0.65 0.05 -0.38 -0.384 1.00   
GDPG -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.23 0.004 -0.22 0.02 -0.24 -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.36 1.00 -0.03 
GDPI 0.22 0.30 0.62 0.67 0.38 0.24 0.61 0.47 -0.17 0.49 0.45 -0.61 -0.03 1.00 
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Table 2. Growth in Real GDP (Annual Percentage Change in GDP) 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Central Europe               estimate projection 
Poland 0.2 -11.6 -7 2.6 3.8 5.2 7 6 6.8 4.8 4.1 4 1 1.4 3.7 4.5 
Check Republic 1.4 -1.2 -11.6 -0.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.3 -0.8 -1 0.5 3.3 3.1 2 2.9 4 
Slovakia 1.4 -2.5 -14.6 -6.7 -3.7 5.2 6.5 5.8 5.6 4 1.3 2.2 3.3 4.4 4.2 4.4 
Hungary 0.7 -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 4 
South-East Europe                
Romania  -5.8 -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 4 -6.1 -4.8 -1.2 1.8 5.3 4.9 4.9 5 
Bulgaria  0.5 -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.9 -9.4 -5.6 4 2.3 5.4 4 4.8 4.5 4.8 
Croatia -1.6 -7.1 -21.1 -11.7 -8 5.9 6.8 6 6.5 2.5 -0.9 2.9 3.8 5.2 4.5 3.5 
Slovenia -1.8 -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 1.7 5.8 4.9 3.5 4.6 3.8 5.2 4.6 3 2.9 2.3 3.1 
Macedonia 0.9 -9.9 -7 -8 -9.1 -1.8 -1.2 1.2 1.4 3.4 4.3 4.5 -4.5 0.7 2.8 3 
Albania  9.8 -10 -27.7 -7.2 9.6 8.3 13.3 9.1 -7 12.7 8.9 7.7 6.8 4.7 6 6 
Baltics                  
Estonia  -1.1 -6.5 -13.6 -14.2 -8.8 -2 4.3 3.9 9.8 4.6 -0.6 7.3 6.5 6 4.7 5.5 
Latvia  1.5 2.9 -10.4 -34.9 -14.9 2.2 -0.9 3.7 8.4 4.8 2.8 6.8 7.9 6.1 7.5 6 
Lithuania 6.8 -5 -5.7 -21.3 -16.2 -9.8 3.3 4.7 7 7.3 -1.8 4 6.5 6.8 8.9 6.5 
CIS (FSU)                  
Russia 2.4 -4 -5 -14.8 -8.7 -12.7 -4 -3.6 1.4 -5.3 6.4 10 5.1 4.7 7.3 5.5 
Belarus 8 -3 -1.2 -9.6 -7.6 -12.6 -10.4 2.8 11.4 8.4 3.4 5.8 4.7 4.7 6.8 4.5 
Ukraine 4 -3.4 -11.6 -9.7 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10 -3 -1.9 -0.2 5.9 9.2 4.8 9.3 6 
Moldova 8.5 -2.4 -17.5 -29.1 -1.2 -30.9 -1.4 -5.9 1.6 -6.5 -3.4 2.1 6.1 7.2 6.3 5.5 
Armenia 14.2 -7.4 -11.7 -41.8 -8.8 5.4 6.9 5.9 3.3 7.3 3.3 6 9.6 12.9 13.9 7 
Azerbaijan  -4.4 -11.7 -0.7 -22.6 -23.1 -19.7 -11.8 0.8 6 10 9.5 11.1 9.9 10.6 11.2 8.5 
Georgia -4.8 -12.4 -20.6 -44.8 -25.4 -11.4 2.4 10.5 10.8 2.9 3 1.9 4.7 5.6 7 5 
Kazakhstan -0.4 -0.4 -13 -5.3 -9.3 -12.6 -8.2 0.5 1.7 -1.9 2.7 9.8 13.5 9.8 9.2 7 
Kyrgyzstan 4 3 -5 -19 -15.5 -20.1 -5.4 7.1 9.9 2.1 3.7 5.4 5.3 0 6.7 4.1 
Tajikistan -2.9 -1.6 -7.1 -29 -11 -18.9 -12.5 -4.4 1.7 5.3 3.7 8.3 10.3 9.1 10.2 6 
Turkmenistan -6.9 2 -4.7 -5.3 -10 -17.3 -7.2 -6.7 -11.3 7 16.5 17.6 11.8 5.1 11.4 9.1 
Uzbekistan 3.7 1.6 -0.5 -11.1 -2.3 -4.2 -0.9 1.6 2.5 4.3 4.3 3.8 4.2 4.2 1 2.5 
 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report Update 2004, April 2004            
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Table 3. Real GDP Level (Annual Percentage Change from Transition Base Year) 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Central Europe              
Poland 100 90 84 86 89 94 101 107 114 119 124 129 130 132 137
Check Republic 100 99 87 87 87 89 94 98 97 96 97 100 103 105 108
Slovakia 100 97 83 78 79 84 89 95 99 103 105 107 111 116 121
Hungary 100 93 82 80 79 82 83 84 88 92 96 101 105 108 112
South-East Europe               
Romania  100 89 78 71 72 75 80 83 78 74 74 75 80 83 87
Bulgaria  100 89 82 76 75 76 78 71 67 69 71 75 78 82 85
Croatia   100 88 81 86 92 97 104 107 106 109 114 119 124
Slovenia   100 95 97 102 107 111 116 120 127 132 135 140 143
Macedonia   100 93 86 85 84 85 86 89 93 97 93 94 97
Albania   100 72 67 73 79 90 98 88 99 108 116 124 130 137
Baltics                 
Estonia    100 86 79 77 81 84 93 98 98 106 113 121 127
Latvia    100 68 60 62 61 63 68 72 74 79 85 91 98
Lithuania   100 79 66 60 63 66 70 75 74 77 82 87 95
CIS (FSU)                 
Russia   100 85 78 68 65 63 64 60 64 71 74 78 84
Belarus   100 90 84 74 66 68 76 82 85 90 94 99 105
Ukraine   100 90 77 60 52 47 46 45 45 47 52 54 60
Moldova   100 71 70 48 48 45 46 43 41 42 45 48 51
Armenia   100 58 53 56 60 63 65 70 72 77 84 97 110
Azerbaijan    100 77 60 48 42 43 45 50 53 59 65 72 80
Georgia   100 55 39 35 36 40 44 45 47 47 50 53 58
Kazakhstan   100 95 86 75 69 69 70 69 71 78 89 97 106
Kyrgyzstan   100 86 73 58 55 59 65 66 69 72 76 76 81
Tajikistan   100 68 57 45 39 32 33 35 36 39 43 47 52
Turkmenistan   100 85 86 71 66 71 63 67 78 86 93 101 110
Uzbekistan     100 89 87 82 82 83 87 91 95 99 103 108 112
 
      Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and author's calculations. 
      Note: Transition base year for each transition country corresponds to the year for which real GDP level is 100%. 
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Table 4. EBRD Structural Policy Reform Indicators 
 
Countries Index of   Index of foreign Index of  Index of  
 price   exchange and trade small scale large scale 
 liberalization liberalization privatization privatization 
              
  1991 2003 1991 2003 1991 2003 1991 2003
               
Albania 1.0 3.7 1.0 4.3 2.0 4.0 1.0 2.3
Armenia 1.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 3.7 1.0 3.3
Azerbaijan 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.7 1.0 3.7 1.0 2.0
Belarus 1.0 2.7 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.3 1.0 1.0
Bulgaria 2.0 4.3 3.0 4.3 1.0 3.7 1.0 3.7
Croatia 3.0 4.0 3.0 4.3 3.0 4.3 1.0 3.3
Czech Republic 3.0 4.3 3.0 4.3 3.0 4.3 1.0 4.0
Estonia 2.0 4.0 2.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 4.0
Macedonia 3.0 4.0 3.0 4.3 3.0 4.0 1.0 3.0
Georgia 1.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.3
Hungary 3.0 4.3 4.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 2.0 4.0
Kazakhstan 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.3 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.0
Kyrgyzstan 1.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.0
Latvia 2.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 3.3
Lithuania 2.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 4.3 1.0 3.7
Moldova 1.0 3.7 1.0 4.3 1.0 3.3 1.0 3.0
Poland 3.0 4.3 3.0 4.3 3.0 4.3 2.0 3.3
Romania 2.0 4.3 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.7 1.7 3.3
Russia 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.3 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.3
Slovak Republic 3.0 4.3 3.0 4.3 3.0 4.3 1.0 4.0
Slovenia 3.0 4.0 3.0 4.3 3.0 4.3 1.0 3.0
Tajikistan 1.0 3.7 1.0 3.3 1.0 3.7 1.0 2.3
Turkmenistan 1.0 2.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0
Ukraine 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 4.0 1.0 3.0
Uzbekistan 1.0 2.7 1.0 1.7 1.0 3.0 1.0 2.7
 
        Sources: EBRD Transition Reports 
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Table 5. EBRD Indicators of Institutional Reform, and Property Rights and Contract Enforcement Institutions 
 
Countries Governance Competition Banking 
Securities 
markets PCINST  ROLINST 
 and enterprise policy  reform and and non-bank   
 restructuring   interest rate  financial          
       liberalization institutions         
 1991 2003 1991 2003 1991 2003 1991 2003 R(1) 2003 1991 2003 
                      
Albania 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.3 1.0 1.7 n.a. n.a. 1 2 
Armenia 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.0 0.6 0.63 1 3 
Azerbaijan 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 1.7 n.a. n.a. 1 2 
Belarus 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.0 0.77 0.85 1 2 
Bulgaria 1.0 2.7 2.0 2.3 1.0 3.3 1.0 2.3 0.91 0.74 1.5 3 
Croatia 1.0 2.7 1.0 2.3 1.0 3.7 1.0 2.7 0.85 0.92 1 2 
Czech Republic 2.0 3.3 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.7 1.0 3.0 0.92 0.87 1.5 4 
Estonia 1.0 3.3 1.0 2.7 1.0 3.7 1.0 3.3 0.73 0.87 1 4 
Macedonia 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 1.7 0.65 0.78 1 2 
Georgia 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 1.7 n.a. n.a. 1 2 
Hungary 2.0 3.3 2.0 3.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 3.7 0.82 0.85 1.5 4 
Kazakhstan 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 2.3 0.51 0.76 1 2 
Kyrgyzstan 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.0 0.24 0.37 1 2 
Latvia 1.0 3.0 1.0 2.7 1.0 3.7 1.0 3.0 0.62 0.76 1 3 
Lithuania 1.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 0.68 0.74 1 3 
Moldova 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.0 0.58 0.66 1 3 
Poland 2.0 3.3 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.3 2.0 3.7 0.81 0.86 1.5 4 
Romania 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.7 1.0 2.0 0.77 0.88 1.5 2 
Russia 1.0 2.3 2.0 2.3 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.7 0.62 0.64 1 2 
Slovak Republic 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.3 1.0 2.7 0.92 0.88 1.5 3 
Slovenia 1.0 3.0 1.0 2.7 1.0 3.3 2.0 2.7 0.93 0.94 1 4 
Tajikistan 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.0 n.a. n.a. 1 2 
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 n.a. n.a. 1 2 
Ukraine 1.0 2.0 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.3 1.0 2.0 0.6 0.65 1 2 
Uzbekistan 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.7 1.0 1.7 1.0 2.0 n.a. n.a. 1 2 
 
Sources: EBRD, ICRG, IMF CD-Ram and author’s calculations. Note: R(1) is the first year of transition recovery stage. 
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Table 6. Transition Year Base (TYB) and First Transition Recovery Year (FTRY) 
 
Countries  TYB T(0)   FTRY R(1) 
    
Central Europe    
Poland 1989  1992 
Check Republic 1989  1993 
Slovakia 1989  1994 
Hungary 1989  1994 
South-East Europe    
Romania  1989  1993 
Bulgaria  1989  1994 
Croatia 1991  1994 
Slovenia 1991  1993 
Macedonia 1991  1996 
Albania  1990  1993 
Baltics     
Estonia  1991  1995 
Latvia  1991  1996 
Lithuania 1991  1995 
CIS (FSU)     
Russia 1991  1999 
Belarus 1991  1996 
Ukraine 1991  2000 
Moldova 1991  2000 
Armenia 1991  1994 
Azerbaijan  1991  1996 
Georgia 1991  1995 
Kazakhstan 1991  1996 
Kyrgyzstan 1991  1996 
Tajikistan 1991  1997 
Turkmenistan 1991  1998 
Uzbekistan 1991  1996 
 
              Sources: EBRD Transition Reports and author’s calculations. 
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Table 7. Initial Level of Development, Resources and Growth 
 
Country Income per capita  URB (%) IND PIND AVG GR NRES NRESD LOCAT 
  at PP US$ 1989       ('85 - '89)       
CEE         
Poland 5150 62 0.52 0.39 2.8 moderate 2 1 
Check Republic 8600 65 0.58 0.37 1.6 poor 1 1 
Slovakia 7600 57 0.59 0.36 1.6 poor 1 1 
Hungary 6810 62 0.36 0.37 1.6 poor 1 1 
Romania  3470 53 0.59 0.37 -0.8 moderate 2 0 
Bulgaria  5000 68 0.59 0.36 2.7 poor 1 0 
Croatia 6171 62 0.35 0.34 0.2 poor 1 1 
Slovenia 9200 62 0.44 0.39 -0.4 poor 1 1 
Macedonia 3394 59 0.43 0.34 0.2 poor 1 0 
Albania  1400 37 0.37 0.34 3.6 poor 1 1 
Baltics          
Estonia  8900 72 0.44 0.34 2.7 poor 1 1 
Latvia  8590 71 0.45 0.35 3.5 poor 1 1 
Lithuania 6430 68 0.45 0.35 2.9 poor 1 1 
CIS (FSU)          
Russia 7720 74 0.48 0.41 3.2 rich 3 1 
Belarus 7010 66 0.49 0.37 5.2 poor 1 0 
Ukraine 5680 67 0.44 0.4 2.4 moderate 2 0 
Moldova 4670 47 0.37 0.35 5.7 poor 1 0 
Armenia 5530 68 0.55 0.35 2.7 poor 1 0 
Azerbaijan  4620 54 0.44 0.36 0.8 rich 3 0 
Georgia 5590 56 0.43 0.35 2.4 moderate 2 0 
Kazakhstan 5130 57 0.34 0.38 4.3 rich 3 0 
Kyrgyzstan 3180 38 0.4 0.34 5.2 poor 1 0 
Tajikistan 3010 32 0.34 0.34 1.9 poor 1 0 
Turkmenistan 4230 45 0.34 0.35 5 rich 3 0 
Uzbekistan 2740 41 0.33 0.37 3.9 moderate 2 0 
       
       Source: De Melo et al. (1997b) 
       Note: PIND stands for predicted share of industry as derived from using the regression results in Syrquin and Chenery (1986)  
       INDO stands for industrial overhang given as the difference between the share of industry in GDP and the PIND. 
 107
Table 7 (cont). Initial Economic Distortions and Institutional Characteristics 
 
Country REPINFL BLKMARP TRADEP YUPLAN STATE 
 (87-90) 1990 (%) 1990 (%)   
Central Europe      
Poland 13.6 277 8.4 41 2 
Check Republic -7.1 185 6 42 1 
Slovakia -7.1 185 6 42 0 
Hungary -7.7 46.7 13.7 42 2 
South-East Europe      
Romania 16.8 728 3.7 42 2 
Bulgaria 18 921 16.1 43 2 
Croatia 12 27 6 46 1 
Slovenia 12 27 4 46 1 
Macedonia 12 27 6 47 1 
Albania 4.3 434 6.6 47 2 
Baltics      
Estonia 25.7 1828 30.2 51 0 
Latvia 25.7 1828 36.7 51 0 
Lithuania 25.7 1828 40.9 51 0 
CIS (FSU)     0 
Russia 25.7 1828 11.1 74 1 
Belarus 25.7 1828 41 72 0 
Ukraine 25.7 1828 23.8 74 0 
Moldova 25.7 1828 28.9 51 0 
Armenia 25.7 1828 25.6 71 0 
Azerbaijan 25.7 1828 29.8 70 0 
Georgia 25.7 1828 24.8 70 0 
Kazakhstan 25.7 1828 20.8 71 0 
Kyrgyzstan 25.7 1828 27.7 71 0 
Tajikistan 25.7 1828 31 71 0 
Turkmenistan 25.7 1828 33 71 0 
Uzbekistan 25.7 1828 25.5 71 0 
 
         Source: De Melo et al. (1997b) 
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Table 7.1 Initial Conditions Correlation Matrix 
 
ICs INC URB INDO AVGR NRESD LOCAT REPINF BLKMAR TRADEP YUPLAN STATE
INC 1   
URB 0.78 1  
INDO 0.29 0.44 1  
AVGR -0.17 -0.21 -0.30 1  
NRESD -0.17 -0.05 -0.29 0.11 1  
LOCAT 0.59 0.40 0.11 -0.25 -0.29 1  
REPINF -0.20 -0.04 -0.28 0.44 0.37 -0.55 1 
BLKMAR -0.11 -0.08 -0.25 0.62 0.37 -0.50 0.87 1
TRADEP 0.00 -0.04 -0.24 0.62 0.05 -0.36 0.71 0.85 1
YUPLAN -0.23 -0.21 -0.41 0.46 0.52 -0.59 0.71 0.80 0.58 1
STATE -0.12 0.09 0.24 -0.41 -0.12 0.34 -0.57 -0.72 -0.72 -0.66 1
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Table 7.2 The Fit Measures of Principal Components 
 
Components Proportion 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
 
INPC1 0.46 0.46 
INPC2 0.19 0.65 
INPC3 0.10 0.75 
INPC4 0.09 0.84 
INPC5 0.06 0.90 
INPC6 0.04 0.93 
INPC7 0.02 0.96 
INPC8 0.02 0.97 
INPC9 0.01 0.98 
INPC10 0.01 0.99 
INPC11 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 7.3 Initial Conditions and Principal Components Correlation Matrix 
IC-s INPC1 INPC2 INPC3 INPC4 INPC5 INPC6 INPC7 INPC8 INPC9 INPC10 INPC11
  
INC -0.33 -0.87 0.07 0.21 -0.12 -0.10 0.09 -0.05 0.05 -0.21 0.01
URB -0.32 -0.82 0.32 -0.06 0.14 0.17 0.21 -0.02 -0.03 0.16 -0.03
INDO -0.45 -0.34 0.06 -0.74 0.17 -0.24 -0.17 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
AVGR 0.66 -0.08 -0.40 0.18 0.55 -0.21 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.02
NRESD 0.43 0.15 0.79 0.25 0.18 -0.18 -0.15 -0.15 0.00 0.01 0.02
LOCAT -0.66 -0.38 -0.14 0.52 0.09 0.02 -0.29 0.18 -0.03 0.06 0.02
REPINF 0.85 -0.17 0.16 -0.14 0.04 0.37 -0.09 0.09 0.20 -0.03 0.07
BLKMAR 0.93 -0.27 0.02 -0.07 0.09 0.04 -0.13 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.16
TRADEP 0.80 -0.37 -0.31 -0.05 0.02 0.13 -0.11 -0.19 -0.22 0.00 0.06
YUPLAN 0.88 -0.01 0.24 0.05 -0.12 -0.14 0.15 0.27 -0.16 -0.01 0.05
STATE -0.74 0.37 0.17 -0.02 0.42 0.27 0.06 0.05 -0.14 -0.13 0.00
 
 110
Table 7.4 Principal Components for Initial Conditions 
 
 Angjellari (2002) EBRD (1999) 
 INPC1 INPC2 IC1 IC2 
Proportion of total variance explained 0.46 0.19 0.497 0.177 
Correlation between INPC1 (INPC2) and IC1 (IC2) 0.97 -0.92 0.97 -0.92 
Central Europe     
Poland -0.48 0.10 -1.87 -0.68 
Check Republic -0.74 -0.20 -3.53 0.6 
Slovakia -0.63 -0.14 -2.95 -0.03 
Hungary -0.65 0.10 -3.25 -0.69 
South-East Europe     
Romania -0.43 0.36 -1.69 -0.88 
Bulgaria -0.32 0.00 -2.12 -0.01 
Croatia -0.51 0.06 -2.54 -0.15 
Slovenia -0.60 -0.12 -3.18 0.49 
Macedonia -0.38 0.31 -2.51 -0.29 
Albania -0.36 0.61 -2.09 -3.08 
Baltics and CIS (FSU)     
Estonia 0.01 -0.54 0.4 1.72 
Latvia 0.08 -0.55 0.24 1.85 
Lithuania 0.12 -0.41 0.01 1.53 
Russia 0.10 -0.28 1.09 1.91 
Belarus 0.43 -0.34 1.07 1.94 
Ukraine 0.36 -0.11 1.4 1.54 
Moldova 0.38 0.09 1.09 -0.31 
Armenia 0.23 -0.24 1.11 1.44 
Azerbaijan 0.39 0.07 3.24 0.07 
Georgia 0.35 -0.02 2.2 0.56 
Kazakhstan 0.51 0.10 2.54 -0.04 
Kyrgyzstan 0.50 0.25 2.27 -1.94 
Tajikistan 0.46 0.36 2.87 -2.22 
Turkmenistan 0.63 0.19 3.43 -1.07 
Uzbekistan 0.55 0.35 2.78 -1.94 
 
           Sources: Angjellari (2002) and EBRD staff calculations.  
Table 8. Polity (The Political Reform Proxy) 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Central Europe                
Poland 5 5 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10
Check Republic -6 8 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Slovakia -6 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 9 9 9 9 9 9
Hungary 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
South-East Europe                
Romania  -2 5 5 5 5 5 5 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Bulgaria  -7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9
Croatia   -3 -3 -3 -3 -5 -5 -5 -5 1 7 7 7 7
Slovenia   10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Macedonia   6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 9 9
Albania   1 1 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 7 7
Baltics                 
Estonia    6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Latvia    8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Lithuania   10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
CIS (FSU)                 
Russia   6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7
Belarus   7 7 7 7 0 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Ukraine   6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Moldova   5 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8
Armenia   7 7 7 7 3 -6 -6 5 5 5 5 5 5
Azerbaijan    -3 1 -3 -3 -6 -6 -6 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7 -7
Georgia   4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Kazakhstan   -3 -3 -3 -3 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -6 -6
Kyrgyzstan   -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
Tajikistan   -2 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -5 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -3
Turkmenistan   -8 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9
Uzbekistan     -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9 -9
 
      Source: Political IV Project, INSCR and CIDCM, University of Maryland. 
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Table 9. Macroeconomic Stabilization (An Institutional Supply Factor) 
 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Central Europe                
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 6 6 
Check Republic 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9 9 9 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 6 
South-East Europe                
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Croatia   0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 6 
Slovenia   0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Macedonia   0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 6 7 
Albania  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Baltics                
Estonia   0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Latvia   0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Lithuania   0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 4 5 6 
CIS (FSU)                
Russia   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 
Belarus   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ukraine   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Moldova   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 
Armenia   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 4 
Azerbaijan   0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Georgia   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 
Kazakhstan   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 
Kyrgyzstan   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tajikistan   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 
Turkmenistan   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Uzbekistan   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
       Source: EBRD Reports and author's calculations. 
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Table 10. Government Expenditures as Percentage of Real GDP (An Institutional Supply Factor) 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Central Europe                
Poland 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.45
Check Republic 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.46
Slovakia 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.48
Hungary 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.47 0.52 0.54 0.49
South-East Europe                
Romania  0.40 0.40 0.39 0.42 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.33   
Bulgaria  0.48 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.41 0.42 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.37
Croatia   0.38 0.36 0.35 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.50
Slovenia   0.41 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42
Macedonia   0.50 0.48 0.55 0.51 0.43 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.42 0.42 0.36
Albania   0.63 0.62 0.44 0.35 0.31 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.29
Baltics                 
Estonia    0.35 0.35 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.41 0.44 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.34
Latvia    0.30 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.37 0.39 0.39
Lithuania   0.39 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.36
CIS (FSU)                 
Russia   0.74 0.71 0.45 0.46 0.37 0.45 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.36
Belarus   0.47 0.46 0.56 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.42 0.46
Ukraine   0.59 0.58 0.55 0.46 0.36 0.40 0.44 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.34
Moldova   0.25 0.57 0.29 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.33 0.34 0.29 0.32 0.30
Armenia   0.28 0.47 0.83 0.43 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19
Azerbaijan    0.58 0.56 0.56 0.46 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.28 0.30
Georgia   0.33 0.36 0.36 0.24 0.12 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18
Kazakhstan   0.33 0.32 0.25 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.24
Kyrgyzstan   0.30 0.34 0.37 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.27
Tajikistan   0.50 0.66 0.61 0.61 0.29 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16
Turkmenistan   0.38 0.42 0.19 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.25
Uzbekistan     0.53 0.43 0.46 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.25
 
    Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report update, April 2004. 
 
 
Table 11. GDPG Determinants: Fixed Effects Results 
 
  FE(1) FE(2) FE(3) FE(4) 
Dependant variable GDPG     
     
Inflation -0.0001 -0.00004 -0.0004 -0.0002 
 (-0.28) (-0.10) (-0.99) (-0.66) 
     
SPR Broad 0.209 0.601   
 (0.14) (0.40)   
     
Lagged SPR Broad 7.651*** 4.724***   
 (6.27) (3.62)   
     
SPR Narrow   -1.274 -0.763 
   (-0.91) (-0.55) 
     
Lagged SPR Narrow   8.324*** 5.672*** 
   (7.23) (4.53) 
     
Regional Tensions -2.543 -2.338 -3.447** -2.976** 
 (-1.64) (-1.56) (-2.26) (-2.01) 
     
Initial Conditions x Time 0.366*** 0.293*** 0.326*** 0.271*** 
 (7.32) (5.86) (6.46) (5.40) 
     
Institutional Reform 0.201 -3.973* 0.189 -3.677* 
 (0.10) (-1.92) (0.10) (-1.84) 
     
Time   3.652***  3.277*** 
  (4.41)  (3.89) 
     
Time Squared  -0.167***  -0.148*** 
  (-3.77)  (-3.27) 
     
Constant -23.669*** -23.824*** -22.235*** -22.322*** 
 (-10.16) (-9.95) (-9.36) (-9.08) 
      
R-squared 0.638 0.670 0.649 0.675 
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 
      
    Note: i) These single equation estimations are obtained using the whole transition period 
     dataset. ii) Fixed country effects are included in all regressions, but not reported;  
 iii) t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
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Table 12. GDPI Determinants: Fixed Effects Results 
 
 FE(5) FE(6) FE(7) FE(8) 
Dependant variable GDPI     
     
Inflation -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.000002 
 (-0.85) (-0.77) (-0.10) (0.00) 
     
SPR Broad -17.004*** -11.322***   
 (-6.13) (-5.27)   
     
Lagged SPR Broad 3.803* 0.811   
 (1.71) (0.43)   
     
SPR Narrow   -15.214*** -10.341*** 
   (-5.91) (-5.21) 
     
Lagged SPR Narrow   2.199 -0.154 
   (1.04) (-0.09) 
     
Regional Tensions -9.966*** -5.603** -8.328*** -4.385** 
 (-3.54) (-2.59) (-2.98) (-2.05) 
     
Initial Conditions x Time -0.063 -0.191*** -0.034 -0.174** 
 (-0.70) (-2.64) (-0.37) (-2.41) 
     
Institutional Reform 23.036*** 10.928*** 23.682*** 10.649*** 
 (6.51) (3.66) (6.96) (3.69) 
     
Time  -3.816***  -3.279*** 
  (-3.20)  (-2.70) 
     
Time Squared  0.390***  0.361*** 
  (6.08)  (5.54) 
     
Constant 77.908*** 94.466*** 78.301*** 94.774*** 
 (18.38) (27.37) (17.96) (26.74) 
     
R-squared 0.265 0.578 0.275 0.585 
Number of Observations 300 300 300 300 
 
    Note: i) These single equation estimations are obtained using the whole transition period 
     dataset. ii) Fixed country effects are included in all regressions, but not reported;  
 iii) t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  
 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
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Table 13. GDPG, SPR and INSTREF Determinants: 3SLS Results 
 
  3SLS(1) 3SLS(2) 3SLS(3) 3SLS(4) 
Dependent variable GDPG     
     
Inflation -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (-0.69) (-0.69) (-1.03) (-1.03) 
     
SPR Broad -0.961 -0.889   
 (-0.72) (-0.66)   
     
Lagged SPR Broad 5.120*** 5.077***   
 (4.13) (4.09)   
     
SPR Narrow   -2.714** -2.641** 
   (-2.15) (-2.09) 
     
Lagged SPR Narrow   6.672*** 6.637*** 
   (5.62) (5.59) 
     
Regional Tensions -2.355* -2.350 -2.851** -2.839** 
 (-1.65) (-1.64) (-2.03) (-2.02) 
     
Initial Conditions x Time 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.261*** 0.260*** 
 (6.07) (6.06) (5.52) (5.51) 
     
Institutional Reform (INSTREF) -4.030** -4.067** -4.173** -4.243** 
 (-2.16) (-2.18) (-2.28) (-2.32) 
     
Time  4.191*** 4.192*** 3.749*** 3.756*** 
 (5.35) (5.36) (4.71) (4.72) 
     
Time Squared -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.171*** -0.171*** 
 (-4.63) (-4.63) (-4.01) (-4.01) 
     
Constant -28.363*** -28.396*** -26.333*** -26.376*** 
 (-10.52) (-10.53) (-9.56) (-9.57) 
R-square 0.676 0.676 0.682 0.682 
Chi-square 632.24 632.21 657.54 657.41 
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 
 
         Note: i) These joint estimations are obtained when the whole transition period dataset is used.  
               ii) Fixed country effects are included in all regressions, but not reported; iii) z-statistics are  
                   reported in parenthesis; iv) the Chi-square statistics indicates the overall significance of the    
                   model; v) 3SLS(2) and 3SLS(4) specifications differ from 3SLS(1) and 3SLS(3) respectively,   
                   only by the presence of Lagged GDPG in the SPR and INSTREF equations. 
 
                  * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
                  ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
                  *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test) 
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Table 13 (cont). GDPG, SPR and INSTREF Determinants: 3SLS Results 
 
  3SLS(1) 3SLS(2) 3SLS(3) 3SLS(4) 
Dependant variable SPR     
     
GDPG -0.002 -0.0003 -0.006** -0.005* 
 (-0.69) (-0.10) (-2.21) (-1.67) 
     
Lagged GDPG  -0.005**  -0.004* 
  (-2.36)  (-1.78) 
     
Lagged SPR Broad 0.678*** 0.679***   
 (17.12) (17.31)   
     
Lagged SPR Narrow   0.687*** 0.681*** 
   (17.39) (17.31) 
     
Time 0.095*** 0.105*** 0.092** 0.103*** 
 (2.73) (3.01) (2.51) (2.79) 
     
Time Squared -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (-2.87) (-3.00) (-2.61) (-2.79) 
     
Initial Conditions x Time 0.0004 0.0012 0.00005 0.0007 
 (0.18) (0.61) (0.02) (0.32) 
     
Polity 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (3.49) (3.32) (3.10) (3.00) 
     
Constant 0.719*** 0.630*** 0.845*** 0.781*** 
 (5.91) (4.97) (6.72) (5.96) 
      
R-square 0.926 0.928 0.914 0.915 
Chi-square 3765.010 3841.200 3204.580 3242.660 
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 
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Table 13 (cont). GDPG, SPR and INSTREF Determinants: 3SLS Results 
 
 3SLS(1) 3SLS(2) 3SLS(3) 3SLS(4) 
Dependent variable INSTREF     
     
GDPG -0.004** -0.004** -0.0037** -0.004** 
 (-2.30) (-2.51) (-2.15) (-2.49) 
     
Lagged GDPG  0.002  0.002 
  (1.08)  (1.54) 
     
SPR Broad 0.265*** 0.271***   
 (6.89) (6.98)   
     
Lagged SPR Broad 0.098*** 0.093**   
 (2.69) (2.56)   
     
SPR Narrow   0.212*** 0.218*** 
   (5.55) (5.70) 
     
Lagged SPR Narrow   0.121*** 0.119*** 
   (3.33) (3.30) 
     
Time 0.138*** 0.135*** 0.139*** 0.132*** 
 (5.97) (5.79) (5.71) (5.37) 
     
Time Squared -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (-4.88) (-4.78) (-4.67) (-4.47) 
     
Initial Conditions x Time -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-6.12) (-6.22) (-6.39) (-6.58) 
     
Polity -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.006* -0.006* 
 (-2.75) (-2.69) (-1.81) (-1.75) 
     
STAB 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 
 (3.48) (3.38) (3.69) (3.58) 
     
GOVEXP 0.562*** 0.566*** 0.465*** 0.469*** 
 (4.06) (4.10) (3.30) (3.34) 
     
Constant 0.005 0.026 0.004 0.034 
 (0.05) (0.24) (0.03) (0.30) 
     
R-square 0.941 0.941 0.938 0.938 
Chi-square 4819.890 4839.260 4517.840 4555.08 
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 
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Table 14. GDPI, SPR and INSTREF Determinants: 3SLS Results 
 
  3SLS(5) 3SLS(6) 3SLS(7) 3SLS(8) 3SLS(Rec)
Dependent variable GDPI      
      
Inflation -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 
 (-1.93) (-1.88) (-1.26) (-1.24) (-0.97) 
      
SPR Broad -29.162*** -29.105***   -21.146*** 
 (-13.70) (-13.67)   (-10.40) 
      
Lagged SPR Broad 4.287** 4.271**   -2.261 
 (2.14) (2.13)   (-1.05) 
      
SPR Narrow   -26.591*** -26.612***  
   (-12.72) (-12.73)  
      
Lagged SPR Narrow   3.025 3.050  
   (1.52) (1.53)  
      
Regional Tensions -4.424** -4.480** -2.856 -2.881  
 (-2.08) (-2.10) (-1.30) (-1.31)  
      
Initial Conditions x Time 0.048 0.047 0.059 0.059 0.082* 
 (0.63) (0.62) (0.76) (0.75) (1.81) 
      
Institutional Reform (INSTREF) 33.392*** 33.286*** 31.888*** 31.840*** 22.610*** 
 (11.90) (11.84) (11.10) (11.07) (5.58) 
      
Time  -3.526*** -3.508*** -3.216** -3.204** -5.764*** 
 (-2.75) (-2.74) (-2.38) (-2.37) (-5.39) 
      
Time Squared 0.342*** 0.341*** 0.322*** 0.321*** 0.381*** 
 (4.96) (4.95) (4.42) (4.41) (5.70) 
      
Constant 87.181*** 87.149*** 93.739*** 93.765*** 91.548*** 
 (20.31) (20.29) (20.53) (20.54) (18.43) 
       
R-square 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.93 
Chi-square 1727.77 1725.62 1630.37 1630.03 3083.27 
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 190 
 
 Notes: i) These joint estimations are obtained when the whole transition period dataset is used.  
            ii) Fixed country effects are included in all regressions, but not reported; iii) z-statistics are  
            reported in parenthesis; iv) the Chi-square statistics indicates the overall significance of the model;  
           v) 3SLS(6) and 3SLS(8) specifications differ from 3SLS(5) and 3SLS(7) respectively, only by the    
           presence of Lagged GDPI in the SPR and INSTREF equations. 
 
          * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
          ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
          *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
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Table 14 (cont). GDPI, SPR and INSTREF Determinants: 3SLS Results 
 
  3SLS(5) 3SLS(6) 3SLS(7) 3SLS(8) 3SLS(Rec)
Dependent variable SPR      
      
GDPI -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.007*** 
 (-7.72) (-3.69) (-7.60) (-4.52) (-6.38) 
      
Lagged GDPI  0.0001  0.003  
  (0.03)  (1.01)  
      
Lagged SPR Broad 0.601*** 0.602***   0.609*** 
 (15.91) (15.38)   (12.72) 
      
Lagged SPR Narrow   0.586*** 0.598***  
   (15.45) (15.01)  
      
Time 0.068** 0.069** 0.061* 0.070* 0.063* 
 (2.06) (1.98) (1.76) (1.95) (1.89) 
      
Time Squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.02 
 (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.56) (-0.79) (-0.64) 
      
Initial Conditions x Time -0.004** -0.004* -0.005*** -0.004** -0.009*** 
 (-2.04) (-1.87) (-2.78) (-2.17) (-3.56) 
      
Polity 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.026*** 
 (1.11) (1.12) (0.97) (0.93) (4.08) 
      
Constant 1.664*** 1.660*** 1.955*** 1.846*** 1.642*** 
 (11.56) (9.41) (13.06) (9.93) (8.67) 
       
R-square 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91 
Chi-square 4070.40 4071.92 3451.46 3459.47 1931.47 
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 190 
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Table 14 (cont). GDPI, SPR and INSTREF Determinants: 3SLS Results 
 
 3SLS(5) 3SLS(6) 3SLS(7) 3SLS(8) 3SLS(Rec)
Dependent variable INSTREF      
      
GDPI 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (9.59) (3.80) (9.28) (3.36) (7.53) 
      
Lagged GDPI  0.002  0.0030  
  (1.26)  (1.56)  
      
SPR Broad 0.349*** 0.349***   0.079** 
 (9.25) (9.27)   (2.13) 
      
Lagged SPR Broad 0.078** 0.086**   0.089*** 
 (2.27) (2.47)   (2.70) 
      
SPR Narrow   0.300*** 0.297***  
   (8.02) (7.95)  
      
Lagged SPR Narrow   0.103*** 0.117***  
   (3.02) (3.33)  
      
Time 0.132*** 0.139*** 0.129*** 0.138*** 0.156*** 
 (6.04) (6.18) (5.64) (5.88) (4.87) 
      
Time Squared -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (-6.22) (-6.35) (-5.84) (-6.06) (-5.34) 
      
Initial Conditions x Time -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 (-6.28) (-5.47) (-6.49) (-5.58) (-4.46) 
      
Polity -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.011*** 
 (-0.44) (-0.52) (0.32) (0.27) (3.26) 
      
STAB 0.015** 0.015** 0.018** 0.018** 0.027*** 
 (1.95) (1.92) (2.24) (2.22) (4.01) 
      
GOVEXP 0.368*** 0.348*** 0.286** 0.259** 0.290 
 (2.89) (2.72) (2.18) (1.97) (1.10) 
      
Constant -0.599*** -0.671*** -0.650*** -0.743*** -0.894*** 
 (-5.2) (-5.18) (-5.33) (-5.44) (-5.83) 
      
R-square 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.97 
Chi-square 5250.22 5293.04 4922.67 4972.32 7559.74 
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 190 
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Table 15. GDPG, SPR and INSTREF Determinants: 
Fixed Effects, 2SLS and 3SLS Results 
 
Section 1 FE(9) 2SLS(9) 3SLS(9) 3SLS (10) 
Dependent variable GDPG     
     
Inflation -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (-3.36) (-3.28) (-3.49) (-3.40) 
     
SPR Broad 1.053 0.943 2.201** 1.185* 
 (0.77) (0.66) (2.07) (1.65) 
     
Lagged SPR Broad -0.687 -0.830 -1.224  
 (-0.56) (-0.62) (-1.12)  
     
Initial Conditions x Time 0.126*** 0.135** 0.135*** 0.134*** 
 (2.60) (2.35) (3.06) (3.04) 
     
Institutional Reform (INSTREF) 5.587** 7.545 8.704*** 7.151*** 
 (2.33) (1.03) (4.06) (3.34) 
     
Time  -1.555*** -1.667** -1.968*** -1.817*** 
 (-2.88) (-2.48) (-4.24) (-3.94) 
     
Time Squared 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.138*** 0.130*** 
 (2.67) (2.68) (3.76) (3.55) 
     
Constant -4.257 -7.312 -10.630*** -8.822** 
 (-0.79) (-0.60) (-2.75) (-2.28) 
      
R-square 0.14 0.14 0.46 0.46 
Chi-square   176.57 170.19 
Number of observations 190 190 190 190 
 
Notes: i) These estimations are obtained when the transition recovery period dataset is used.  
            ii) Fixed country effects are included in all regressions, but not reported; iii) z-statistics are  
 reported in parenthesis (t-statistics for FE(9)); iv) the Chi-square statistics indicates the overall 
significance of the model;  v) 3SLS(9) differs from the 3SLS(10) specification only by the 
presence of Lagged SPR Broad in the GDPG equation and the presence of the non-linear time 
trend in the INSTREF equation. 
 
          * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
          ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
          *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
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Table 15 (cont). GDPG, SPR and INSTREF Determinants: 
Fixed Effects, 2SLS and 3SLS Results 
 
Section 2 FE(9) 3SLS(9) 3SLS (10) 
Dependant variable SPR    
    
GDPG 0.003 0.007* 0.006 
 (0.67) (1.69) (1.40) 
    
Lagged SPR Broad 0.455*** 0.576*** 0.575*** 
 (7.79) (10.91) (10.88) 
    
Initial Conditions x Time 0.0034 0.0039 0.0041 
 (1.19) (1.40) (1.47) 
    
Time 0.1324*** 0.1029*** 0.1028*** 
 (4.52) (3.63) (3.63) 
    
Time Squared -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (-5.13) (-4.61) (-4.59) 
    
Polity 0.005 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.62) (5.79) (5.82) 
    
Constant 1.668*** 1.182*** 1.189*** 
 (9.19) (7.34) (7.39) 
     
R-square 0.51 0.91 0.91 
Chi-square  2024.03 2022.61 
Number of observations 190 190 190 
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Table 15 (cont). GDPG, SPR and INSTREF Determinants: 
Fixed Effects, 2SLS and 3SLS Results 
 
Section 3 FE(9) 3SLS(9) 3SLS(10) 
Dependent variable INSTREF    
    
GDPG 0.004 0.007*** 0.005** 
 (1.60) (3.32) (2.00) 
    
SPR Broad 0.042 0.001  
 (0.95) (0.03)  
    
Lagged SPR Broad 0.067* 0.052 0.097*** 
 (1.80) (1.53) (3.61) 
    
Initial Conditions x Time -0.004** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (-2.56) (-2.93) (-3.51) 
    
Time 0.042** 0.059***  
 (2.32) (3.64)  
    
Time Squared -0.001 -0.002*  
 (-0.79) (-1.82)  
    
Polity 0.014*** 0.006* 0.010*** 
 (2.94) (1.70) (2.89) 
    
STAB 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.063*** 
 (3.24) (3.54) (13.65) 
    
GOVEXP 0.154 0.385 0.350 
 (0.48) (1.36) (1.23) 
    
Constant 1.525*** 1.360*** 1.422*** 
 (8.29) (9.58) (11.19) 
    
R-square 0.72 0.97 0.97 
Chi-square  7673.41 6653.71 
Number of observations 190 190 190 
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Table 16. GDPG, SPR, PCINST and ROLINST Determinants: 
Fixed Effects, 2SLS and 3SLS Results 
 
Section 1                       PCINST                      ROLINST   
 FE(10) 2SLS(10) 3SLS(10) FE(11) 2SLS(11) 3SLS(11)
Dependent variable GDPG       
       
Inflation -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (-1.19) (-1.54) (-1.31) (-0.41) (-0.11) (-0.37) 
       
SPR Broad -1.775 -1.147 -3.345*** -1.195 -1.436 -2.217* 
 (-1.40) (-0.86) (-2.87) (-0.93) (-1.03) (-1.88) 
       
Lagged SPR Broad 2.019 1.010 2.925*** 1.843 0.619 2.232** 
 (1.72) (0.77) (2.70) (1.54) (0.41) (2.04) 
       
Institutions 6.287 18.751** 9.619** 0.596 3.784* 1.110* 
 (1.28) (2.29) (2.14) (0.89) (1.79) (1.81) 
       
Initial Conditions x Time 0.062 0.031 0.074* 0.165*** 0.227*** 0.182*** 
 (1.46) (0.67) (1.91) (3.26) (3.39) (3.93) 
       
Time     -0.447 -0.545 -0.389 
    (-1.14) (-1.27) (-1.08) 
       
Time Squared    0.063* 0.072* 0.057* 
    (1.86) (1.94) (1.84) 
       
Constant -0.875 -9.227 --- 1.380 -1.704 -2.320 
 (-0.18) (-1.41) --- (0.37) (-0.38) (-0.57) 
        
R-square 0.07 0.12 0.31 0.11  0.35 
Chi-square  --- 503.2  --- 96.07 
Number of observations 166 166 166 166 166 166.000 
 
Notes: i) These estimations are obtained when the transition recovery period dataset is used.  
            ii) Fixed country effects are included in all regressions, but not reported; iii) z-statistics are  
 reported in parenthesis (t-statistics for FE(10)and FE(11); iv) the Chi-square statistics indicates 
the overall significance of the model; v) In FE(10), 2SLS(10) and 3SLS(10) there is no time trend 
included. When the time trend was included, the Time and Time Squared coefficients were 
insignificant. The specifications reported are the ones without the non-linear time trend. 
 
          * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
          ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
          *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
 
 
 
 
 126
 
Table 16 (cont). GDPG, SPR, PCINST and ROLINST Determinants: 
Fixed Effects, 2SLS and 3SLS Results 
 
Section 2             PCINST                   ROLINST 
 FE(10) 3SLS(10) FE(11) 3SLS(11) 
Dependent variable     
     
GDPG -0.008 -0.016*** -0.005 -0.009* 
 (-1.51) (-3.19) (-0.80) (-1.73) 
     
Lagged SPR Broad 0.671*** 0.682*** 0.595*** 0.602*** 
 (13.13) (14.40) (9.86) (10.82) 
     
Initial Conditions x Time 0.0120*** 0.0130*** 0.008** 0.009*** 
 (4.51) (5.06) (2.40) (2.82) 
     
Time   0.074*** 0.071*** 
   (2.89) (3.03) 
     
Time Squared   -0.007*** -0.007*** 
   (-3.22) (-3.34) 
     
Polity -0.002 -0.001 0.0007 0.0004 
 (-0.18) (-0.14) (0.08) (0.05) 
     
Constant 1.359*** 1.124*** 1.452*** 1.416*** 
 (7.44) (5.37) (7.60) (6.46) 
      
R-square 0.55 0.87 0.58 0.88 
Chi-square  1141.83  1234.77 
Number of observations 166 166 166 166 
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Table 16 (cont). GDPG, SPR, PCINST and ROLINST Determinants: 
Fixed Effects, 2SLS and 3SLS Results 
 
Section 3              PCINST           ROLINST 
 FE(10) 3SLS(10) FE(11) 3SLS(11) 
Dependent variable     
     
GDPG -0.0003 0.001 0.002 0.011 
 (-0.23) (0.70) (0.24) (1.14) 
     
SPR Broad -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.137 -0.004 
 (-2.70) (-2.82) (-0.09) (-0.03) 
     
Lagged SPR Broad 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.364** 0.347*** 
 (2.72) (2.80) (2.60) (2.72) 
     
Initial Conditions x Time 0.006*** 0.006*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
 (8.76) (9.37) (-3.41) (-3.95) 
     
Time   0.025 0.03 
   (0.50) (0.63) 
     
Time Squared   -0.004 -0.05 
   (-1.06) (-1.30) 
     
Polity 0.008*** 0.007*** -0.038** -0.037** 
 (4.17) (4.52) (-2.26) (-2.46) 
     
STAB 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.047 0.047 
 (7.74) (8.37) (1.47) (1.61) 
     
GOVEXP 0.290** 0.291** -2.502** -2.474** 
 (2.22) (2.42) (-2.10) (-2.28) 
     
Constant 0.609*** 0.687*** 2.484*** --- 
 (7.32) (7.64) (3.18) --- 
     
R-square 0.46 0.94 0.39 0.85 
Chi-square  2483.88  14115.79 
Number of observations 166 166 166 166 
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Table 17. GDPG Determinants: Fixed Effects and 2SLS Results 
 
 FE(12) 2SLS(12) FE(13) 2SLS(13) 
Dependent variable GDPG     
     
Inflation -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.00002 
 (-0.3) (0.51) (-0.62) (-0.03) 
     
SPR Broad -1.391 -2.830 -2.308* -2.788** 
 (-1.07) (-1.56) (-1.86) (-2.05) 
     
Lagged SPR Broad 1.637 -0.991 1.427 -0.705 
 (1.35) (-0.5) (1.19) (-0.44) 
     
INSTREF 1.978 13.679 2.958** 6.003*** 
 (1.02) (1.57) (2.13) (2.65) 
     
ROLINST 0.567 4.062* 0.489 3.461 
 (0.84) (1.69) (0.72) (1.54) 
     
Initial Conditions x Time 0.17*** 0.26*** 0.13*** 0.23*** 
 (3.32) (3.32) (2.80) (3.43) 
     
Time -0.587 -1.525*   
 (-1.41) (-1.93)   
     
Time Squared 0.065* 0.086**   
 (1.92) (2.01)   
     
Constant -1.255 -20.385 -0.222 -6.005 
 (-0.28) (-1.57) (-0.06) (-1.26) 
     
R-square 0.22 --- 0.39 --- 
Number of observations 166 166 166 166 
 
Notes: i) These single equation estimations are obtained using the transition recovery period dataset.  
ii) Both INSTREF and ROLINST are included in the single equation estimation of the GDPG 
equation, in order to measure their separate effects on GDPG. iii)Fixed country effects are 
included in all regressions, but not reported; iv) z-statistics are reported in parenthesis (t-statistics 
for FE(12) and FE(13); v) In FE(13) and 2SLS(13) there is no time trend included as compared to  
FE(12) and 2SLS(12). 
 
          * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level (two-tailed test). 
          ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
          *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
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Table 18. Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
                           Endogenous Dependent Variable   
  GDPG(1) GDPG(2) SPR(1) SPR(2) INST(1) INST(2) 
Explanatory Variables       
       
Inflation 100 100     
       
SPR 75 0   100 100 
       
Lagged SPR  100 0 100 100 100 100 
       
Institutional Development 25 100     
       
Regional Tensions 100      
       
Initial Conditions x Time 100 100 100 100 100 100 
       
Time  100 100 100 100 100 100 
       
Time Squared 100 100 100 100 100 100 
       
GDPG   60 100 90 100 
       
Lagged GDPG   70  100  
       
Polity   100 100 30 80 
       
STAB     100 100 
       
GOVEXP     100 90 
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Table 18 (cont). Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
                           Endogenous Dependent Variable   
  GDPI(1) GDPI(2) SPR(1) SPR(2) INST(1) INST(2) 
Explanatory Variables       
       
Inflation 100 100     
       
SPR 100 100   100 100 
       
Lagged SPR  100 50 100 100 100 100 
       
Institutional Development 100 100     
       
Regional Tensions 100      
       
Initial Conditions x Time 100 100 100 100 100 100 
       
Time  100 100 100 100 100 100 
       
Time Squared 100 100 100 100 100 100 
       
GDPI   100 100 100 100 
       
Lagged GDPI   100  100  
       
Polity   100 100 50 90 
       
STAB     100 100 
       
GOVEXP     100 100 
              
 
Notes:  i) This table gives the percentage of times each coefficient had the expected sign in all the  
empirical specification models estimated, including the ones that were not reported in Table 11 
through Table 16. ii) Two sets of three equation systems were estimated, depending on whether 
GDPG or GDPI was used to measure output performance. Each of these sets separately uses the 
three institutional development indicators, INSTREF, PCINST and ROLINST, thus yielding a 
total of six estimated sets of systems. Several empirical specifications were estimated for each set. 
iii) The index (1) in each of the endogenous dependent variables refers to the estimation results 
when the whole transition period dataset is used, while the index (2) refers to the estimation 
results when the transition recovery stage dataset is used. 
 
 
 
